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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Capt 1st Rank Bobrakov Criticizes Reforms

90UM0332A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Bobrakov, deputy chief of the Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering School imeni V.I. Lenin, under the rubric "Military Reform: Problems and Discussion": "A Common, State Concern"]

[Text] The draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress indicates the need "to work toward military reform." As previously reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which has reviewed the results of the All-Army Officers' Conference, has already issued specific instructions to the pertinent agencies of command and control and officials of the Armed Forces on the practical implementation of proposals for accomplishing the reform. What will it consist of? Judging from the editor's mailbag, our readers are disturbed by this matter. Despite the fact that much is already being done in this area—the numerical strength of the Armed Forces is being cut, their structure is being improved and new general military regulations are being worked out—people are still writing that they foresee problems with military organizational development.

By initiating the rubric "Military Reform: Problems and Opinions," we hope to give everyone who expresses his opinion candidly, substantively and with good reasoning the opportunity to speak out in the newspaper.

From a Professional's Point of View

We know that work on the Law of the USSR on Defense is presently being completed. We officers expect a great deal from it. We hope that this law will finally regulate and place onto a rigid legal foundation the most important, key aspects of our nation's defense and the organization of the military service. We also expect a lot from the special commission set up, as we know, in the Armed Forces to work out the concepts for their development for the period 1991-1995 and the period extending to the year 2000. We know little about the functioning of this commission, to be sure, but we hope that it will suggest ways to effect a truly drastic reform of the Armed Forces.

All of us are going to have to do some serious thinking. In the present situation the army and navy are regularly "stirred up": now by large-scale "rejuvenation," now personnel stagnation, now expansion, now reductions.... But military science frequently lags behind, obediently demonstrating the genius at times of even libertarian decisions. Now we have a new reduction.... If it is carried out in the spirit of the past, in my opinion, a lag in military affairs is inevitable.

The necessary number of soldiers can be gathered within a few days in case of universal mobilization. But what about restoring skills, experience, the technology of military production...? It takes months to train a good soldier, years for an officer. We simply cannot cure our old, firmly established malady of spending millions to

save a kopeck, sacrificing the future for immediate gain. If we are going to conduct military reform, we must not limit ourselves to specific decisions which, even though advantageous to someone today, do not provide any guarantees for the future. The military structure must be modernized in a comprehensive manner.

In my opinion, this will require basic improvement of four components of the existing system: the quality of the officer corps, the quality of the replenishments, material circumstances, and legal relations within and between the army and the state. First of all, however, I believe that it will be necessary to make all citizens accountable under the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Service. In the ancient democratic states we know that the rights of a citizen were enjoyed only by those who were able to protect those rights and the state with weapons. I would like to mention this to the "enthusiastic supporters" of freedom who interpret democracy strictly as an exemption from certain hardships and duties.

I am also convinced that it would be beneficial for those entering higher military educational institutions first to serve a year as a soldier or sailor. I myself passed through that crucible. The experience of the Russian army also indicates the benefit to an officer of spending some time "in the shoes of a private." Unfortunately this practice was eventually abolished. One assumes that this was to keep those who were destined to become generals and admirals from wasting an extra year on the ensured path to the gleaming pinnacles.

Now something about those who did not master the initial military training in school, or, as they also say, those who do not desire to carry a weapon. I feel that those young people who have succeeded in evading serving in the units until the age of 21 years should be drafted for a period of three years into auxiliary units or support subunits for the combat units. This would be so-called "alternative service." The army and navy need not just armed people but also people to use a shovel, a ladle and so forth. If we want the gunner to hit the target, the hogs on the subsidiary farm have to be tended by someone else.

In general, in my opinion, the support system for the Armed Forces needs special attention. If one listens to some of our leaders, the army and navy have enough of everything they need (except for housing—they now admit that). Some people believe these optimistic statements and are inclined to see excess money in the pockets of the homeland's defenders—everything from calls for cutting their pensions to suggestions such as "Let the army feed itself." If we are objective, however, we have to admit that the Armed Forces lack many things. Take the death of 42 submariners on the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets. This too was in great part a result of our poverty: We lack reliable rescue equipment, lack the protective clothing which can be donned to keep one afloat in cold water.... The fact is that we have not a military-industrial complex but an

industrial-military complex. That is, the army, air force and navy are being given not the weapons which they need but those whose production is profitable to industry or which it is capable of producing.

We spend enormous amounts because of the separate development of weapons for various departments. Every branch of the Armed Forces is inventing its own wheel. Why not have a single program for standardizing weapons for the army, air force and navy? The fewer the modifications of a weapon, the easier it is to service and maintain and to train the specialists for this. And so that they meet the demands of the times, we should accept weapon systems on a competitive basis, from several alternative designs.

Because of the rearmament we also need a program for altering the cadre and T/O situation and the training of specialists, including officers. Perhaps then we will finally stop being surprised that ships and aircraft "suddenly" become obsolete and inefficient. Or the opposite: Why do we have a new weapon system but no one to service it? In general, it seems to me, we are going to have to make a serious effort to achieve a balance. We should not have a situation, for example, in which a base does not have two tugboats with a four-man crew, and a combat ship which carries a crew of 400 and costs as much as 100 tugboats is unable to depart the pier and is lost.

Even if we get to the bottom of these matters, however, the army and navy will still experience difficulties in performing their assigned missions if we do not adjust the system of legal relations in them and pertaining to them. In the first place, we must precisely set forth in the law the procedure for using the Armed Forces both in peacetime and in time of war, so that it is always clear who is empowered in what situations to issue the army and navy orders to take various actions. It is no less important to define the procedure for the use of weapons both by the troops and by individual servicemen. Today's reality has demonstrated that we cannot do without this. We must also hold people strictly accountable for insulting the dignity of the army, the flag or the uniform and require all citizens to carry out the demands of the military authorities and servicemen during the performance of their service duties. The latter could be a part of special laws on special and extraordinary situations, martial law and curfews.

With respect to legal relations within the Armed Forces, it is my opinion that the reality demands a basic revision of the measures applied to people committing military crimes. Those currently in effect are not always effective. But this is a subject for another discussion. Right now I would only like to make this comment: Experience has shown that along with the servicemen who commit the crimes, individuals who have been accessories (relatives who cover up a soldier's absence without leave, let us say) must also be held accountable. Incidentally, with respect to this matter numerous worthwhile proposals were submitted at the All-Army Officers' Conference. I

would like to think that they will all actually be thoroughly studied and incorporated in legislation.

An enormous amount of work will have to be performed to implement the military reform, of course. If we enlist in it officers who think and exercise initiative from the military units and the ships, however, the benefit will be doubled. The problems will be viewed not just from the angle of the headquarters parquet but also from the tactical field and the ship deck. And the development of a military reform program will not be dragged out for many years, because it will be done by people vitally interested in rapidly implementing it.

Gen Army Lizichev on Future of Political Organizations in Military

90UM0375A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*
in Russian No 8, 23 Feb 90 pp 2-3

[Interview with General of the Army Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, chief of the Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy by Valeriy Kalinkin: "By the Measure of Sincerity"]

[Text] An office like any other office. It is broad enough to think while leisurely pacing from end to end. And the telephones on the desk are ready to ring with alarm. Especially—during these days. Especially—from there where earlier our gaze was drawn to the permanent snowy caps of Elbrus and Kazbek.

The following will be asked during the conversation with the chief of the Main Political Directorate: "When did he last clench his fists?" He will answer: "When the northern waves carried away the lives of the seamen of the submarine Komsomolets and quite recently when the latest dispatches arrived from the Transcaucasus."

An office like any other office. He entered it for the first time nearly thirty years ago as the assistant to the chief of the Main Political Directorate for Komsomol Affairs. There are two flights of stairs between the offices of the chief of the Main Political Directorate and his assistant for Komsomol Affairs.

And remote garrisons are five thousand kilometers to the east from the capitol and about two thousand to the west.

And his entire officer career.

If someone says "functionary," it is his right. My right is to ascertain if he functions for 16 hours per day. It is sort of like a day off when my work day is only 12 hours [long].

The ring of the telephone. "I understand...." And—a gloomier face.

[Kalinkin] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, was it a call from there?

[Lizichev] From there. I have served for more than forty years and this is the first time that I accept combat-type reports on my own soil. And, as they say, in the middle of peace time.

[Kalinkin] By the way, many people do not agree that Army units should be introduced into Baku and into other areas of the Transcaucasus.

[Lizichev] I think that is from a lack of understanding. How bitter it is to admit the government had no other method to stop the bloodshed and to place a barrier before the wave of nationalism.

But, take a good look at the television screens. At the faces of the simple Azeris, Russians, and Armenians giving milk to their rescuers in military uniform. Remember the tears of the mother who is hugging the soldier who has arrived in the Transcaucasus.

I would not like to seem excessively biased however I also do not have the right to remain silent. Soldiers, officers, and generals are demonstrating both the steadfastness of military character and real parliamentary wisdom in the Transcaucasus.

The name of General Surkov has been heard by millions of our people. "The young general"—with an ironic delivery by a deputy who knows how to speak ironically. But I sincerely want the people on the restless streets of the Transcaucasus to hear the "young general" and all those who can, who must and who are obliged to say an intelligent word now and who are capable of reining in nationalist emotions.

[Kalinkin] What can you say about the activities of Army political workers in this situation?

[Lizichev] What I have already partially stated: They, like other soldiers, are manifesting both courage and wisdom.

[Kalinkin] The question of political workers was not raised, so to speak, by division of departmental subordination. If they are arguing about the Army as a whole in debates today, what kind of Army do we need if some people are saying, without a preface, that party political work is not needed in the Army.

[Lizichev] I will answer but I ask you to believe that I have also removed my departmental shirt.

Those who argue against political organs in the Army and in the Navy are primarily those who have a vague idea about them. Who affixed the "Stalinist" label to them while forgetting that they were created by the will of the Red Army members of the Leninist Era—in the Civil War on the Eastern Front. If they exclusively examine the Army political worker from the point of view of deformations that he endured during the years of the cult of personality, voluntarism, and stagnation, then it is logical to look into excesses in other spheres from those same positions. However, I am afraid that there

would not be one institute that would not need to be abolished using this approach in the Army, in the Party, and in the State.

It is interesting that political workers total eight percent of the officer corps. One third of them have graduated not from military political schools but from combined-arms command, tank, and other schools. By the way, I myself studied at a combined-arms command VUZ.

The requirements for our political workers are unchanged: To be ready to take the place of the commander at any moment—at the head of a subunit, at the controls of a tank, at the yoke of an aircraft, or on the captain's bridge of a ship.

No one has relieved the commander of the obligation to conduct party, political, and educational work as well.

[Kalinkin] After the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum, people in the Army are increasingly and more loudly saying that the days of the Glavpur [Main Political Directorate] are numbered. They are associating this with the inevitable repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution and the future multi-party system.

[Lizichev] I have not seen anything like this at either the Plenum or in its decisions. These rumors have no basis to them.

[Kalinkin] But there already is a precedent—abolition of the political organs of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Armies....

[Lizichev] Yes, today there are no main political directorates or their structures. Time will show how legitimate this is. But, first of all, it is impossible for us to blindly copy someone just because of obvious differences in the scale of missions, and secondly, and the main thing! for the time being no one has removed and I do not think that they will remove other educational functions from the Armed Forces that are characteristic to them without our knowledge.

Only time will tell if there will be political organs in our Army or not. One thing is indisputable: We cannot get by without centralized political and educational work in the Army and Navy. Especially, and I emphasize this, under a multi-party system.

[Kalinkin] Some deputies are also speaking out against political organs. For example, USSR People's Deputy Lieutenant Colonel Podziruk.

[Lizichev] That is his personal position, although I think it is not irreproachable from a truly party or from a truly military point of view.

[Kalinkin] We have had the opportunity to hear that same Podziruk or, let us say, Colonel Martirosyan, whose views do not coincide with the views of the "Army powers that be" are soundly "educating..."

[Lizichev] Can you name the "educators"?

[Kalinkin] I do not have their names.

[Lizichev] I also do not have them. The conversation with them will be stern.

For now I will say: When, still during the period of the pre-election campaign the question was raised about discharging Lieutenant Colonel Podziruk from the Armed Forces, I decisively interfered and made everyone to understand that the peculiarities of an officer's position are still not grounds for personnel measures.

Almost everyone of the, I will put it this way, radically minded military deputies visited me at my office. Not by order. One—by invitation, but the majority at their own initiative. It seems to me that not one left with resentment or without having received an answer to the questions posed.

But there is another extreme to highlight. Some are beginning to think that they can criticize the positions of seniors and they cannot be criticized. Thus a new caste of untouchables will appear among us. It is already beginning to appear....

[Kalinkin] Nevertheless the bounds are a bit greater for criticism "from above."

[Lizichev] I will not argue with that. That is why one of my first actions in the post of chief of the Main Political Directorate consisted of renewing the good tradition and precisely: To place communist leaders in conditions when they can be distinguished for their duties and deeds in the party collective where they are taken to account and where they pay their membership dues. If you consider that there are still quite a few people in the Army who are ready to examine criticism of their own egotistical, careerist, nepotistic, and similar downfalls as attempts on the life of leadership by one man, it is not surprising to hear them even at the present: How can this be, allegedly, "to scold" a communist general in the presence of a communist staff clerk? But we in the Main Political Directorate were uncompromising. Paraphrasing the hero of the popular play, we said: We have a Party that is fighting and making mistakes but it is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and not the Party of the generals or the Party of the colonels...Just a minute...

(A telephone call prompts a new turn to the conversation).

[Kalinkin] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, it is thought that for many years our military ideology was based exclusively on Soviet concepts. "Behind the scenes," the history of the national culture remained particularly Russian.

Is the Main Political Directorate ready to decisively broaden the spectrum of ideological influence? In other words, we are talking about the readiness for the age-old Russian culture to go begging for time immemorial.

[Lizichev] We are ready and we have already bowed to it. Look at the Voenizdat's plans—there is also historical theme literature in them. Read KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, SOVETSKIY VOIN, AND VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. And look at the permanent sold-out sign on "Pavel I" at the Central Theater of the Soviet Army!

There is no denying that in this same party political work we are partially forgetting our pre-October Revolution history. They sporadically talked about Matrosov and Gastello, about the warriors of Kulikov's field. About General Karbyshev's steadfastness—books and songs, about the headlong bravado of General Rayevskiy who stood on the Borodino battle field with his two young sons beside him—not a word.

[Kalinkin] About this—our Papas and Mamas who are trying to hide a small son from the draft commission. And yet with the motivation: All the newspapers there are writing about disarmament...

[Lizichev] Where could you read this small notice: Nth NATO subunit, they say, has retargeted its missiles from the Soviet Union to some other target?

[Kalinkin] Alas, the Army has stopped being an accumulator of prestige. Attacks against it have not always met an adequate rebuff either from the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, or from the Main Political Directorate.

[Lizichev] ...And the editorial offices who agonize over the matter of reliable defense of the Fatherland and in books of writers who tend the Army's prestige.

No, no, I do not disclaim my personal key responsibility for all defects. Because someone has succeeded in destroying the hero image of the Soviet soldier and officer. In eroding the achievements of the "Afghan" warriors. For their valor and combat experience not claimed by society and for the very same "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts].

[Kalinkin] Some people, and there are quite a few of them, are inclined to think that the impetus in combating relations not in accordance with regulations was provided not by the Army but by Yuri Polyakov. In "Sta dnya do prikaza" [One Hundred Days until the Order].

[Lizichev] I read "Sta dnya..." but much earlier in 1961 and I attended a briefing at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Workers by Marshal of the Soviet Union F.I. Golikov who was chief of the Main Political Directorate at that time. The impetus was being provided even then! Even then quite a few "grandfathers" went before military tribunals and the officers who hid this bid farewell to their positions and to the Armed Forces. Now the approach is stricter still and the assessment is much keener.

But I do not want to talk about Polyakov: There are quite a few famous books and articles about the Army right now. If only one could be furious but prudent.

As for our own political worker, he is often not very lucky in our literature.

[Kalinkin] He is not but she very often is [lucky]. There is no way that I can explain to myself how it occurred and became intertwined like that in our literature and art that the romantic revolutionary ideal of the commissar became embodied... in female forms—the heroines of the “Optimistic Tragedy” and Vsevolod Vishnevskiy and Nonna Mordyukovaya from the film “Commissar.” Men, where are you?

[Lizichev] Is that a question, the way I understand it, for modern writers? I am ready to repeat it. Here (six small books are lying on the desk) is the truth in the documents about our political workers. Each fate is like an unwritten book.

[Kalinkin] By the way, that same Main Political Directorate at times conducts battles of more than local significance with writers and journalists....

[Lizichev] I would like to precisely state that you see an exclusively negative profile of our Army in its past and present through writers and journalists and through new recruits.

Let us face the facts. Books, newspapers, and magazines (far from all, of course) have already done quite a bit to deform young people's social and moral instincts. It is already not just individuals that do not want to serve in the Army—in the best case, they have served their time. They come into the service with doubts about the appropriateness of service. How do you like that?

[Kalinkin] I do not like it at all.

[Lizichev] No one can like that and no one should like it. Sometimes my eyes stumble on these lines: The Army does not produce, the Army consumes. I would argue with this by making a correction for the labor of military construction personnel, for military sovkhozes, and for the conversion of military enterprises. Although here I will say: The times are still such that we are still not waiting for refrigerators from military industry but for something else that is capable of cooling some hot heads.

We have somewhat belatedly recalled one truth that has also been printed on the pages of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA. From those who do not get tired of repeating: The people who do not wish to feed their own Army will be compelled to feed their enemy's army.

[Kalinkin] I am ashamed to say that some people are not afraid of this.

[Lizichev] What?!

[Kalinkin] I heard one of the informalists say at a rally: Allegedly if we are conquered, the conqueror will bring civilization to our country and sausage and meat into our homes.

[Lizichev] Like they say in Odessa, where are we singing? What is this a Golden Horde—the golden era of Rus? I do not want to serve as a commentator on this delirium.

[Kalinkin] What is your attitude toward the critics in the press who offend you personally?

[Lizichev] I accept criticism but not (verbal) attacks.

[Kalinkin] In its third issue of 1990, OGONEK published a critical letter that was written by a group of officers and warrant officers that did not agree with your praiseworthy assessment of the state of affairs in a Kiev Military District regiment. I recall: While speaking at the All-Army Officer's Meeting, you praised Unit Commander Lieutenant Colonel N. Fomenko and Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Lieutenant Colonel A. Belopolskiy. Just who is correct?

[Lizichev] In this case, OGONEK and the letter's authors. Although even here everything is not unambiguous.

[Kalinkin] The magazine called this “glasnost general-style.”

[Lizichev] I understand: Are we returning to the conversation about constructive criticism and destructive (verbal) attacks?

[Kalinkin] This question, Comrade General of the Army. The Komsomol work assigned to you is “major” party work. Let us put it this way, would your career be the topic today if that work had been as unpopular during the 1960's as it is currently?

[Lizichev] I am not sure. Possibly, but possibly not. It is unlikely. But who thought about that? We worked. We stuck with it. Not for the need of stagnation, as some zealots like to say, but for the good of the Fatherland.

Even now over the years, as they say, I share that sincere devotion to duty. With all of the dislocations and defects of that time. In general, I think: First and foremost a man is tested by the measure of sincerity in his work. I think it is intolerable to excuse our own lack of skill and laziness with a nod to miscalculations in society. If all we did was to mend our ways through our errors.... I am afraid that we would still have a stone ax.

I repeat, we worked. We played at weddings. We raised our children. For example, I have two sons—regular military personnel.

[Kalinkin] There are different opinions among the people on this score. A dynasty of farmers, lathe operators, bakers, and others is one thing—but when papa is a marshal and the son is a general or papa is a general and the son is a colonel....

[Lizichev] I do not have any close or distant relatives who were marshals. I formulate my position on that score in this way: It is very important to me how you serve and I am not at all interested in whose son you are.

The origins of your Army dynasties date back to our ancient past. To Kulikov's field and to the field of Borodino (remember General Rayevskiy and his sons?). To Rumyantsev and Suvorov. To Mikhail Vasilyevich and to Timur Frunze.

I would only name a few as examples of our days. The son of Colonel General Kuzmin fought in Afghanistan. He was wounded. The son of the current Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army Varennikov, went through the Afghanistan school with his father.

About my own sons. One serves in the West and the other is serving his ninth year in the Far East. I have not yet been embarrassed by either of them. If it happens, I will think that both their father and their political officers blundered.

[Kalinkin] If you do not object, several questions of the "short and varied" type.

[Lizichev] Please.

[Kalinkin] Whose initiative was it to appoint you chief of the Main Political Administration?

[Lizichev] Comrade Commander General of the Army Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev. And the Party Central Committee as a whole. Our Party's Central Committee General Secretary reported the decision to the chairman of the National Defense Council at a conference in Minsk in the summer of 1985.

[Kalinkin] What military rank does the chairman of the Defense Council hold?

[Lizichev] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev does not hold a military rank.

[Kalinkin] Your passion in literature?

[Lizichev] Historical stories, novels, and documentaries.

[Kalinkin] Your highest sports achievement?

[Lizichev] Second class skier.

[Kalinkin] Have you counted how many cities and garrisons you have been stationed in during your service career?

[Lizichev] I have counted them—21. In short, I did not arrive as a general. I came out of the debtor's office of mutual assistance for the first time as a general, more accurately, a lieutenant general. You are laughing?

[Kalinkin] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, the opinion exists (it is hard to argue with it): The higher the rank, the farther the serviceman is from home. From family concerns. In this sense, how are things in the family of the political leader of the Army and Navy?

[Lizichev] There is this one vaudeville joke: The role of an artist consists in his not playing a role. Laughter

through tears but my answer regarding family participation is somewhere in parallel with the vaudeville joke.

[Kalinkin] Your wife may not appreciate that.

[Lizichev] One hope is that she will once again appreciate my honesty.

[Kalinkin] What do you dream of?

[Lizichev] First of all, that no one gets the idea of verifying the parity of forces from a position of strength. Secondly, that the defects of our society and our Army are soon entered in dictionaries with the notation "anti-quated." It is not a sin to dream about this but it is best of all to work toward this.

Military People's Deputies on OGONEK Treatment of Armed Forces

90UM0548A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 15,
Apr 1990 p 3

[Unattributed Article: "In the Wake of Our Articles"]

[Text] A "round table" of Soviet Army officers, entitled "What Kind of Army Do We Need", was published in this year's No 9 issue of OGONEK, and in the No 13 issue of the journal—an article, entitled "Dacha Privileges in Light of Glasnost", by Vladimir Sergeyev, the chief inspector for the Committee of People's Control. This article discussed the privileges of the Soviet Army's highest ranking personnel, which exceed all reasonable limits. Recently, a letter, asserting that OGONEK's activities "can only be compared to the repressions carried out by Stalin during the 1930s", from a group of deputies addressed to comrade A. I. Lukyanov, began to be circulated in the USSR Supreme Soviet. On Sunday, 1 April, the "Mayak" radio broadcast evaluated this letter and the fact of its existence became widely known. Therefore we are publishing the text of the letter, which, as the saying goes, needs no commentary. It is impossible to make out the majority of the signatures at the bottom of the letter, there are about 20 of them. (It is also impossible to accurately count them). The following signatures can be read: Akhromeyev, Kulikov, Kryuchenkova, Yu. Sokolova, Gorbachev A. G., and V. Nikolayev. The editorial staff will publish the surnames of all the signatories if they report them to us. The people must know their heroes.

To comrade A. I. LUKYANOV, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Honorable Anatoliy Ivanovich!

A great uneasiness about the combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces makes our uncommon appeal to you absolutely essential.

For several years now, OGONEK has presented to the public a biased history of our society's development since 1917 and a biased view of the CPSU's role and place in this development. During this time, the journal's

efforts have been aimed at showing only negative occurrences, which actually took place, and at suppressing everything good that the CPSU did during those years for the country and the people.

We consider this position incorrect, but under the conditions of glasnost and democracy, the editorial board ultimately has the right to its own position. And we respect this right, although it damages the restructuring in our country.

But OGONEK has conducted itself absolutely intolerably in one of the most important issues for our country and the Soviet people. Month after month and year after year, it has engaged in discrediting the USSR Armed Forces.

The journal presents a distorted view of life and activities in the Army and Navy and attempts to split the officer personnel by setting the Army's and Navy's general and flag rank officers against the bulk of the officer personnel. The journal systematically slanders Soviet generals and admirals, whom the journal represents as egoists, careerists, and half-wits. The journal maliciously and untruthfully informs readers that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense shows no concern for officer personnel.

It conducts methodical attacks on the USSR Minister of Defense, his deputies, and on the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

One could continue this list of its activities.

Taking into account that OGONEK is published with a circulation in excess of three million copies and antimilitary materials are published in issue after issue, OGONEK's activities have assumed a character which threatens our society. On a scale of negative consequences these activities can only be compared to the repressions carried out by Stalin against command and political personnel during the 1930s. In operating methods OGONEK's materials are comparable to propaganda against the opposing side's armed forces during war.

All of our attempts to halt or even to limit these activities by OGONEK have been disregarded. There also has been no response to numerous speeches in the USSR Supreme Soviet requesting that the activities of this journal be investigated.

In view of this, we propose to put the question "On OGONEK's Social and Political Activities" to a discussion at one of the USSR Supreme Soviet's upcoming sessions, hearing at this time the account of V. A. Korotich, OGONEK's chief editor.

We are asking that the inclusion of this question, as a supplementary item, on the USSR Supreme Soviet's agenda be put to a vote.

USSR People's Deputies: (about 20 signatures)

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Georgian Group Seeks to Train National Officers' Corps

90US0974B Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI
in Georgian 7 Apr 90 p 2

[Letter to the editors from the Military Council of the "Georgian Falcons" All-Georgia Military-Patriotic Sports Society]

[Text] On 22 February of this year under the title "Let Us Create a National Military School" your newspaper published Vano Beridziashvili's article, prefaced by an editorial introduction, expressing the hope that readers would respond.

We are obliged to state that the article must have been written by someone who has been sitting in a barrel, who has heard nothing about the Georgian Falcons' Legion, because every one of the proposals he offered is nothing other than material copied from our Charter and Program of Action.

It seems to us that the article was directed against the authority and further progress and development of our Society, and we categorically demand that our statement be published as soon as possible.

Our Society has been in operation for over half a year now and has its own press organ, the newspaper LEGIONERI. The Society's activities are directed toward training a national corps of officers. In this sacred cause, the Society is supported by all patriots who are not afflicted with the Solomon Medzhganuashvili Complex ("But what will happen to me?"). We are also supported by retired Georgian officers who have been driven out of the Soviet Army for the love of their nation.

Georgian Military-Sports Group Explains Group's Rationale

90US0975B Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI
in Georgian 17 Apr pp 4-5

[Article by Georgian Falcons Legion Chief of Staff Temur Mikautidze: "Meet the Georgian Falcons Legion!"]

[Text] I took a careful look at Vano Beridziashvili's article "Let Us Create a National Military School" (AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI, 22 Feb). Certainly, Georgians have always had to give a good account of themselves in battle. There must indeed have been an original merger of our ancestor fighters and laborers, to be able to come through our historical turmoils and troubles all right. The Great Ilia used to say, "This little handful of people has survived because the Georgian has always held a sword in one hand and a plow in the other." Ilia believed that we would "continue to do so if we can hold on to these two ancient implements of the nation's might."

That's the way it was "then." Every lofty epithet applies to our forefathers. Yes, they were able to work better than we. Yes, they were better fighters. And, yes, in their veins ran blood that was more noble and knightly. I am also convinced, sad to say, that the Georgians' moral values have never been so diminished and degraded as now. The fact that Georgians are less industrious and have less fighting spirit is something we try to blame on others, seeking to place the blame elsewhere. But it is we who are to blame. What we have lost, we lost of our own will. This is what we must come to understand first; it is here that we must seek the causes, and only then denounce the empires which have supposedly robbed us of our freedom. It is not easy to be robbed of one's freedom unless it is given up voluntarily. We have lacked the ability to fight. We have failed (for we did not wish) to fight for freedom. We have talked big and then meekly submitted our necks to the yoke. It is not that our enemy has brought down the apparatus of our oppression from the sky. He has appointed functionaries of our own blood to serve as the levers of that apparatus. Nor has Georgia ever lacked for Korganashvilis, Makashvilis, Shadimanis, Ordzhonikidzes, and all the other turn-coats. And they are still among us.

Fortunately for us, Georgian genes are finally beginning to stir and pulse again. Georgians have tasted the idea of freedom and are striving toward it. Our life is indeed worth something, contrasted with the life of our fathers. There is probably not a single Georgian who does not dream of freedom. Many, perhaps, don't even know what non-freedom is. Many, perhaps, have no idea why we should be captives, just what is meant by "Georgia is captive," by whom or what. But everyone wants to be free. This is good, this is fortunate.

Mr. Vano Beridziashvili rightly comments on the need to form a Georgian military institute. I have to say, however, that we ought not to be so quick to place all the blame on someone else for the fact that Georgian young people hate military service. A large portion of Georgian young people serve very well outside of Georgia. Generally speaking, young Georgians are distinguished in their units by their quick thinking. As for those Georgian boys serving within Georgia, however paradoxical it may seem, they give the completely opposite impression. Many of them lack endurance, stamina, and mental toughness. Mr. V. Beridziashvili says, "Many a young man has tried suicide as a way to escape punishment." Let's not be hasty in saying something like that; after all, people read that article. But that's not the whole story. A Georgian is not by nature a coward. It's not all that easy to make him kill himself. But if it does occasionally happen, it is not always the fault of some "detestable officer" or the result of hatred for the service. And let us not be so soft-hearted (we should always be judicious in these things). A real man does not kill himself, and if we think that a boy of 17 or 18 is not a man but a child, we are taking the wrong stance. A Georgian of 17 or 18 is a man, not a child.

Treating him like that (like a child) will do us Georgians more harm than good.

I served the Soviet Union for 15 years, and then I retired in August of 1989. I served and fought alongside men of many nationalities. I too have to admit that boys from the Baltic republics stand two heads higher in terms of their stamina, tenacity, endurance, and their unique ability to stand by one another. I have often wondered whether *they* are constantly being told, "Resist not evil."

For our part, unfortunately, we have all too often manifested the arrogance, discourtesy, conceitedness, pride, and superciliousness described so pointedly by Davit Kldiashvili rather than other, more positive qualities characteristic of Georgians generally.

Nevertheless, our nation is striving for independence.

Bravo! It's about time.

As we are now, and what we are, we want independence. It is our right, and we are worthy of it. But the desire for freedom is one thing; winning it is another, and defending it is yet another, no less important thing.

We do need our own army. But what kind?

Where are we coming from?

Turkey has an army of over 500,000 men. Iran has about the same. That's one million right there. The Russians, who can always provide us with "unselfish help" (the way they "helped" Afghanistan, for example), will still have three or four million even after troop reductions. Now let's think about what we should do.

At this point, readers will probably divide into two groups. The first group might be thinking something along these lines: "No country is about to start a war today." That may be so (it is devoutly to be wished!), but that's no guarantee for us. We have to have our own capability. The second group may be more skeptically inclined: "My God, man, if we're faced with that kind of forces and can't match them, it makes no sense to fight." But it does: it always makes sense to fight. Especially when it is a fight for freedom. In any battle the one who wins is the one who wants most to win, who thinks and strives the most, who is the most resourceful. Victory, even if it should take a war, is entirely possible. I will not go into the theoretical, strategic, and tactical substantiation for this here. But the fact that self-determination and self-government must always be accompanied by military might is perfectly clear.

Today we suffer from a catastrophic shortage of officers necessary to form a national army. And the latest figures show that there are a little more than 1700 Georgian officers in the Soviet Army now. Many among them, moreover, are "Georgians" only on their passports. The majority of these officers are artillery men. In addition, 60 to 70 percent of that entire corps are either working in the commissariats or trying to get a job there. Well,

everybody's human. There's no way you can force anyone to serve his country. And I wouldn't trust that kind of service.

To my knowledge, only a very small number of Georgian officers on active duty now have expressed a positive opinion about the creation of a Georgian national army. But it is a historical necessity. You can't hide a spear under your shirt, as the saying goes, and what is there to hide anyway. If we are fighting for full economic and political independence, we're going to have to defend that independence too—we ourselves, as best we can, whatever it takes.

Is anyone thinking about this?

Many, probably. I believe that all of the parties in Georgia have raised this question, from various angles. I think the Georgian Communist Party must also have considered the issue when it was working on the Concept of Georgian Economic and Political Development.

So far, however, no one has done anything about it. Except—one man, a Tbilisian, who has set everything else aside and given up the microphone and demonstrations (and I have to admit that he didn't choose that line of struggle before either) and has got up and done something about it. Quietly, calmly, diligently, with Georgian dedication, he has thoughtfully spearheaded the effort to form a Georgian national army. And he has done it.

The Georgian Falcons Legion is an organization of the military-sports type. It is not political. Its purpose is to defend an independent Georgia from outside enemies. It is not subservient to the interests of any party today. It will only be subservient to the government of an independent homeland. And until we do have an independent Georgia, the Georgian Falcons Legion will be administered by a Military Council.

Let no one think that the Legion is a gang of terrorists. God protect us from that kind of action. If anyone entertains doubts about this, these doubts are easily dispelled. All it takes is to read the Charter and spend maybe one day in the Legion.

The starting point for a member of the Society is man's moral values. According to the Charter, his activity must aim primarily toward that.

As I mentioned above, the Georgian Falcons Legion is governed by a Military Council. It has its own work plan as well as its own views concerning the formation of a national army and radical restructuring of the military system in Georgia. But it has never imposed anything on anyone and does not intend to now.

The structure of a Georgian national army must be fundamentally different from that of the present Soviet Army. The Georgian Falcons Legion has created chapters in the rayons, or has plans to do so. The Legion believes that this kind of military unit is the best kind to form. It is more economical and more effective.

The Georgian Falcons Legion believes that it is essential to radically restructure military instruction in the schools and to totally reject the bulk of the present program. The schools should provide in-depth, qualified instruction in the history of the Georgian military arts. The level of proficiency in the use of firearms needs to be raised, and more attention must be paid to military physical training (not at the expense of physical education, which, incidentally, also needs some changes). One day a month should be devoted entirely to military subjects in a military training camp, where youngsters can work directly with equipment.

The Telavi Military-Physical Culture Institute should be made the base for a real military school. Most of the instructors should be Georgian officers. The school should turn out military personnel. Teachers of military subjects should be officers. They should be paid a salary from the military budget. They should be subject to assignment to a military unit at any time, and any officer in such a unit should be subject to appointment as a military instructor at any time. Boys in school ought first to be in the reserves of a military unit or chapter. In other words, a unit should train its own school students for itself and select its own officer candidates in accordance with youngsters' wishes.

The Georgian Falcons Legion also has its own ideas about the work of the Commissariat. It's easy to see that if the army is formed with the new structure, the Commissariat will lose most of its functions, and its remaining functions should all be turned over to the Council; the Commissariat should cease to exist.

Departments of DOSAAF will also lose their functions. They should be converted into military training camps, which will also be subordinate to the rayon chapter commander.

Tbilisi's present higher military schools ought to be closed down and converted into a base for the formation of a multi-profile Georgian Military Academy.

Some readers may think that the Georgian Falcons Legion has decided to turn Georgia into a military camp. That's not so. First of all, the process of military instruction and training would go on without disrupting processes of schooling and production. Secondly, a youngster in service at his place of residence, despite strict discipline and a certain amount of restrictions during the period of compulsory service, would still be at home, and thus the state would incur less expenses. In the third place, the formation of an army according to this structural formula would still be a temporary measure until Georgia had the strength to form a volunteer army (known as a mercenary army).

Meanwhile, the Georgian Falcons Legion is doing what it can, with activities four days a week in gymnasiums; people work out whenever they can, mainly during the evening from 21:00 to 23:00. The other three days are spent in the woods, in the mountains, and on marches, with full simulation of military games.

Thank God there are still many young men in Georgia who are able to overcome temptation, get out of their warm beds, leave their VCRs and TVs, and go out in the rain and snow, subject their bodies to hardship, and toughen their spirit—without shunning adversity or grumbling.

Finances? Nothing except for 10 rubles apiece which they collect themselves or solicit from sympathetic Georgians, pooling the money to buy sports and military gear. The main thing is, no one complains or grumbles. They work. You know the old saying, "He who wants to work will find a way; he who does not want to work will find excuses."

If you see a young man in the streets of Tbilisi wearing green camouflage clothing, stop him and ask why he's wearing that armband which reads KShL [Kartvel Shevardenta Legioni = Georgian Falcons Legion]. He will answer that soon an independent Georgia will need to be defended, and he's getting ready for that. These boys won't accost anyone and demand why they haven't joined. In fact, they will do other people's work and never begrudge them. That's how these boys practice love for their people and for Georgia. This is as it should be. They were Georgians Georgia's own—before they were born, and they will still be after they die. Truly, they act with a fervent heart and cool reason.

You won't see any of them indulging in immoral behavior. You can see the nobility in their eyes. They are handsome boys, genuine knights of their homeland.

P.S. Let no one think that the purpose of this article is to call upon anyone to join. We are not doing that, because we don't promise anything except tough labor [chernoye delo] and difficult, serious service. But we do hopefully await dedicated, noble, and honest young men who are truly devoted to their country.

'Draft Concept' of Military Reform Proposed

90UM0653A Kiev *LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA* in Russian
24 Apr 90 p 2

[“Draft Concept presented by group of officer USSR People's Deputies: ‘How To Reform the Army?’”]

[Text] Dear Editors,

For several months now various newspapers and journals have been writing about a draft concept of military reform drawn up by a group of USSR people's deputies in conjunction with military scientists and disseminated as an official document at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Various assessments of this concept and even pressure on its authors have been reported. And here we have one latest piece of news: Academician Ye. Velikhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Armed Forces Subcommittee for Defense and State Security, has submitted a petition concerning encouragement of the most active developers of the concept of reform in the Army. But why has the text of this

sensational document not been published anywhere; is it secret? Perhaps this could be undertaken by *LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA*?

[Signed] Major I. Tyurin.

From the editors: No, this concept contains no secrets. We publish below the text made available to us by Guards Major V. Yerokhin, people's deputy of the USSR. We hope that readers of *LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA* will voice their opinions on it.

1. Need for Military Reform

The positive changes in the world, the affirmation of the new political thinking, and revolutionary restructuring in the country are demanding an in-depth transformation of the defenses and Armed Forces of the USSR.

The contradictoriness of the development of the international situation and the continuation of the military danger presuppose the presence of a strong, high-quality army. The state of the USSR Armed Forces, however, does not correspond to the command of the times, and the measures which are being adopted are of a cosmetic nature and prevent the army being brought to a new quality level, which was reflected in concentrated fashion in the course of the “Afghan campaign.” Military reform encompassing all spheres of defense building is essential to achieve this goal.

The objective need for military reform is dictated by a number of profound contradictions:

- between the requirements of a dependable armed defense taking account of the level of the actual danger of war and the continuing traditional approach to a solution of problems of defense capability thanks to quantity to the detriment of quality;
- between the profound structural transformations in society and the lagging of such transformations in the Armed Forces on account of the absence of a real concept of their restructuring;
- between the original purpose of the socialist army and its use in a sphere which is not its domain owing to the absence of clear-cut legal regulation of the relations of the army and society;
- between the high national significance of the army for the country and the decline in its prestige in connection with the unfortunate state of the material and social amenity support for the servicemen and members of their families, which is causing reduced interest in service, a growth of social apathy among the officers, and a mass aspiration to break with their profession, and also on account of the negative processes in the Armed Forces (the flowering of protectionism and military bureaucracy, the deaths and maiming of personnel in peace time, and the mockery and abuse);
- between the goals of education in the process of military service and the preparation therefor of the citizen-soldier, given the qualitative change in the

draft contingent, and the conservative system of education and the evolved mechanism of suppression of the personality.

2. Basic Principles of Military Reform

An analysis of the sum total of factors determining the content and development prospects of the country's defenses makes it possible to formulate the basic principles of military organizational development designed to constitute the basis for the elaboration of military reform. These should include:

1. Effective leadership of the entire sphere of the country's defenses and the subordination of the military department to the highest state elective authorities and society as a whole, given complete glasnost and the maximum possible openness.
2. Correspondence of the structure of the Armed Forces, the priority directions of the development of equipment and arms, and the financing of military organizational development to the level of the actual military danger and defense sufficiency.
3. Preferential orientation toward qualitative characteristics of defense and military organizational development and the staged professionalization of the army.
4. The personal interest of each citizen in the high-quality accomplishment of the country's defense assignments.
5. Democratization of the entire military organization of society in accordance with the principles of a law-based state and rules of international law.
6. Consideration of national-historical traditions and progressive experience of modern military organizational development.

3. Content of Military Reform

1. The activity of the state and its bodies and departments and society as a whole geared to cardinal transformations in the sphere of defense building in accordance with a uniform legal enactment (law) incorporating general provisions, organization, and methods of manpower acquisition of the Armed Forces, the procedure of military service by USSR citizens, and questions of leadership of the military sphere constitute the basis of the content of military reform.

2. The main idea of the reform is staged transition to a cadre, regular army staffed on a professional, volunteer basis.

To find the budget appropriations for such an army thanks to a significant reduction in arms, the strength of the personnel of the Armed Forces and the number of military training institutions, and the creation of the optimum, economical system of training military personnel; a change in the table of organization job assignment structure of the organs of administration; an

expansion of the use in the army and navy of civilian specialists; elimination of the shadow military economy; standardization of civilian and military production; elimination of the costly privileges for senior command personnel; and so forth.

To accomplish transition to a professional army in stages, beginning with the strategic missile and landing forces (including the corresponding formations of the navy and air force, airborne forces, and naval assault landing formations), then the ground forces and air defense forces. For the purpose of training reserves to utilize forms of the territorial-police system created on the basis of DOSAAF [All-Union Volunteer Society for Assistance to the USSR Army, Air Force, and Navy] training subunits. To provide in the reform for a new organizational and manning structure of the Armed Forces designed to ensure the conditions for an improvement in the training of the troops for conducting combat operations, to exclude use of the army for functions which are not within its province, and to eliminate the military construction and railroad forces as a labor army.

3. To change control of the Armed Forces, ensuring the real participation of the whole of society in the implementation of military policy and the principles, paths, and methods of defense building. The top leadership of this sphere should be made over to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the government. Questions of the building, improvement, and financing and expenditure of the military budget and the training of the Armed Forces should be discussed annually at the congresses of people's deputies and by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The role of the CPSU should be determined by the transition from direct substitution for organs of the state in the leadership of defense to the winning of public recognition of the right to be the exponent of the collective intellect and the elaboration of a modern Marxist-Leninist vision of the problems of war and peace and the defense of socialism setting reference points for the people and the army in this sphere. This will require a reduction in the number and manning level of the political authorities and the introduction of their electivity and a reorientation of work toward elevation of the personality of the soldier and his protection.

4. To provide for a fundamental reorientation of the organs of administration of the Defense Ministry and other ministries connected with defense and the removal from their structure of intermediate and duplicative components.

5. To humanize the army and change the position of the personality of the serviceman and the conservative-exclusive nature of intra-army practices and the tenor of barracks life; ensure the civic equality of servicemen and their social protection; create specific mechanisms for the protection of their personality, promote the establishment of the principles of justice and sole responsibility on a legal basis, and examine in a package all

legislative enactments, rules, regulations, and instructions along the lines of the creation of genuinely socialist, democratic relations in the multinational military collectives, and create the conditions for the active incorporation of the entire personnel in the political life of the country and the Armed Forces on the basis of legal support for extensive glasnost and a healthy moral and psychological atmosphere.

4. Ways and Methods of the Accomplishment of Military Reform

For the purpose of the accomplishment of military reform:

1. To lift the secrecy from questions of military organizational development, tell the whole truth about the state of the defenses and the army, and in conjunction with the people discuss urgent problems of perestroika in the defense sphere.
2. To elaborate an integral concept of perestroika and a comprehensively targeted program conforming thereto of the development of the reform with the participation of the top scientific forces of the country and the Armed Forces.
3. On the basis of the comprehensively targeted program to draw up a plan of military reform and the bills connected therewith and to submit them following discussion in their first reading at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet for discussion by the army and navy community and the entire people.
4. Following approval of this document at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to complete by 1991 all the constitutional work and embark on its realization.

Appeal of All-Union Veteran's Council on Ecological Concerns

90UM0635A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 23,
4-10 Jun 90 p 3

[Article signed by the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces: "Appeal of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Dear compatriots!

Man's economic activity has become a powerful nature-transforming factor in the modern world. However, it has both constructive and negative influence upon the environment. The area of land unfit for use is increasing, forests are being destroyed, which is leading to irreversible changes in the climate, and the air, surface water and underground water are being polluted. Great complexities are arising in providing water to the population, industry and rural production. Incompetent use of mineral fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides in many agricultural regions is leading to the poisoning of farmland, production of low quality agricultural products, and the poisoning and death of the animal world. All of this is often the result of

a parasitical attitude toward nature, and of an egoistic attitude toward the future. Neglect of the principles of competent nature management has led us to the brink of catastrophe. This must be deeply recognized, and when we come to understand it, we must not be indifferent to it. Development of life on the planet depends on the position each of us takes, and primarily people of the senior generation, wizened by life's experience. And the personal responsibility of each individual for what is happening in our common home, and for preservation of the motherland's ecological health, is now rising as never before.

It is to you, the veterans, that we appeal, understanding that the experience of former years might help to evoke the growing generation's deep interest in preserving our unique nature and restore faith in something that never dies—one's home, one's own chunk of land, village and stream.

What is it that each of us must do? First of all, join together with the proponents of environmental protection, and take part in the activities of labor and social organizations working to create ecologically safe conditions for the society's development. Second, try to encourage each individual to engage in noble nature-conserving activity. Third, do more practical things—perhaps inconsequential at first glance, but concrete and useful.

Let each person not be indifferent, let him understand that it is precisely he who determines the future conditions of life, or more accurately, the conditions of survival. We appeal to you to take a direct part in ecological actions and measures dedicated to World Environmental Conservation Day, which will be celebrated by the entire planet Earth on 5 June.

Ecological actions may include concern for our home, for the future of life on Earth, for our children and grandchildren, and for our physical and moral health.

Today as never before, we sense a need for deep scientific study, especially when it comes to predicting the ecological consequences of the economic decisions we make, and the need for serious ecological expert examination of all projects calling for economic transformations. We must not begin a single construction project without first meticulously analyzing the evolving situation far into the future. Each individual in our society must receive answers to questions troubling him concerning ecological problems, and feel certain that his health and the health of his family are protected by serious measures and by state law.

We appeal to the councils of war and labor veterans at all levels to participate in development of a movement of young friends of nature, of blue and green patrols and of young journalists, to provide assistance to secondary schools and preschool institutions in organizing the training of the growing generation in nature protection concerns, and impart to them the habits of a thrifty attitude toward the environment.

It is our recommendation to the republic councils of war and labor veterans to interact and cooperate with union

republic state committees for protection of nature and with public nature conservation organizations.

It is our deep belief that having recognized the impending catastrophe, we will all gather our forces,

unite, and do what has long been obvious. To ignore the complex ecological situation is a crime! We are crossing the danger line! It is our duty to combine our experience and knowledge, to raise social consciousness, to create an atmosphere of responsibility for the motherland's future!

Discussion of Withdrawal From Czechoslovakia

90UM0640A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jun 90 p 8

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent V. Izgarshv, Prague-Moscow: "Return: The First Phase of Withdrawal of Soviet Troops From Czechoslovakia Is Coming to an End"]

[Text] Soviet Army combined units and units will be returning home from Czechoslovakia. Some will be disbanded, while others will continue active service. Total forces withdrawal will include 73,500 personnel, 1,200 tanks, 2,505 fighting vehicles [other than tanks], 1,218 artillery pieces, 77 fixed-wing combat aircraft, 146 combat helicopters, plus other equipment.

I must admit that I wanted very much to visit garrisons of the Central Group of Forces on those spring days when the first flatcars arrived home in Gorkiy. This urge was evoked by my journalist's duty to the men of my unit, both those still living and, alas, those who are no longer with us, with whom in August 1968 I entered Czechoslovakia by decision of the allied countries, a decision which is now acknowledged to have been in error.

Just prior to this an old friend of mine from Prague, a colonel, had phoned me at work in Moscow. We don't get together very often, but we maintain quite friendly relations and, most important, we are quite candid with one another.

"Vasiliy, I am now a mister. That is the way I must now be addressed...."

"Then you can call me mister too," I replied. "Full equality."

I heard the familiar chuckle at the other end of the line: everything was fine, and he still had his sense of humor.

"Are you coming?" "I am." "There will be a lot of new things for you." "In what way?" "In every way."

That same day the first train carrying tanks arrived home in Gorkiy, a combined exercise commenced in Czechoslovakia, involving troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army and our group of forces.

On the previous day I had read in a Czechoslovak military newspaper a brief article titled "Objection To Field Exercise." In this article a number of organizations and movements declared that the exercise "is of a provocational nature from a political standpoint."

Provocational—no more, no less.

I have observed combined exercises on numerous occasions. In addition to all else, they left a lasting feeling of a cheerful holiday event. And on this occasion? The other party was unable even to accept the traditional

combined exercise name "Friendship." Two Czechoslovak battalions—a motorized rifle battalion and a tank battalion—and a Soviet tank battalion under the command of Lt Col L. Kononenko, headquarters at barracks, with limited movements along routes at a tank training facility. That was the entire extent of the exercise. In addition: "Pan nadporucik!" [Mister Senior Lieutenant] "Pan vojak!" [Mister Private] A little strange, you've got to agree.

I encountered the new which had been promised to me by my Prague soudruh [comrade], now pan [mister], in precisely this form on the very first day I arrived in the Group of Forces.

The main thing is the troop withdrawal. It is perceived in different ways in the line units. Primary-rank enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers are extremely pleased about it. After all, they are going home! No more putting in one's time behind the solid-green fences, past the double and triple checkpoints. At home you can get a pass to go into town, your girl friend can visit you on holidays, there is a possibility of visiting home yourself, and then there are the parcels from mom. And, the fact is, home is home....

The withdrawal of forces presents problems to officers, warrant officers, their families, as well as to Soviet Army civilian employees.

The first problem is: where are they to go? Many have no place to go back home to. In a missile unit, where Lt Gen V. Sharikov, Group of Forces military council member, and I were the target of a crossfire of justifiable questions by the wives of military personnel, almost 80 percent of the officers' families have no place to live back home in the USSR. How about parents? Many have no parents still living, while the elderly parents of others are living a miserable existence in decaying Russian backwater localities. They have no place to send their belongings.

Another question also arises. Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate officials have recently been saying a great deal about democratic processes in the military. Assemblies of officers.... Women's councils.... But why not implement such processes in this missile unit? In the sense that officials empowered with authority would come here from Moscow and confer with the officers, warrant officers, and their wives. They could give them something concrete to work on. In such and such a city you will get so much housing immediately, so much after six months, and so much after a year. And your children will receive so many slots at nursery schools and kindergartens. The situation with schoolchildren will be as follows. In short, they could sit down at the table, have an intelligent discussion and resolve all matters, with input by the interested parties, as they say.

But they have become accustomed to foisting off all this work on local political workers. They are instructed to explain to and implement policy among the masses. And it never occurs to anybody that with this they are merely placing good people under fire. What can they

"explain"? How can you convince a person that posting to a duty assignment in the Turkmen desert is not an act of getting even for declining to accept an assignment in the Bryansk forests but rather is a manifestation of paternal concern for the vital needs and daily requirements of one's men? You simply cannot convince people of this.

...I remember that summer of 1968. We entered Prague at dawn on 21 August. Lovers were still strolling along the Vltava embankments, on Charles Bridge, and on Wenceslas Square. And many people, upon seeing tanks, ran toward them, unaware of whose soldiers were sitting on the armor. "Are you ours, Czechs?" they would ask, perplexed. "No? Poles? Not that either? Are you Russians? My God, why are you here?"

Three elderly residents of Prague, Communists, walked toward the tank crewmen, correctly identifying them as Soviet, carrying bottles of water. Incidentally, Sergey Aleksandrovich Borzenko told about this at the time in an article carried in PRAVDA, in a powerful, harsh manner, characteristic of him alone. Our paths have been crossing for years, time and again, but I never imagined that there would come a time, after about 20 years, when fate would give me his desk at the newspaper office and his telephone number.... He, a war hero, was quite shaken at the time by those three bottles of water.

Those three Czechs remembered Prague in May 1945, and they remembered the first baptism of fire for the Ludvik Svoboda Battalion on the banks of the Mzha River, near Sokolovo in Kharkov Oblast, Sergey Borzenko's native region. And PRAVDA correspondent Borzenko remembered the soldiers of Czechoslovak patriot Svoboda. He had entered liberated Kiev together with them. He wrote about all this at the time not with words but with his heart's blood.

What would my PRAVDA friend and predecessor say now if he were to visit Czechoslovakia these days? What would those old Czechoslovak Communists and war veterans have to say?

Because once again, just as back then, the same slogans as in 1968 are painted on buildings and shop windows: "Ivan go home!", "Ivan, it is 2,000 kilometers to Moscow!", and "Occupation forces have no place in Czechoslovakia".... And once again, just as before, someone had attempted to paint out the red star on the turret of the heavy tank which had been placed by a liberated Prague on a pedestal in the center of Soviet Tanker Square, not far from Prague Castle.

August 1968 was preceded by June, the Sumava combined exercise. It was a rather strange exercise. Five days of "battles" in a training area in the Sumava Mountains and almost a month and a half of marking time in the garrisons. It was a time of feverish activity. The "Prague Spring" was in full swing. There was the "2,000-Word Manifesto." And there were the political clubs.... Practically every day a deputation of journalists would ask the exercise director, MSU Ivan Yakubovskiy: "When will

the withdrawal of allied troops from the exercise begin?" "Soon," the imperturbable commander in chief would reply. "As soon as we finish equipment repairs...."

They disparaged the equipment in order to justify the departure delay. An official post-exercise debriefing had been held, attended by A. Dubcek, L. Svoboda, M. Dzur, and other Czechoslovak leaders, but the troops were not budging. Only when the trade unions threatened a general strike did allied troop convoys set out for home.

But the people of Czechoslovakia, the working people, and Czechoslovakian youth, remembering the days in May 1945, greeted us and later bade us farewell, those who had taken part in the Sumava exercise, as brothers. Soldiers and vehicles streamed past a solid line of greetings, flowers, and smiles along the entire route to the Czechoslovak border. Later we returned. In August. Not everybody welcomed us as they had at the Sumava exercise.

"I am a friend of the Soviets," I was told by a Czechoslovak soldier by the name of Ivan. "There are many like me in our country. But there should be more. You must more boldly make a friendship gesture."

Unfortunately, however, we did not. That is, there was plenty of talk about friendship in speeches and articles. But in actual deed? For 22 years we sat behind the walls of military garrisons and unit compounds. Orders were to stay put, not to come out from behind those walls. By whose orders? The same ones who made that secret decision to bring troops in. The same ones who preached the most about friendship and forbade people from making friends. But what would the effect have been if over the course of those 22 years each and every private, sergeant, warrant officer, and commissioned officer who served a tour of duty with the Central Group of Forces had left just one friend behind in this brother country? And what if they left more than one friend?

Unfortunately persons with criminal proclivities were frequently the ones to make friends. Profiteers in military uniform, with a hankering for the property of others, traded in currency and gasoline. Who were the friends of these "emissaries of the people"? The same kind of criminal types, whose place is behind bars.

...At night, when the streets would grow quiet, local Communists would frequently make furtive visits to the quarters of Soviet officers. What will happen to them when we leave the country? Even now they are having a hard time of it: they are fired from their jobs, and boisterous youths hurl catcalls at them.

I was told about this by Col Vitaliy Sinchurin. Their division is scheduled to be the last to leave. They have good relations with their Czechoslovak comrades. The colonel is sincerely concerned about the fate of Czechoslovak Communists. They truly fear the future.

"You have betrayed us," Communists tell Soviets right to their face. "When you leave, they will settle the score with us."

But maybe this will not happen. We shall hope for the best....

Troop trains are leaving Czechoslovakia. There are no flowers, no smiles, no kind words of farewell. I have seen tears in the eyes of our soldiers. We so genuinely loved this country. And could it have been otherwise? 140,000 men lost their lives on this soil. One of them in the very center of the capital, alongside gold church domes. He had grown to love this city, its Vltava, with its 15 beautiful bridges. As he lay dying he asked that he be buried here, where the bells ring out the hour, like the Kremlin Spasskiy Tower back home. "Eternal glory to Comrade Belyakov, who died for the liberation of Prague." The inscription in black stone, with a touching misspelling in the word "liberation," seems to have been carved just yesterday. And there are always fresh carnations on the grave.

In a quaint old pub in Lysa nad Labem, where 22 years ago an elderly innkeeper had treated Sergey Borzenko and me to some Nimburger Light, today the bar is tended by a robust young lad. A new innkeeper, but the beer is the same—cool and foamy. A Soviet soldier walked in.

"Would Mister Soviet vojak like some spekacky [wurst] and a glass of beer? Such spekacky and beer as Mister vojak will not find at home in Russia."

"The soldier would like, Mister Innkeeper, both spekacky and beer," replied the soldier, young, beardless, practically a boy. "It is true, Mister Innkeeper, that at the present time we have in Russia neither such spekacky nor such beer, which is famed throughout Europe. But Mister Soldier, who just a couple of months ago was called soudruh—comrade—in your country, has only enough korunas on him for a soft drink. Please open a bottle of pop, kind sir, for the Soviet soldier...."

He said this softly, with dignity, and his words were heard by the old bierstube's regulars.

I believe that this mister soldier will remain comrade to the entire kindly Czechoslovak people, because he never was a member of an occupation force, either in essence or in spirit. He was and will remain a comrade, an adopted brother to those whose names are inscribed on the pedestal on which stands the IS-3 tank bearing the hull number 23 and a red star on the turret, two points of which had been painted out by some scapegrace with white paint.

He is a comrade to them, the saviors of Prague, and he is also a comrade to the people of Prague.

Lopatin on Military Reform, Conversion

90UM0642A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 22,
28 May 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Major Vladimir Lopatin, USSR people's deputy, by S. Aleksandrov; place, date not specified; "To Serve the People and Not Parties"]

[Text]

[Aleksandrov] Why did it become necessary to change the tuned-up mechanism of the military machine?

[Lopatin] It is only in songs and in past reports of Ministry of Defense leaders that the Army is strong and the "tanks are swift." But in reality, in the Army as in the entire society, the crisis is accelerating. These are its symptoms: In peacetime several thousand servicemen die every year. Up to 20 percent of them, according to sociologists' data, end their life in suicide. Cases of desertion have become more frequent. Last year 6,000 young men were charged with evasion of military service, and this is five times more than in 1988. Crime is growing in the Army. Its exact dimensions are still kept a secret, but as a deputy I can say that in 1989 alone the USSR Supreme Soviet reviewed about 70 cases on depriving servicemen of their decorations after they committed crimes.

And here are several more figures which I think will come as a surprise to many. According to last year's data, 45 percent of the conscripts in our 4-million-man Army are people with various mental aberrations. Fifteen percent have criminal records. This is to whom we entrust weapons in the drive for numerical strength. One-third of the conscripts almost have no command of the Russian language—the language of directives! This is 12 times more than in 1969. If we retain the former system of manpower acquisition, then by the year 2000, in the opinion of scientists, half of all our soldiers will not understand Russian. How can an army like this be commanded?

[Aleksandrov] The army becomes unmanageable.... This, Vladimir Nikolayevich, is frightening to hear.

[Lopatin] It is possible, of course, to assuage oneself with the hope of the success of our foreign policy and a decrease in the military threat. But what is really frightening is the unmanageable and uncontrolled growth in military expenditures. The appetites of the military industrial complex, as it becomes clear, have not decreased, despite the warming in the international atmosphere. How much do we spend on military needs? It is said that in 1989, R70 billion were "eaten up." Is that so? Recently Marshal Akhromeyev could not give a U.S. congressman even an approximate figure of military expenditures. And it is hardly likely that he knows and is hiding it. The fact is that the resources of the military budget are spread out among the hands of dozens of ministries that have a tie to the military-industrial complex. And where are the expenditures of

the Union republics and local authorities for the maintenance of garrisons accounted for? Or the defense expenditures of enterprises (this includes both the establishment of a system of defense and the detachment of workers for periodic training with the continuation of average wages)? We mention also the military training of pupils and students. And it turns out that all of this is not taken into account anywhere.

At a meeting of our commission a Ministry of Defense representative talked about annual military expenditures of R120 billion. Three months ago in the journal NOVOYE VREMYA the figure of R200 billion was cited. Aside from everything else, this "fog" creates favorable opportunities for abuses. Because also not taken into account are the incomes of the Ministry of Defense that are received from, let us say, military sovkhozes [state farms] or military workshops.

[Aleksandrov] It seems that the slogan of defense sufficiency has been articulated, but in fact reasonable state regulation of military expenditures is impossible?

[Lopatin] Our group of deputy-officers believes that the forthcoming military reform must turn over all resources to one pair of hands—the Ministry of Defense. It will play the role of both customer and consumer of military equipment. Then the state also will be able to monitor and regulate the military budget in accordance with the level of defense sufficiency and the real capabilities of the country.

But for the major officials of the military industry, this step means giving up unlimited authority. Will they accept this voluntarily? Probably not. There is strong opposition to reform from here, where everything is set in motion.

It happens that we are simply being deceived. Take such an important matter as the conversion of the capacities of military plants to the output of civilian products. For two years already the people have been fed stories about conversion. But what are the facts? It became apparent that there was practically no so-called "conversion." The increase in output of civilian products in the military complex was obtained due to the resubordination to it of enterprises of the light and food industries. This is eyewash. But this is not all. The management of the military-industrial complex recently demanded that the USSR Supreme Soviet earmark R63 billion allegedly for the conversion of defense capacities to the output of consumer goods. However, it turned out that R13 billion will go directly for these purposes. Why then another R50 billion? It seems for the construction of civilian plants under the aegis of the military department. This will bring the people new hardships: This kind of production will be significantly more expensive than the usual production.

[Aleksandrov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, the economic prerequisites for the coming military reforms are more or less obvious. But, apparently, the deputy group of

officers has other considerations regarding the reconstruction of the Soviet military machine?

[Lopatin] These are considerations of a political nature. Remember: There are 10 years between the introduction of troops into Afghanistan and the Tbilisi tragedy. But the mechanism of employing the Army for political purposes remains as before. Now the Army is commanded by the Supreme Soviet and by the president of the USSR personally. However, the CPSU Central Committee headed by the Politburo remains the real administrator of the Armed Forces. Why? There are weighty reasons for this. All of the military managers, beginning with the commander of a division and above, are approved by the Central Committee. For an officer to advance in the service requires not so much professionalism as membership in the party and personal loyalty to the CPSU leadership.

It seems to me that it is necessary to eliminate the party structures in the Army. The Armed Forces must serve the people, and not parties. And that is to say: Various political organizations are cropping up everywhere now. Servicemen also join them. It follows that the Army risks transforming itself into an arena of political passions. This is intolerable. In the United States, for example, servicemen do not have the right to belong to one or another party. In the FRG military personnel can engage in political activity only during nonservice time....

[Aleksandrov] As is known, at the third USSR Congress of People's Deputies you came out for the retirement of the present leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Why this rejection with respect to the supreme command?

[Lopatin] It is my conviction that new people should stand at the head of reform activity. The more so because we are approaching still another side of reform—moral reform. According to the data of our deputy commission and also of the USSR People's Control Committee, many military ranks, alas, abuse their positions. Thus, four higher military leaders built country cottages for themselves near Moscow at the expense of the state at a cost of more than half a million rubles each. But only R40 thousand is allowed. Where did they get the rest? From other items of expenditure of the Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, in our garrison no kindergartens have been built for the 800 children of servicemen. We asked our own ministry for help and we got the answer: There is no money for you.

Improved housing conditions are needed by 280,000 service families. The ministry ignores their disastrous situation. Soon the number of those who are not set up will increase—a massive withdrawal of troops from foreign territories is coming. Are we ready to receive them, and to set them up. We are not ready. This means social tension will grow in the Army. And in the Army any tension is intolerable, for these are people with weapons.

[Aleksandrov] How is the Ministry of Defense reacting?

[Lopatin] Here is how: It was decided to put the housing problem in the hands of the local soviets. But even without this, there are enough priorities everywhere. This means that the Army is once more set off against the people.

Social questions in the Army have to be resolved not at the expense of the people but at the expense of the military budget. To do this it is not necessary to increase it, but only to redistribute the resources.

How is our military budget expended? Forty-four percent goes for equipment, and only 26 percent goes to personnel support (in the United States, more than half of military expenditures go to personnel support). Incidentally, the level of expenditure on a serviceman also determines his professionalism. The main point of the reforms we propose is also to have a smaller army of a better quality.

[Aleksandrov] Do you believe that it will be possible in the near future to shift the Army to a professional footing? Many people's deputies are talking about this....

[Lopatin] Nothing is that simple of course. The change, in my opinion, in any case will be gradual. At the beginning noncommissioned officer personnel and technical specialists from among the compulsory service personnel will have to be converted to a professional status. Also the most prestigious and technically equipped types of Armed Forces and branches of troops. In the transition period, according to our concept, there will be a mixed method of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces—a combination of voluntary enlistment in the Army on a contractual basis for a period of up to five years and the conscription of citizens to perform service according to a territorial principle. But also the opportunity to choose alternative service (work on construction jobs and in enterprises). Within the next few years we must arrive at a professional volunteer army. I am confident that the volunteer principle of manpower acquisition (with a good salary) will only increase the combat capability of the Armed Forces. An incentive will develop to master combat skills. In the 1920s Frunze started military reform in those years specifically with an increase in monetary pay for all personnel of the Armed Forces.

And the problem with discipline will be resolved. This is shown by the example of the United States. There, the volunteer principle was introduced in 1973, and in the succeeding 17 years crime in the Army dropped by 70 percent.

[Aleksandrov] As is known, the flower of any army is its officer corps. What do you have to say about the qualification level of Soviet officers?

[Lopatin] Last year, according to data of operational inspections, the qualification of 40 percent of our officers was evaluated only as "satisfactory." And this is as it should be. Twice a year commanders receive replacement recruits—and they teach them the same

thing over and over. Naturally, officers do not have the time to raise their own professional level. This is one more flaw in the current system of compulsory manning of the Army. By the way, do you recall the loss of the submarine "Komsomolets?" I went to the unit [soyedineniye]. They agreed there with the conclusions of the state commission investigating the cause of the accident: The employment of compulsory service personnel on such complex equipment is not advisable. Professionals are needed.

[Aleksandrov] Apparently those working on the draft of the reform are thinking not only of the military aspects but also of the legal aspects of the future restructuring of the Armed Forces?

[Lopatin] This is also a burning question. Today four laws are in force that have a bearing on the Army. These are the fifth chapter of the USSR Constitution, the Law on Universal Military Training, the Law on Criminal Responsibility for Military Crimes, and the recently adopted Law on Pensions for Servicemen. The rest are directions and instructions.

[Aleksandrov] And regulations?...

[Lopatin] Excuse me, these are not law. Of course, they state that the order of a commander is the law for a subordinate. But where is the limitation on the authority of a commander? Is it incumbent on a subordinate to execute an order that is inhumane or that contradicts common sense? According to regulations, he is bound to do so. Thus, it is time legislatively to formulate a legal basis for the activity of servicemen—what is prohibited, what must absolutely be executed, and what is allowed. Military tribunals must be replaced by courts, and the accused must be permitted to bring in a professional lawyer for his defense. And all servicemen must know their rights—for this we are proposing to introduce a legal service into units that is independent of the command authorities.

And less indoctrination. We now have thousands of political workers of various ranks. Why so many? We are proposing to retrain part of them for other very necessary Army specialities: lawyers, sociologists, and psychologists. It is time to put self-education in first place and to respect the individuality of the soldier.

[Aleksandrov] The last question, Vladimir Nikolayevich. It is known that you were expelled from the party in April, and that you were restored to its ranks by a decision of a party commission under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. How do you assess what happened?

[Lopatin] I was extremely surprised when I heard about the hasty decision of the party organization where I was registered to expel me from the CPSU. And I directly associate this step with the fact that several collectives nominated me to take part in the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress. What happened to me is the usual attempt of the conservatives to get rid of candidates for

delegate to the congress who are objectionable. This means that the military partocracy does not intend to yield its positions. So we will fight.

Military Reform Requires Reequipping of All Combat Arms

90UM0395A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Colonel A. Akimenkov, test-pilot first class, under the rubric "Military Reform in the Context of Perestroika": "The Clock Ticks Without Stopping"]

[Text] Mankind has moved away from the critical boundary of war. But the threat of military conflicts has not disappeared and that means that the problem of improving the Armed Forces remains.

February 23 is Soviet Army and Navy Day. A National Armed Forces holiday that was earned through victories in battles for the Fatherland and that bears the enormous spiritual potential of heroism and selflessness of our soldiers and that reflects the gratitude of our countrymen for providing many years of peace.

Honor and a low bow to those who at this minute are on alert duty, who master their military profession, undergo severe moral and psychological tests, protect us and serve. But right now during the holidays, we need to work and to find ways to improve all state institutions without rejecting and without disparaging them.

During recent years, mankind has become much wiser and has substantially restrained one of its most dishonorable historical inheritances—aggressiveness. But the era of universal security has not yet become a guaranteed factor. For now it is only the most promising version of international relations. A hope and a dream.

And the fact that the draft CPSU Central Committee Party Platform on the eve of the 28th Party Congress has also devoted attention to the defense issue is not nearly accidental. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum's point of view is clear and defined: We need to enact military reform.

Certainly a year or two ago a reader would have recognized only marshal's judgments as authoritative on the subject of military reform. Now it is a different time. The right both to a search for and to the truth in any sphere of our society belongs to all citizens of the USSR. This is precisely why on Soviet Army and Navy Day we extend the opportunity to the "absent" author to share his thoughts about the essence and the direction of military reform.

Is there anyone among us who has absolutely nothing to do with the fate of the Army? Let us estimate.... Servicemen, retirees, reservists, veterans, and draftees. It turns out that there are no indifferent people. But I am a professional and the entirely prosaic side troubles me—Armed Forces reform.

Let us concentrate our attention on two issues: What is the essence of military reform and what is the utilization effectiveness of budgeted resources allocated to the Armed Forces?

In my opinion, reform must solve the problem of coordinating the state of the Armed Forces with the requirements of a country living in the new political reality of the modern world. If this coordination is achieved, reform is a fact. If not, then reform is not [achieved]. The type of path [taken to achieve] this coordination (reduction of the Army, its increase, making it cheaper, or making it more expensive) is nevertheless secondary.

Strictly speaking, the need for military reform arose not through perestroika but through a complex synthesis: Through the new military political reality and the next sequence of that spiral [of the arms race] through which the equipment and techniques of armed combat are developed.

The military political reality is as follows. Nuclear missile confrontation has exhausted itself: It is no longer capable of accomplishing the missions traditionally assigned to the Armed Forces by the politicians. But, alas, the threat of war has not yet become a thing of the past. And it is searching for tools that are suitable for modern conditions. Judging by the latest studies, the leading trend for the next few decades has been quite clearly determined: Precision-guided weapons with conventional warheads.

It would seem that there is cause for joy for the [the world's] inhabitants. Due to their actual unacceptability, nuclear weapons have ceased to be a real threat and precision-guided weapons with conventional warheads are nevertheless "conventional" weapons. But it is too early to rejoice. First of all, precision-guided weapons are close to nuclear weapons in combat effectiveness because they are highly accurate!

Secondly, the money from our already lean State budget is pumping out quite a few precision-guided weapons. Incidentally, these "conventional" weapons are created using super-technology and therefore they are more expensive than nuclear weapons.

Thus, qualitative rearmament of all branches of the Armed Forces is the essence of military reform if we do not want to end up defenseless.

There is also one other aspect. Obviously it is also understood by non-military experts that precision-guided weapons fire so accurately not only due to their unique technical characteristics but also thanks to the highest professionalism of the serviceman who operates these weapons. And therefore the transition to a professional Armed Forces manning principle will soon become an important and obligatory component of military reform.

This is precisely the inevitable qualitative rearmament and professionalization of the military profession—the

quintessence of modern reform of the Army. The specific nature and peculiarity of this process (reduction—
increase, increase the cost—decrease the cost) is the essence of secondary phenomena.

Everything that has been said until this point has only been an introduction to the subject for civilians. They find something else more interesting: Reform requires colossal resources—where do we get them?

I will immediately point out in advance that the burden of expenditures for military reform will be very heavy using the standard approach. Consequently, we need non-standard approaches and solutions. What kind?

For example, inclusion of internal market laws in the production of defense capability. There are many specific items here. Let us say, according to Marx, that goods that have a specific use value are the "elementary cell" of market relations. And just what is the use value with regard to military equipment? That is the capability to accomplish a specific combat mission.

Here is the basic factor. It is not important to the Armed Forces (as a system) which equipment they have to use to carry out a typical combat mission. Which one is more effective with regard to the mission is this one that should be used. Here effective does not signify individual fire effectiveness but economic effectiveness: A ruble's "combat capability." If it is economically advantageous to accomplish a specific mission employing a combat helicopter, we need to invest the peoples' money in helicopters (for this mission). If it is more effective to utilize the "tank" ruble, we need to invest in tanks. Hence, there is one additional component of military reform—the high structural dynamics of the Armed Forces.

But here is the trouble. Such (!) structures have developed in the military industrial complex at the present time that there is hardly a force that can destroy them.

The military budget's "itemized" expenditures are not being carefully hidden from their countrymen for nothing. Some of the highest achievements of the defense industry are not being so skillfully propagandized in the civilian press for nothing. And only accidents like those that befell two of our submarines one after the other penetrate the smoke screen over the real situation in the defense complex.

It is sufficient for some of our bureaucrats to be involved with the portion of the State budget that is somewhat uncontrolled by society so that they can live well. The military budget is the ideal performer for this role. And believe me, those routes and roads through which the peoples' money that is allocated for defense is being spent are very carefully hidden from us. This is not a secret for the CIA. First of all because it is so hard to hide anything in the modern world and secondly they are not trying very hard. Really, the CIA does not participate in our lives—neither in elections, discussions, or searches for ways to overcome acute problems.

And the time is ripe for reform, well-thought out, profound, and open to society from all sides. It will be too bad if it becomes overripe. In gardening—it is rotten fruit and, in the defense industry, it is additional expenditures for the arms race and for the rapidly racing hands of the world military clock. Unfortunately, mankind also lives by that clock.

Military Membership in Housing Construction Co-ops

90UM0365A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Answers to questions from readers by Col V. Korolenko, section chief in the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Legal Service": "How Does One Join a Housing Construction Cooperative?"]

[Text] A number of government decisions have been adopted in recent years toward the development of cooperative and individual housing construction. The benefits established for this apply also to the military.

The editors' mail shows, however, that it is not an easy matter to make practical use of the rights or to take advantage of certain benefits. This is partly because both officials and our readers do not clearly understand matters pertaining to cooperative construction.

We have asked Col V. Korolenko, section chief in the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to comment on the situations and questions most frequently encountered in the letters.

[Question] What documents define the procedure whereby servicemen become members of housing construction cooperatives? Can you become a member of a housing construction cooperative in a city other than the one where you are stationed? (Capt V. Derevyankin)

[Answer] The general procedure for becoming a member of a cooperative is defined by the Fundamental Housing Laws of the USSR and the Union republics and by the Regulations for Registering Citizens in Need of Better Housing. The decree of the USSR Council of Ministers which was designated as the guide by Order Number 65 of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1981, establishes a number of preferential provisions for joining cooperatives for extended-duty servicemen, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and officers.

Individuals on active military duty in the groups of forces abroad, in areas of the Far North and equivalent areas, as well as at military posts remote from large populated areas, have the right to join housing construction cooperatives in cities and populated areas of their choice. Other servicemen join cooperatives where they are stationed.

[Question] My brother-in-law, Warrant Officer V. Kozlov, serves in the Western Group of Forces. He gathered the necessary documents and sent them, along

with a petition from the unit commander, to the ispolkom in the city of Zaporozhye. They were returned to him with the notation that a petition from the commander is not enough. Is this correct? (N. Sachko)

[Answer] Yes, it is. Under the existing procedure he should have applied to the billeting directorate of the group of forces. From there the documents, with the official stamp, should have been sent to the district within which the city selected is located—the Kiev district in this case.

This somewhat complicated procedure is a result of the need for strict record-keeping with respect to incoming requests. The fact is that each military district is assigned a specific ceiling on the numbers joining housing or housing construction cooperatives.

[Question] I am stationed abroad. I decided to join a cooperative in the city of Belaya Tserkov, from where I was inducted. I was refused on the grounds that the ceiling had been reached. I sent a request to Voroshilovgrad, but the situation was the same. Nor could I get anything from Borispol. Just how can I exercise my right to become a member in a housing construction cooperative? (Capt V. Korovko)

[Answer] The ceilings set for cooperative construction for servicemen at the present time are indeed clearly inadequate. This is in great part due to the fact that when they were set, the reduction of the Armed Forces presently underway was not foreseen. It is my understanding that the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense is presently preparing new normative documents.

[Question] Tell me what procedure there is for providing financial assistance to servicemen joining a housing construction cooperative. (WO G. Shokhin)

[Answer] In accordance with Decree No 406 passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on 31 March 1988 and Order No 67 issued by the USSR minister of defense on 17 February 1989, one who has served irreproachably more than 15 calendar years in the army or navy is provided with non-repayable financial aid in the amount of up to 50% of the indebtedness for the cost of the cooperative housing.

Servicemen joining housing construction cooperatives have recently received significant amounts of financial assistance. At the same time, there have been frequent unjustified refusals. Certain chiefs of military unit finance services, for example, refuse to transfer money to the account of housing or housing construction cooperatives, claiming that they lack the funds to provide financial assistance. Instructions from the Central Finance Directorate, however, specify that these outlays are to be taken out of free funds, with subsequent repayment of the amounts spent.

[Question] Are studies at a military school included in the minimum of 15 years of service required to receive financial assistance? (Capt V. Antipov)

[Answer] Yes, they are, the same as regular service, with the absolute requirement, however, that there has been no break in term of service. This stems from the essence of the non-repayable financial assistance, established for resolving the housing problem, on the one hand, and for strengthening the cadres, on the other.

[Question] Does the aforementioned benefit with respect to repaying the loan apply to officers and warrant officers discharged into the reserve? (Lt Col (Res) V. Kovalenko)

[Answer] No, it does not. In accordance with the decision adopted by the USSR Ministry of Finance on 30 August 1989, the only exceptions are servicemen who were discharged from the Armed Forces after 17 February 1989 but before the order from the USSR minister of defense was received in the unit.

However, in accordance with a decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 21 March 1989, for servicemen discharged for reasons of health, illness or personnel reductions, the time spent on active military duty is counted toward the length of employment (following discharge) at an enterprise, establishment or organization required for receiving non-repayable financial assistance.

[Question] Is non-repayable financial assistance provided for blue- and white-collar workers of the Soviet military? (F. Kovtunova)

[Answer] No, the existing normative acts do not provide for this. For blue- and white-collar workers employed in military units, at military establishments, organizations or educational institutions or at enterprises of the Ministry of Defense, financial assistance for joining a housing construction cooperative is provided in accordance with Union laws: where social development funds are set up, out of these funds; in budgeted organizations, out of funds of the ispolkoms of local soviets.

The terms and the procedure for providing assistance in affect in the army and navy do not apply to servicemen assigned to work in other ministries and departments. They may be provided with assistance out of the funds of those ministries and departments under terms specified by the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 31 March 1988.

USSR Law 'On Pension Support to Servicemen'

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[USSR Law signed by M. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, the Kremlin, April 28, 1990: "Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: On Pension Support to Servicemen"]

[Text] In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and the current Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR," this Law defines the conditions, norms, and standards of pension support for USSR Armed Forces' servicemen, troops and organizations of the USSR Committee for State Security, Internal Troops, Railroad Troops, and other military formations and leadership and rank and file personnel and families of the internal affairs agencies.

1. General Provisions

Article 1. Types of Pension Support

Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have internal affairs organization service or military duty service under this Law have the right to a life-long service pension.

Servicemen and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have become disabled under conditions provided for by this Law acquire the right to a disability pension.

In the event of the death of servicemen or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, their families have the right to a pension due to loss of the breadwinner.

Article 2. Pension Support Conditions

Servicemen and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have the right to pension support and pensions in accordance with this Law are granted and paid pensions after release from service.

Disabled servicemen, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families are granted pensions in the event of loss of the breadwinner regardless of length of service.

Article 3. Individuals Who have the Right to Pensions on a par with Extended Service Military Personnel and Their Families

The pension support conditions, standards, and procedures prescribed by this Law for extended service military personnel and their families also apply as appropriate (unless otherwise stipulated):

- a. To partisans and their families (other than those listed in Article 4 of this Law);
- b. To workers and employees of appropriate categories defined by the USSR Council of Ministers who worked in zones of military operations during the Great Patriotic War (on frontal railroad lines, at fortified defensive lines, naval bases, airfields, and others) and to their families;
- c. To citizens who were in hunter battalions, platoons, or squads defending the people, and their families;

d. To servicemen drafted into training, special, and muster assemblies, and their families; and,

e. To paramilitary security force workers and USSR Ministry of Communications special communications services junior command and rank and file personnel and their families who are not subject to State social security.

Article 4. Individuals Who Have the Right to a Pension on a Par with Officers, Extended Service Military Personnel, and Their Families

Pensions are also being implemented for personnel who held command positions and corresponding officer positions in partisan detachments and formations and for their families on the bases prescribed by this Law for officers and their families.

Pension support for women who were accepted onto active duty military service into positions as soldiers, seamen, or noncommissioned officers and their families is also being implemented on the bases prescribed by this Law for extended service military personnel and their families.

Article 5. Granting a Pension to Servicemen, Internal Affairs Organization Command and Rank and File Personnel, and Their Families on the Bases Prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families can (according to their desire) be granted a pension under conditions and in accordance with standards prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR." Furthermore, all types of monetary allowances received by these servicemen, command and rank and file personnel, and their families prior to their release from the service along with wages are taken into account while calculating their pensions. Preferential terms are used to grant old age pensions that are prescribed by legislation for individuals working in Extreme Northern areas and locations and with regard to servicemen and command and rank and file personnel performing duty in the Extreme North or at locations equivalent to areas of the Extreme North.

Pensions are also granted to servicemen and to internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have been stripped of military or special rank and to their families on the bases prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

Article 6. Pensions for Families of Deceased Pensioners

Families of deceased pensioners who were servicemen and command and internal affairs organization rank and file personnel have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the bread winner on the same basis with

families of servicemen and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel.

Article 7. The Right of Pension Selection

Servicemen, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families who simultaneously have the right to various State pensions are granted one pension of their choice.

Article 8. Resources to Pay for Pensions. Tax Exemptions for Pensions

The State provides pension payments to servicemen, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and to their families using USSR State Budget resources.

Pensions are not subject to taxation.

Article 9. Payment of Benefits

Servicemen and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who are released from service and the families of the corresponding categories of servicemen and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel and pensioners who were servicemen or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have lost their breadwinner are paid benefits in the procedure and in the amounts determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Article 10. Organizations Providing Pension Support

Social security organizations provide pension support to compulsory service military personnel and their families in accordance with this Law. Pension support to officers, warrant officers, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families is carried out in the same manner when they are granted pensions under conditions and in accordance with standards prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR" (Article 5 and the first portion of Article 26 of this Law).

The USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR Committee for State Security provide pension support to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families in accordance with this Law and in the procedure determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Article 11. Social Assistance to Pensioners

Union and autonomous republic legislation, local Soviets of people's deputies, administrative and enterprise, institution, and organization workers collective decisions may establish supplemental types of material support and benefits for pensioners who were servicemen or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel and for members of their families

within the limits of the rights afforded to them by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR" using republic and local budgets and wage fund additions to pensions granted in accordance with this Law.

Article 12. Special Service Pensions

Servicemen and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union or Hero of Socialist Labor or have been decorated with the Order of Glory, three classes, the Order of Workers Glory, three classes, or the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," three classes, or who have honorary titles of the USSR and also in the event of other service to the Soviet State can be granted a special service to the Union of SSR pension in the manner prescribed by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

2. Service Pensions

Article 13. Pension Granting Conditions

The following personnel have the right to a service pension:

- a. Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have 20 or more years of service on the date of release from duty in the military service or internal affairs organization service; and,
- b. Officers and middle, field-grade, and senior level command personnel released from service due to age, illness, reduction of staff, or restricted health condition and who have reached 50 years of age on the date of release and have a total service period of 25 or more calendar years of which military or internal affairs organization service totals not less than 12 years 6 months.

Article 14. Pension Amounts

Service pensions are granted in the following amounts:

- a. Officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have 20 years or more of service (Article 13, paragraph a.): For 20 years service—40 percent, and those retired for age or illness—45 percent of the corresponding monetary allowance amount (Article 46); for each year of service over 20 years—3 percent of the corresponding sum of monetary allowances but not more than a total of 75 percent of this sum; and,
- b. Officers, and internal affairs organization middle, field-grade, or senior level command personnel who have a total of 25 or more calendar years length of service of which military or internal affairs organization service totals not less than 12 years 6 months (Article 13, Paragraph b.); for a total of 25 years of service—40

percent and for each year over 25 years—1 percent of the corresponding amount of monetary allowances (Article 46).

Article 15. Minimum Pension Amount

Service pensions granted in accordance with this Law cannot be lower than the minimum old age pension amount.

Article 16. Increasing Pensions of Certain Categories of Pensioners

Service pensions calculated in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of this Law for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel in the amount of less than 200 rubles per month are increased by 20 rubles per month. Furthermore, the pension should not exceed 200 rubles per month with the increase.

Article 17. Increased Pensions for Disabled Persons and War Veterans

Service pensions are increased for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who are disabled veterans (Article 22, Paragraph a.) to the sum of the minimum pension amount stipulated by Article 24 of this Law for disabled veterans who were compulsory service soldiers and seamen in accordance with the corresponding disability group.

Minimum old age pension amounts will be increased by 25 percent for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have performed service in an army in the field, in partisan detachments or formations, or who participated in combat operations while fulfilling their international duty if they are not disabled veterans of war.

Article 18. Service Pension Increases

Service pension increases are calculated for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have 20 or more years of service (including to those calculated in the minimum amount):

- a. Non-working pensioners who have disabled dependent family members who belong to the circle of people provided a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner—for each disabled family member in the amount of a social pension prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR" for the corresponding category of disabled persons. Furthermore, the increase is calculated only for those members of the family who do not receive a labor or social pension. When a disabled family member simultaneously has the right to a social pension and an increase to a service pension, a social pension can be granted to

the family member or an increase can be calculated just for this family member in accordance with the pensioner's choice;

b. Pensioners who are Group 1 disabled veterans (besides those who have the right to a pension increase provided for by Article 17, part one), and also single pensioners who have reached 80 years of age—will have 50 percent of a minimum old age pension allocated for their care.

Increases stipulated by paragraphs a. and b. of this article can be calculated simultaneously.

Article 19. Calculation of Years of Service

The USSR Council of Ministers determines the years of service calculation procedure for granting pensions in accordance with this Law to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel.

3. Disability Pensions

Article 20. Pension Granting Conditions

Disability pensions are granted to military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have become disabled if the disability occurred during the period they were performing service or no later than three months after release from service or if the disability occurred after this time period but as a result of a wound, contusion, serious injury, or illness that occurred during the duty performance period.

Article 21. Determination of a Disability

Disability groups and causes and also the times of their occurrence are determined by a Medical Disability Determination Commission (VTEK) that functions based on the Provisions about them that have been approved by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Disabled persons are divided into three groups depending on the degree of loss of their ability to work.

Article 22. Causes of Disabilities

Disabled persons who were military personnel or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel are divided into the following categories depending on the causes of disabilities:

a. Disabled war veterans—when a disability occurs as a result of a wound, contusion, or serious injury received while defending the USSR or while executing other military service duties (job responsibilities) or an illness associated with a stay at the front or fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations:

b. Other disabled veterans who were military personnel or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel—when a disability occurs as a result of a serious injury received as a result of an accident not

associated with accomplishment of military service duties (job responsibilities) or an illness not associated with a stay at the front or fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations.

Article 23. Pension Amounts

Disability pensions are granted to servicemen and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel in the following amounts:

a. Group 1 and 2 disabled war veterans—75 percent and Group 3—50 percent of salary (total monetary compensation, hereinafter referred to as salary); and,

b. Other Group 1 and 2 disabled personnel—55 percent and Group 3—30 percent of salary.

Article 24. Minimum Pension Amounts

Minimum disability pension amounts have been established:

Group 1 and 2 disabled war veterans who were compulsory service soldiers and seamen—in the amount of 150 percent and Group 3—75 percent of the minimum old age pension amount and, for other disabled servicemen who were Group 1 and 2 compulsory service soldiers and seamen—in the amount of 100 percent and Group 3—50 percent of the minimum old age pension amount; — disabled servicemen who were compulsory service sergeants, ranking NCO's, privates, and senior seamen—in the amount of 110 percent, those who were warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel—120 percent, and those who were officers and internal affairs organization command (besides junior) and rank and file personnel—130 percent of the appropriate minimum pension size stipulated by this Article for disabled servicemen who were compulsory service soldiers and seamen.

Article 25. Pension Increases for Certain Categories of Disabled Servicemen

Disability pensions calculated in accordance with Articles 23 and 24 of this Law for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel in the amount of less than 150 rubles per month are increased by 20 rubles. Furthermore, the pension with the increase should not exceed 150 rubles per month.

Minimum old age pension amounts are increased by 25 percent of the minimum old age pension for group 2 disabled war veterans who do not have the right to other types of pensions and increases for care stipulated by Article 27 Paragraph b. of this Law.

Article 26. Granting Disability Pensions in the Amount of Old Age or Service Pensions

Disability pensions may be granted in amounts of old age pensions stipulated by this Law with the appropriate

length of service for group 1 and 2 disabled servicemen who were servicemen or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who have the length of service necessary for granting old age pensions prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR" (including under preferential conditions).

When a Group 1 or 2 disabled serviceman who was an officer, warrant officer, extended service military personnel, or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel has the length of service needed to grant a service pension (Article 13, Paragraph a.), a disability pension can be granted to him in the service pension amount with the appropriate length of service.

Article 27. Increases to Disability Pensions

Increases are added to disability pensions granted to servicemen and to internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel (including to those calculated in the appropriate minimum amount):

a. Non-working Group 1 and 2 disabled servicemen who have dependent disabled family members who belong to the circle of people provided a pension in the event of loss of the breadwinner—for each disabled family member in the amount of a social pension prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR" for the corresponding category of disabled persons. Furthermore, the increase is calculated only for those members of the family who do not receive a labor or social pension. When a disabled family member simultaneously has the right to a social pension and an increase to a service pension, a social pension can be granted to the family member or an increase can be calculated just for this family member in accordance with the disabled serviceman's choice;

b. Pensioners who are Group 1 blind disabled veterans and Group 2 single disabled war veterans who need constant assistance—[a pension] in the amount of 100 percent [is provided] for their care and other Group 1 disabled veterans and Group 2 single disabled veterans who need constant care—50 percent of the minimum old age pension amount.

The increase stipulated by Paragraphs a. and b. of this Article can be added at the same time.

Article 28. Increases to Disabled War Veteran Pensions

Disability pensions are increased by 25 percent of the minimum old age pension for military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who performed service as part of an army in the field, partisan detachments or formations, or who participated in combat operations while fulfilling their international duty and who became disabled as a result of causes indicated in Article 22, Paragraph b. of this Law (including those calculated in the appropriate minimum amount).

Article 29. Time Periods for Granting and Payment of Disability Pensions

Disability pensions for military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel are granted for the entire disability period established by VTEK and for disabled men who are over 60 years old and women over 55 years old for life with recertification of these disabled persons only according to their applications.

In the event a pensioner who has not reached pension age is declared to be able-bodied, he is paid the pension until the end of the month in which he is declared to be able-bodied but no further back than from the date on which the disability is established.

Article 30. Pension Recalculation when Changing Disability Groups

When a change of disability group occurs after a pension has been granted, the pension amount is changed accordingly. Furthermore, if a disabled war veteran's disability becomes more severe as a result of illness, a serious work injury, or professional illness, the pension is recalculated according to the new disability group with preservation of its cause.

Article 31. Resumption of Pension Payments for an Intermittent Disability

When a disabled serviceman who was a servicemen or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel passes a VTEK reexamination, pension payments cease and, in the event that he is again declared to be disabled, it is resumed from the date it was stopped but no more than one month from the date of reexamination.

In the event that the disabled serviceman has passed the reexamination for a valid reason, pension payments are resumed to him from the date they were stopped but no more than three years from the date of reexamination if the VTEK declares him to be disabled for that period. Furthermore, if another disability group is established during the reexamination, the pension is paid in accordance with the previous disability group for the indicated period.

4. Pension in the Event of the Loss of the Breadwinner

Article 32. Pension Granting Conditions

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are granted to families of military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel if the breadwinner died while performing service or no later than three months after release from service or later than this period but as the result of a wound, contusion, serious injury, or illness that occurred while performing service and for families of pensioners who were military personnel or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel—if the breadwinner died while receiving a pension or no later than

five years after pension payments stopped. Furthermore, families of military personnel who are missing in action during a period of combat operations are on a par with families of those who perished at the front.

Article 33. Family Members Who Have the Right to a Pension

Disabled family members who were dependents of those deceased (perished) military personnel or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner.

Regardless of the nature of the dependents' relationship with the breadwinner, a pension is granted to: Disabled children; disabled parents or wife if they lost their source of livelihood after the breadwinner's death; or disabled parents and wives of military personnel who died at the front or while fulfilling their international duty in countries conducting combat operations.

The following are considered to be disabled family members when determining the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner:

- a. Children, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren who have not reached 18 years of age or older if they became disabled prior to reaching 18 years of age and who are students at professional technical schools, middle special or higher educational institutions—until graduation from these education institutions but no later than when they reach 23 years of age. Furthermore, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren have the right to a pension if they do not have able-bodied parents:
- b. The father, mother, or wife if they have reached pension age: Men—60 years, women—55 years or if they are disabled;
- c. The wife, one of the parents or grandfather, grandmother, brother or sister, regardless of age or ability to work if he (she) is engaged in caring for children, brothers, sisters, or grandchildren of the deceased breadwinner who have not reached eight years of age and who does not work; and,
- d. The grandfather and grandmother—in the absence of individuals who are obliged to support them by law.

The USSR Council of Ministers can establish other conditions for granting pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner for parents and wives of individual categories of deceased military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel.

Article 34. Family Members Who are Considered to be Dependents

Family members of the deceased are considered to be his dependents if they were completely dependent on him or received assistance from him that was their permanent and primary livelihood.

Family members of the deceased for whom his assistance was their permanent and primary livelihood but who they themselves received some kind of pension have the right to transfer to a new pension.

Article 35. Pension Payments to Children Who Are Totally State Supported

Children who have lost both parents (orphans) are paid the total [pension] amount during the period of total State pension support.

Other children who are on total State support are paid 25 percent of the pension granted.

Article 36. Adopters and Adopted Persons Right to a Pension

Adopters have the right to a pension on an equal basis with parents and adopted persons—on an equal basis with natural children.

Adolescents who have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner also preserve this right in the event of their adoption.

Article 37. Stepfather's and Stepmother's and Stepson's and Stepdaughter's Right to a Pension

A stepfather and stepmother have the right on an equal basis with a father and mother under conditions if they have raised and supported the stepson or stepdaughter of the deceased for no less than five years.

A stepson or stepdaughter have the right to a pension on an equal basis with natural children if they have not received child support from their parents.

Article 38. Retention of a Pension Upon Remarriage

A pension granted in the event of the death of a husband is also maintained if the pensioner remarries.

Article 39. Pension Amounts

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are granted in the following amounts:

- a. To families of military personnel or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who died as a result of a wound, contusion, or serious injury received while defending the USSR or while executing other military service duties (job-related responsibilities) or as a result of an illness associated with a stay at the front or fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations—40 percent of the breadwinner's salary for each disabled family member. The same pension amounts are calculated for families of deceased pensioners who were disabled war veterans and for families that consist of children who have lost both parents (orphans) regardless of the breadwinner's cause of death; and,
- b. To families of military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel who

died as a result of serious injury received as a result of an accident not associated with fulfilling military service duties (job-related responsibilities) or an illness not associated with being present at the front or with fulfillment of international duty in countries conducting combat operations—30 percent of the breadwinner's salary for each disabled family member.

Article 40. Minimum Pension Sizes

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner that are granted to families of military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel cannot be lower than the following for each disabled family member:

a. While calculating pensions in accordance with Article 39, Paragraph a. of this Law: For families of compulsory service soldiers and seamen—100 percent; for families of compulsory service sergeants, noncommissioned officers, privates, and senior seamen—110 percent; for families of warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization junior command and rank and file personnel—120 percent; and, for families of officers and internal affairs organization (other than junior) command personnel—130 percent of the minimum old age pension amount; and,

b. While calculating pensions in accordance with Article 39, Paragraph b. of this Law—75 percent of the amount stipulated by Paragraph a. of this Article for families of corresponding categories of military personnel and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel.

Article 41. Calculation of Pensions for Orphans

A pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner can be calculated for families of compulsory service military personnel that have children who have lost both parents (orphans) based on the total salaries of both parents in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR."

Article 42. The Period for Which a Pension is Granted

A pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner is established for the entire period during which the family members of the deceased are considered to be unable to work (Article 33) and for family members who have reached: Men—60 years of age and, women—55 years of age—for life.

Article 43. Granting One Pension for all Family Members. Allocating a Portion of a Pension

One overall pension is granted to all family members who have the right to a pension,

At the request of a family member, that person's share of the pension can be allocated and paid to that person separately.

Allocation of a portion of a pension is conducted from the first of the month following the month in which the application for division of the pension arrived.

Article 44. Changing the Pension Amount and Ceasing Payment of it

If a change occurs in a family that has been granted a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner as a result of which individual family members or the family as a whole loses the right to a pension, pension recalculation or cessation of its payment occurs from the first of the month following the month in which the change occurred.

Article 45. Procedures and Time Periods for Establishing Disability of Family Members

Regulations about procedures and time periods for establishment of a disability set forth in Articles 21, 29, and 31 of this Law appropriately apply to family members who are disabled.

5. Calculation of Pensions

Article 46. Salary (Monetary Allowance) for Calculation of Pensions

Pensions granted to compulsory service military personnel and their families in accordance with this Law are calculated according to prescribed standards in percentages of average monthly salary that military personnel received prior to being conscripted into military service or after release from military service until application for pensions or in percentages of average monthly monetary allowances received by military personnel during the period they performed military duties under contract. Furthermore, average monthly salary (monetary allowances) for calculating their pensions is determined in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

Pensions are established for compulsory service military personnel, who did not work prior to being conscripted into military service or after release from military service and who are not on military service on contract, and for their families in the minimum amounts prescribed according to Articles 24 and 40 of this Law.

Pensions for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families are calculated from monetary allowances of these military personnel and command and rank and file personnel. Furthermore, the appropriate salaries, military or special rank, and percentage increase for length of service (continuous work) are taken into account in the procedure and amounts determined by the USSR Council of Ministers for calculating their pensions.

Article 47. Recalculation of Pensions from Higher Salaries

After being granted disability pensions, pensioners among compulsory service military personnel who have worked no less than two years at a higher salary than that upon which the pension was calculated establish a new pension amount based on their application and proceeding from the salary determined according to the procedure prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR." Recalculation of pensions granted in a minimum amount as a result of the absence of a salary are conducted under these same conditions.

A new recalculation of a pension is conducted at a pensioner's request in the event of a further increase in his salary. Each subsequent pension recalculation is conducted no earlier than two years after the previous recalculation.

Article 48. Calculation of Pensions for Pensioners' Families

Pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are calculated for families of pensioners who were military personnel or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel based on the same salary (monetary compensation) from which the breadwinner's pension was calculated.

Families of pensioners who were compulsory service military personnel who had the right to recalculation of a pension according to the procedure stipulated by Article 47 of this Law and pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner are calculated from the salary from which the indicated pension recalculation was conducted or could have been conducted.

Article 49. Increase of Minimum Pension Amounts and Maximum Salary Amounts

Minimum pension amounts granted to military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families and increases to these pensions determined based on the minimum wage and also maximum salary size taken into account to calculate pensions for compulsory service military personnel and their families are increased with minimum wage increases. Furthermore, their increase is carried out from July 1st if the minimum wage increase has been conducted prior to July 1st or from January 1st of the next year if the minimum wage increase occurred on July 1st or later.

Article 50. Application of Rayon Coefficients to Pension Amounts

Pensions are granted to pensioners who were officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and members of their families who reside in rayons where rayon coefficients have been prescribed for workers and employees salaries for the time periods during which they reside in these rayons in accordance

with this Law (including minimum amounts) are calculated with the application of the appropriate rayon coefficient prescribed in this rayon for workers and employees of non-production sectors but no greater than a coefficient of 1.5.

Pensions are calculated for pensioners who were compulsory service military personnel and for members of their families for the period of residence in rayons where rayon coefficients are added to workers and employees salaries according to the procedure prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

6. Granting Pensions

Article 51. Pension Grant Applications

Pension grant applications for compulsory service military personnel and members of their families are submitted to the rayon (city) department of social security or to another social security organization (Hereinafter referred to as rayon (city) social security department) that corresponds to it at the location of their residence and for officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and members of their families—to USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, or USSR Committee for State Security pension organizations.

Article 52. Organizations that Grant Pensions and Time Periods for Examination of Documents on Granting Pensions

Pension granting commissions grant pensions to compulsory service military personnel and to their families (Article 100 of the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR") and USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, or USSR Committee for State Security pension organizations grant pensions to officers, warrant officers, extended service military, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families (taking into account Article 10, part one).

Pension granting organizations review pension granting documents no later than 10 days after their arrival.

Article 53. Pension Granting Time Periods

In accordance with this Law, pensions are granted:

- a. To compulsory service military personnel—from the date of discharge from the hospital but no earlier than from the date of release from military service if VTEK establishment of disability and application for pensions occurred no later than three months respectively from the date of discharge from the hospital or from the date of release from military service and for families of compulsory service military personnel and pensioners who were military personnel—from the date of the death of the breadwinner or the origin of the right to a pension but no more than 12 months before application for a

pension. A pension is awarded to parents or the wife of military personnel and pensioners who have obtained the right to a pension as a result of loss of livelihood from the date of application for a pension; and,

b. To officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel—from the date of release from service but no earlier than the date prior to which they were approved monetary allowances and for families of these military personnel and command and rank and file personnel and pensioners among them—from the date of the breadwinner's death but no earlier than the date prior to which monetary allowances or a pension were paid to him except for the following cases of granting them pensions from later time periods:

The indicated military personnel and command and rank and file personnel who have been recognized as disabled at the expiration of three months from the date of release from service or as a result of an accident or illness that occurred after release—from the date the disability is established and those condemned to imprisonment—from the date of application for pensions after release from the site of imprisonment;

Family members of the indicated military personnel, command and rank and file personnel, and pensioners among them who have acquired the right to a pension after the death of the breadwinner—from the date of origin of the right to a pension and, parents or wife who have acquired the right to a pension as a result of the loss of the source of livelihood—from the date of the application for a pension.

A pension for past time when an application is submitted late is granted from the date of origin of the right to a pension but no more than 12 months prior to the application for a pension.

Article 54. Time Periods for Recalculation of Granted Pensions

When circumstances arise that entail a change in pension amounts granted to compulsory service military personnel and their families, recalculation of these pensions occurs in accordance with the time periods prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR."

Recalculation of pensions granted to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families is conducted from the first day of the month that follows the month in which the circumstances occurred that entail a change in pension amount. Furthermore, if the pensioner acquired the right to a pension increase, the difference in the pension for the past time can be paid to him for no more than 12 months.

7. Pension Disbursements

Article 55. Pension Disbursement Organizations

Social security organizations at the pensioner's actual place of residence disburse pensions to pensioners who were compulsory service military personnel and members of their families regardless of official residence.

USSR State Workers' Savings and Credit Bank institutions disburse pensions to pensioners who were officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and members of their families at the location of the pensioner's actual residence regardless of official residence based on the appropriate documents processed by USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and USSR Committee for State Security pension organizations.

Article 56. Disbursement of Pensions to Pensioners when There is Salary or Other Income

Pensions granted in accordance with this Law are completely disbursed regardless of whether or not the pensioner has a salary or other income.

Article 57. Pension Disbursements for Past Time

Pension amounts calculated for pensioners who were servicemen, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families and not claimed by them in a timely manner are disbursed for no more than three years prior to the application for receipt of a pension.

Pension amounts not received by pensioners in a timely manner due to an error by an organization that grants or disburses pensions are disbursed for the past time period without any limitations whatsoever.

Article 58. Pension Disbursements to Pensioners Who Reside in Boarding Homes

The difference between a pension and the cost of maintenance in a boarding house (hotel) is paid to single pensioners who were servicemen or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel and who reside in boarding homes (hotels) for the elderly or disabled but no less than 25 percent of the pension granted and no less than 20 percent of the minimum monthly old age pension amount. If a pensioner who resides in a boarding house (hotel) for the elderly or disabled has disabled family members who are his dependents and who belong to the circle of people provided pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner, the pension is subject to payment in the following order: 25 percent of the pension but no less than 20 percent of the minimum old age pension amount is paid to the pensioner himself and the remaining portion of the pension but no more than 50 percent of the amount granted is paid to a designated family member.

Pensioners who are family members of military personnel or internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel are paid 10 percent of the pension granted but no less than 20 percent of the minimum monthly old age pension amount during the period of residence in boarding houses (hotels) for the elderly or disabled. In those cases when the amount of the pension exceeds maintenance costs at the boarding house (hotel), they are paid the difference between the pension and the maintenance costs but no less than 10 percent of the pension granted and no less than 20 percent of the minimum old age pension per month.

Article 59. Pension Disbursement During a Stay at an Inpatient Treatment Facility

A pension is completely paid during a pensioner's stay at an inpatient treatment facility (at a military hospital, clinic, hospital or other treatment institutions) and also at a hospital for lepers.

Article 60. Halting Pension Disbursement During Imprisonment

Payment of a pension is halted during the period of confinement in the event a pensioner is imprisoned.

Article 61. Pension Deductions

Deductions from pensions granted to servicemen, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families are conducted in the manner prescribed by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR." Furthermore, pension sums paid in excess to pensioners who were officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families as a result of abuse on their part are withheld based on USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and USSR Committee for State Security pension organization decisions.

Article 62. Pension and Allowance Disbursements in the Event of a Pensioner's Death

Pension sums owed to pensioners, who were servicemen, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, or members of their families and left under-received as a result of his death, are not included as part of the inheritance and are paid to those members of his family who belong to that circle of people provided pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner.

However, the parents, wife, and also family members who resided with the pensioner on the day of his death have the right to obtain this sum in the event that they are not in the circle of people who are provided pensions in the event of the loss of the breadwinner.

When several family members apply for the sum owed, the pension is equally divided among them.

The sums mentioned above are paid if application for them has occurred no later than six months after the pensioner's death.

In the event of a pensioner's death, his family is paid a burial allowance amounting to two months pension.

If the pensioner's burial is conducted by persons other than his family, they are paid an allowance in a sum that does not exceed the actual internment expenses borne within the limits of the allowance amount indicated above.

Article 63. Pension Payments when Emigrating Abroad

Military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families who have emigrated for permanent residence abroad are not granted a pension in the USSR.

Pensions granted are paid to the above named persons in the USSR until emigration for permanent residence abroad in the manner stipulated by the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens in the USSR."

8. Pension Recalculation Procedure

Article 64. Recalculation of Previously Granted Pensions

Recalculation of previously granted pensions for military personnel, internal affairs organization command and rank and file personnel, and their families as a result of this Law taking force is conducted according to the documents that are in pension files at the time of recalculation. If pensioners subsequently submit additional documents that give them the right to further pension increases, recalculation is conducted at a later time but no more than 12 months from the date that the additional materials are submitted and no earlier than the date that this Law enters into force.

Article 65. Salary Taken into Account During Pension Recalculations

Recalculation of pensions granted to compulsory service military personnel and their families prior to this Law entering into force can be conducted from the average monthly salary for the five years prior to the Law entering into force or prior to granting the pension, or based on the salary from which the pension was previously calculated, in accordance with the pensioner's choice.

Article 66. Pension Increase as a Result of Changes of the Cost of Living Index and Wage Increases

Pensions calculated from wages (monetary compensation) in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 23-26, 39, and 40 of this Law are increased annually taking into account changes in the cost of living index and wage increases in the manner determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet but no less than two percent of the salary (monetary compensation) from which the pension is calculated.

Enactment of Law 'On Pension Support to Servicemen'

90UM0629B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Enactment signed by USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov, Moscow, the Kremlin, April 28, 1990: "USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On Procedures for Enacting the Law of the USSR 'On Pension Support to Servicemen'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To enact the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Servicemen" (Hereinafter referred to as the Law) on January 1, 1991 and with respect to pensions for disabled war veterans, other war veterans, and the families of deceased servicemen—on October 1, 1990.

2. Pensions granted to compulsory service military personnel and their families prior to enactment of this Law, including minimum pensions, are increased to amounts prescribed by the Law when recalculated with the addition of the appropriate increases but no less than five rubles per month in cases where an individual has been on a pension for up to five years inclusively, and 10 rubles—from 5 to 10 years, 15 rubles—from 10 to 15 years, 20 rubles—from 15 to 20 years, 30 rubles—from 20 to 25 years and, 40 rubles—from 25 or more years (without taking into account increases provided for by Article 28 of the Law).

When a subsequent minimum pension amount increase occurs as a result of minimum wage increases, pension recalculation occurs without taking into account the 40 ruble pension increase mentioned above.

3. Recalculation of pensions granted to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel, internal affairs command and rank and file personnel, and their families are conducted in the following manner until the Law is enacted:

a) Service, disability, and loss of breadwinner pensions, including minimum pensions, are recalculated according to the standards prescribed by the Law that have been established on the date this Law enters into force while proceeding from the standards and types of monetary allowances taken into account during calculation of pensions for appropriate categories of servicemen and internal affairs command and rank and file personnel who are on active duty. Furthermore, pensions are increased no less than 5-40 rubles per month depending on duration of time on a pension that has been stipulated by Paragraph 2 of this Resolution (without taking into account increases provided for by the second half of Article 17 and by Article 28);

b) Old age pensions granted to officers in accordance with legislation previously in force are increased by 40 rubles per month. In accordance with the desires of these pensioners, they can be granted service or disability pensions in accordance with the standards prescribed by

the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Servicemen" or old age pensions in accordance with the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Citizens of the USSR."

4. Deceased servicemen's loss of breadwinner pensions paid to parents and wives (who have not remarried) and also loss of breadwinner pensions or disability pensions since childhood as a result of wounds, contusions, or serious injury associated with combat operations during the Great Patriotic War or its aftermath are increased by 15 percent of the minimum amount of the old age pension over and above the increase stipulated by paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Resolution.

5. Retain what has been enacted until the Law enters into force by:

—granting and paying pensions to cosmonauts who are servicemen and to their families; and,

—paying pensions to pensioners who were servicemen or internal affairs command and rank and file personnel and to members of their families who previously emigrated abroad if this procedure provides more favorable conditions than prescribed by this Law.

6. The USSR Council of Ministers will: Adopt the required normative acts within a two month period for application of the Law of the USSR "On Pension Support to Servicemen" on issues considered by the Law to be within the jurisdiction of the USSR Council of Ministers. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 46 of the Law, provide unity in determining the monetary allowance for various categories of servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces, USSR Committee for State Security [KGB] troops and organs, internal troops, railroad troops, other military formations, and internal affairs command and rank and file personnel;

Implement measures that provide for timely accomplishment of work for recalculating, granting, and paying pensions in accordance with the Law;

Submit a proposal on procedures and time periods for increasing pensions as a result of changes in the cost of living index and wage increases to the USSR Supreme Soviet (Article 66 of the Law) simultaneously with the draft Law on indexing the population's income.

7. While pensions are being recalculated in accordance with the Law, afford the USSR State Committee for Work and Social Issues the right to adopt, jointly with the USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and USSR Committee for State Security, decisions on the procedures for its implementation including those affecting individual categories of servicemen and internal affairs command and rank and file personnel and make it mandatory for ministries and departments of the USSR and the union republics.

8. Recommend Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics and local Soviets of people's deputies implement required measures to provide additional

social protection guarantees and improvement of pensioners living conditions among internal affairs command and rank and file personnel and their families in accordance with the Law.

Effects of Long-Term Exposure on Personnel Working in Chernobyl Area

90UM0637A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 90 p 4

[Article, published under the rubric "Encounter," by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Goncharov: "Cesium Garrison SOS"]

[Text] ...We live in an area which was subjected to radiation contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. For the first three years they concealed everything from us. We were told that everything was fine, that everything was normal. We have now learned that there is indeed radiation and that most of the foodstuffs we are consuming are contaminated.

But who has done anything for us and our children? In September 1989, in response to a letter we wrote, a board of inquiry was established by the Ministry of Defense, which visited our area. We were told by the board chairman, Maj Gen Avn G. Khramtsov: "Our board possesses full competence and authority. There will be nobody greater or higher than this board." He assured us that they had come to help us, that they would not leave us in the lurch, since we are considered as coming under the Ministry of Defense and, together with our husbands, are performing a single common duty to the homeland.

A good deal of time has gone by, and apparently the board did not really possess authority and was unable to help us. The sum total result of its effort is an illuminated display which shows radiation level. And that is about it. There have been no other changes. We are consuming the same local produce, our children are drinking contaminated milk, and there are no juices, strained vegetables or fruits in the stores. It is true that some of the board members said that there is nothing bad in the fact that a small amount of cesium and strontium will get into one's system together with ingested food.

But we do not like this! Who will guarantee that elevated radiation will not affect our health and the health of our children? Who will give us a guarantee for the future? The fact is that we are already experiencing weakness, a tendency to get tired rapidly, and diminished fitness.... Children experience fainting and bleeding from the nose. How can you call this a healthy generation? Practically not a single sanatorium voucher is sent to our children for the summer, even for those who suffer from chronic ailments. They offer only Pioneer camps in Pskov and Kurgan. Requests for transfer submitted by our husbands are turned down even when the grounds are state of health of family members, since we are very short of personnel.

...The Ministry of Health of the republic on whose territory this base is located has drawn up a list of ailments for which residence in localities subjected to contamination is contraindicated. But once again this has not applied at all to us. Nor do we have any social protection whatsoever.

...Can it be that the Ministry of Defense cannot find any way to help us? How can we go on like this? We have lived through this for four years now. What will the fifth year bring?

Zhuchkina, Chelkasova, Kovaleva, Dvoryakova....136
signatures in all

This distress signal was received from a certain garrison. Maj Gen Avn Gennadiy Andreyevich Khramtsov, chairman of the board of inquiry which investigated the situation at that garrison, provided us with some detail: "I mentioned the high degree of competence of our board of inquiry. In addition to military specialists, we enlisted the services of experts from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Minsk, who responded to our request to help determine the radiation situation."

Just what did the board determine? Here are some of its conclusions: the gamma radiation exposure dose rate on the base exceeds the natural background level by a factor of 2-2.5, and exceeds it by a factor of 10 at certain points in grassy areas away from residential locations. The board failed to discover, however, any cases of medical problems connected with the effect of radiation. It noted, however, that over the course of the last three years children have shown an increase in affections of the endocrine organs and vascular system....

More than seven months have passed since the board completed its work. What has been done? The reader knows about the illuminated display. Major General of Aviation Khramtsov added that a staffing list has been drawn up for a radiation monitoring laboratory to be established (but when?) at the base. Contamination-free foodstuffs have begun to be supplied to the base on a supplemental basis. Twenty officers and nine warrant officers have been transferred to new duty stations.

Chief medical officer Col Med Serv V. Gritsenko assured us: "Everything necessary is being done to satisfy requests from this garrison for Pioneer camp travel and accommodation vouchers. The matter of sanatoria is also being resolved."

Therefore one cannot say that Moscow has failed to respond to these people's plight. But particular actions do not compensate for the lag in settling strategic issues. Troubling conclusions reached by the State Expert Commission which was conducting investigations in the stricken areas have been published in the press. For example, at the present time we do not yet know the actual magnitude of contamination of stricken areas with strontium, plutonium, and hot particles....

The disaster zone also contains—in addition to a civilian populace, which is being handled by the governments of the union republics and local soviets—military garrisons, airfields, various facilities, supply depots and other military installations under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense. People are stationed at these installations, and their families are living with them. What measures are being taken to give urgently-needed assistance to these people?

I put this question to Lt Gen Nikolay Nikolayevich Dolgin, deputy chief of USSR Civil Defense.

"You are asking the wrong person," he initially replied. "The government instructed us to perform physical radiological decontamination of populated localities and areas within the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant zone, and our units are performing this work. I cannot tell you anything about military garrisons. I do not know the situation there, because I am responsible for the civilian population.

"I agree, however, that I should know. Especially about the situation at restricted garrisons where civilians and the families of military personnel are living and working. We are apparently seeing a stereotype in action here: our military people will always be able to take care of themselves and their loved ones. They have plenty of equipment, instrumentation, and a smoothly-functioning, mobile organization. You know, I recall an incident: they were evacuating everybody from a town threatened by the consequences of an accident at a chemical plant. Whom did they think about first? Civilians. Whom did they almost forget? The people at a military base situated next to the town. It took a while to come to the realization that they too needed help. Military people! They are perfectly knowledgeable and can handle any exigency! It turned out that our assistance was timely indeed. So there is a problem here. We shall give it some thought.

"In conclusion, it would not be a bad idea for us at the Ministry of Defense to have a center which would coordinate the actions of all subunits aimed at neutralizing the consequences of major accidents and disasters. Incidentally, the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff recently signed a directive calling for the establishment of a non-T/O working group tasked with drawing up and overseeing Chernobyl disaster recovery measures. Time will tell whether it could become such a center."

Scientists have not yet succeeded in completing the drafting of a plan for safe residence in areas subjected to radioactive contamination. For this reason a decision has been made at the governmental level to draw up two interlinked programs: an urgent measures program, and a long-range program. At the USSR Council of Ministers

I thoroughly examined the "State Union-Republic Program of Urgent Measures for 1990-1992 Pertaining to Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster Recovery," adopted by our country's Supreme Soviet on 25 April of this year. This program stipulates a great many measures: resettlement, improvement in the level of medical care and environmental cleanup, stabilization of the radiation environment, provision of contamination-free foodstuffs, establishment of an environmental radioactive contamination information system, and scientific support for addressing problems....

Just what from all this will the Ministry of Defense and our garrisons in the stricken areas receive in the way of special allocation? Say, for example, of the imported medical equipment and medicines which will be purchased for hard currency? Not one thing! And yet the program, I should note, costs more than 10 billion rubles. And not one kopeck of specific allocation will go to the military personnel who have performed and are continuing to perform an enormous volume of hazardous work activities in this zone! Just what is the meaning of this? Those who drew up the program replied: "We have received no suggestions or proposals from the Ministry of Defense."

Does this mean that the ministry will be compelled to finance its own post-Chernobyl operations? But one thing is quite obvious: "cesium" garrisons can be given something only at the expense of others. At the expense of already unfortunate, semi-indigent garrisons in the Far North, Transbaikalia, Far East, and Central Asia.... Can it be tempted to do so? In my opinion the answer is no, under no circumstances. It therefore probably makes sense to reexamine ministerial approaches to the problem. An integrated long-range state union-republic program is currently being drawn up to protect the population of the USSR against the effect of the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, a program which the USSR Supreme Soviet is planning to ratify by year's end. Its cost is estimated at tens of billions. The program must provide for specific-purpose financing and must provide for the emergency needs of the Ministry of Defense.

Recently our government has adopted a number of decisions which prescribe an aggregate of measures to aid the victims. Orders applying to the Ministry of Defense have been issued on the basis of decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers. But let us look the facts in the face: these are initial approaches to an enormous number of extremely difficult problems.

Here is a simple example. Families residing in localities where a restriction has been imposed on the consumption of locally-produced foodstuffs, including from private plots, if said families contain pregnant women, children under the age of 14, as well as family members with medical contraindications, may relocate if they wish. They will receive monetary compensation for property left behind, and the cost of their move will be

paid.... But what about the families of military personnel? Where are a wife and children supposed to go if her husband is stationed at a garrison in a contaminated area?

The labor performed by military personnel in Chernobyl disaster recovery efforts and military service at "cesium" garrisons which are deleterious to one's health should be adequately appreciated by the state. These people deserve it.

Rifle Stolen in Attack on Guard

90UM0637B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jun 90 p 3

[News item, published under the rubric "Direct Wire," by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Falichev, Yerevan, 2 Jun: "Another Attack"]

[Text] Recently there have been reported 48 incidents of attack on military personnel for the purpose of seizing weapons. One of the most recent of these incidents took place at approximately 5 a.m. on 31 May, near the community of Nurbashen [sic; Nubarashen]. The perpetrators, attacking a soldier on guard duty, stabbed him in the neck with a knife, seized his assault rifle, ammunition, and bayonet, and fled. Pvt Ye. Kyrykbayev, who had lost a great deal of blood, was taken to a military hospital in serious condition.

Unfortunately today such reports, which are reminiscent of the war years, are no rarity. It is distressing to acknowledge that hostile feelings toward the military have become widespread in this republic since 27 May. There have been incidents of physical assault on and insulting of individuals merely because they were wearing a military uniform. The entrances to many military establishments are presently barricaded with sandbags in case it becomes necessary to repulse an attack, and guards wearing body armor are posted at entrances. Officers are sending their families away to other cities.

It is paradoxical: the army, which was called in to perform a protective function, has been forced to defend itself. How long will this continue?

Critique of Reserve Training

90UM0637C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jun 90 p 4

[Article plus commentary, published under the rubric "Reporter, Take to the Road!" by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Dolgikh: "Temporary Duty With Hunger Strike"]

[Text] "Gentlemen: I, S. L. Plastun, am presently undergoing reserve military personnel refresher training.... The training activities are poorly organized, and we are not being treated well. Recently when we were standing in formation, unit commander Colonel Tatarkin insulted us,

as a consequence of which I am declaring a hunger strike until such time as he apologizes...." (From a letter to the editor).

This disturbing letter, phrased in no uncertain terms, frankly impelled me to drop what I was doing and travel to the locality. Here are the facts I learned. A month and a half ago 16 persons arrived at a military maintenance depot. It was necessary not only to house and clothe these persons and to provide them with three meals daily, but they also were to be made into specialists in repair and maintenance of combat equipment and armament. They managed to handle the first items, but things proved to be much more difficult with the training. And there were many reasons for this.

"First of all, the military commissariat did a poor job," explained depot commanding officer Col M. Tatarkin. "I don't know what determined their decision, but you've got to agree that it was foolish to send a rifleman [combat infantryman] to be retrained as a specialist in maintenance and repair of small arms [armorer]. In addition, we operate on the basis of economic accountability at our enterprise, and pay is based on end results. Who is going to want to bear the expense of training people?"

In short, depot management viewed the arrival of the reservists as another chain around their neck.

The reservists' attitude toward their duties was directly proportional to the way they were treated. They violated uniform regulations, drank, and sometimes ignored orders from superiors. The mutual antipathy grew. And then, a week before completion of their training, Col M. Tatarkin decided to hold an inspection with the reservists in hopes of improving their external appearance. Unfortunately his hopes were in vain. What Mikhail Ignatyevich saw upset him, and he directed some strong language at the reservists. Reserve Sergeant S. Plastun could not control himself and demanded an apology of the colonel. He received instead three days in the guardhouse. The result was an abrupt aggravation of the conflict, which escalated in an instant to extreme forms. Plastun declared a hunger strike. The fact is that this is a highly questionable method of protest. Incidentally, as it turned out, all this was more for show.... Particularly since the commanding officer soon rescinded his order.

In any case it is obvious that there was more to this conflict than met the eye. One might say that the soil was prepared by the entire atmosphere of the active-duty training stint. It is also obvious that today a great deal of revision and reexamination is needed in organizing refresher training for reserve personnel and that new approaches are needed in this important area.

We asked Maj Gen L. Kozhendayev, section chief, USSR Armed Forces General Staff, to comment on the facts presented in this report.

I have heard time and again from unit commanders that they are dissatisfied with the quality of selection of reserve personnel. But they themselves are to blame. According to the applicable documents, the entire responsibility for selection and training of military reservists is borne by the unit commanders.

In addition, their training is assigned to officers and warrant officers, who receive their pay independently of performance of production assignments. The maintenance depot commanding officer in question has a sufficient number of military specialist personnel under his command to provide training to military reservists.

At the same time one understands the problems of the head of an enterprise. We still lack sufficient housing to provide quarters to personnel, and we lack the capability to create other essential conditions as well. We are therefore at the present time working out a different approach to reservist training. The essence of this approach is that in the future people will undergo

reservist active-duty training at special locations, where they will be provided everything they need. This method is already being adopted in the line units.

Finally, in connection with transition to new forms of economic management and adoption of the far from perfect USSR laws on state enterprise (association) and on cooperative endeavor, we are receiving complaints about failure to pay the average monthly earnings at one's place of employment to military reservists for a period of active-duty training, as is required by the Universal Military Training Law. Some people are demanding that reservist training be discontinued. I should note that this is a utopian idea. As long as the military exists, it will need trained reserves. It is therefore essential to do everything possible to ensure that enterprise workforces do not suffer when somebody temporarily leaves to train for defending the homeland. We have made suggestions on this score. Improved laws are needed.

Screens On SU-27 Intakes Prevent Foreign Object Damage

90UM0329A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Special Correspondent Colonel A. Andryushkov: "Collision With A Bird"]

[Text] Singapore, February 21 (By telephone)—The Fifth Asian International Aerospace Show had just lowered its flags. Specialists' interest in Soviet equipment did not wane, however. They paid particular attention to the SU-27 fighter-interceptor.

During the show, the commander of the Australian Air Force went up in the aircraft and piloted it. The event was widely covered in the mass media. And now came another request. This time, Brigadier General Michael Teo, Commander of the Singaporean Air Force, expressed a desire to personally become convinced of the Soviet fighter's high maneuverability. M. Simonov, the leader of the Soviet delegation, consented.

The flight was made in the SU-27UB combat training aircraft on February 19. The rear cabin, which is to say the instructor's cabin, was occupied by Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Pugachev, a leading test pilot from the P. O. Sukhoy Experimental-Design Bureau.

The flight, in a piloting zone over the Indian Ocean between Singapore and Malaysia, lasted nearly 40 minutes. Four Singaporean Air Force fighters—two F-15s and two F-16s—met our fighter-interceptor when it left the zone and flew alongside it.

They returned to the Chenti airfield at low altitude. The route passed over jungle-covered Malaysian islands and the shallow waters of the Indian Ocean off Singapore's shores. Large concentrations of birds are to be observed in the area at this time of year.

After circling over the airport, to the delight of spectators and with cameramen from various television networks recording the event, the SU-27UB fighter-interceptor gently touched down on the runway.

"This is the best aircraft I have ever flown in," the Singaporean Air Force commander said of the Soviet airplane.

On land, the aircraft was turned over to the caring hands of specialists. The dual-control aircraft was met by the man who had the right to be the first to approach the pilots as they emerged from the cabin—aircraft technician Aleksandr Ivanovich Ivanov.

"No problems to report," the pilots told him.

Believe me, for an aircraft technician, that kind of statement is dearer than any decoration for meritorious service.

The pilots went off to a briefing. Aleksandr Ivanovich set about his duties—inspecting the SU-27UB. It was he

who found traces of blood and some gray feathers sticking to the engine intake. Ivanov immediately reported these signs of a collision with a bird to test engineer Yu. Korsakov. Along with aircraft mechanic Ye. Gavrilin, who came to assist them, they carefully examined the compressor and found rather deep dents on the first five blades of the first stage [stupen]. Decoding of data from a monitoring device that objectively records flight parameters and the power plant's performance only confirmed the pilots' words: no problems to report. This attests first of all to the high reliability of the engine, which was developed by the collective of the Lyulki Experimental-Design Bureau.

M. Simonov, general designer at the P. O. Sukhoy Experimental-Design Bureau, shared his hypothesis with me about how the bird might have been sucked into the fighter's air intake.

"The SU-27 fighter-interceptor," Mikhail Petrovich said, "has the following special feature. When flying with undercarriages down, the air intake is covered by special screens. They prevent foreign objects from being sucked into the engine. With undercarriage up, the protective screens are retracted as well. This is done in order to ensure the power plant's operation in other regimes. Apparently, when the pilots were flying at low altitude with undercarriage up, the engine 'trapped' the bird. And although the damage to the compressor was rather serious, it is impossible to establish the exact time of the collision—for not a single parameter of the power plant's operation showed any irregularity. Otherwise, the monitoring device would have recorded it instantly. The engine operated reliably, never missing a beat."

Nevertheless, Mikhail Petrovich Simonov decided to replace the engine. Ground specialists have now set about the necessary work. For the first time during the entire show, the pilots got a chance to see Singapore.

More Than 60 Percent Of Low Airspace Not Covered By Current Radars

90UM0329B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major V. Dernovoy, Correspondent and Organizer For the Moscow Air Defense District Newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU: "'Dead Zone': How It Formed In the Combat Formation Of One Air Defense Unit"]

[Text] When the combat work was over, a tired Lieutenant Colonel A. Tochilin put his hand on the plan position indicator, a sizable part of which was cut off by a black meandering line, and said:

"We don't see more than 60 percent of low airspace on the screen, on account of the elevation. You sit at the control panel and feel vulnerable."

"What if you raised the radar station to higher ground?"

"The detection equipment has already been raised to the maximum height."

"Are the commanding officers aware of the problem?"

"It was discovered five years ago during a flyover of the complex. But nothing has changed."

Despite the specialized nature of the cited dialogue, the reader no doubt understood what was at issue. It turns out that the anti-aircraft missile subunit's combat position, which is always selected with special care, fails to meet the necessary requirements. What does this mean? As the division commander, Lt Col Tochilin, said, the soldiers do not see 60 percent of the airspace at low altitudes on the indicator screens. To put it simply, this is a "dead" zone for them. And that being the case, the question necessarily arises of guarantees that the subunit can carry out its combat mission. Are there any?

One commander who visited the division reassured me, saying that within the overall defensive system, the division is capable of accomplishing its combat mission. That's true. But what does "in the overall system" mean? Just one thing: that the division has to rely on its neighbors and on the regiment command for help. But what if it has to act independently? This is a rare, almost exceptional, scenario, but one that is possible in a combat situation. It's no accident that even under the combat training program, many actions are practiced autonomously. And yet in this situation, the division could find itself helpless. When we take into account the fact that the subunit occupies a special place in the combat formation, covering the point of contact of two units, and that cruise missiles are used at just such low altitudes, it becomes clear that this is hardly acceptable.

From a statement by US Secretary of Defense R. Cheney (Washington, February 5, TASS): The United States does not intend to refrain from modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. "Strategic deterrence and the maintenance of sufficient nuclear forces remains the core of our strategy... Even if we reach an agreement on strategic offensive weapons, we still have to move forward in modernizing our strategic forces."

How could it happen that the combat position of an anti-aircraft missile subunit was chosen without regard for the technical possibilities of accomplishing its combat mission? Lt Col Tochilin explained: This was once the site of an old combat position that had become obsolete. And so it was decided to use it, in order to save money. Of course, it would have been costly for the state to build a new position. It's not very easy to find money these days. And this could not be overlooked. But we also want our defenses to be reliable, and no expense is too great to ensure this. Is this possible? The experience of the first days of the Great Patriotic War demonstrated something in this respect. And yet even today, combat readiness and expediency are sometimes accorded secondary importance. Yes, it is economically more advantageous to use an old position. But this advantage nonetheless comes at the expense of combat readiness. It

is fraught with unpredictable consequences for combat duty. Won't it turn out that, while coming out ahead in the short run, we will eventually lose out in the long run?

We have already discussed the division's "blindness" at low altitudes. Here is another example of "economizing." There used to be a cabin for the duty shift at the position. They haven't put up a new one because it was decided that the old one would do. But the distance from it to the cabins of the combat directorate is such that when an alert is called, the missile crews can't take up their work stations in the mandated period of time. One hardly need explain what this could lead to.

This is not to mention the psychological aspect of the matter: When they go on combat duty, the soldiers are aware of their helplessness: If they should have to act in a decentralized regime, will they accomplish their combat mission?

How can this situation be rectified? If we look at the overall picture and proceed from the requirements of combat readiness, there is only one solution: change the position.

"The unit's commanders forwarded several proposals on this score, substantiated in writing, to their superiors," the officers said. "They didn't get any reply."

The directorate's officers are not losing hope, however. They call attention to the division's problems at every opportunity. The question was raised at recent routine assemblies. It was promised that the division's combat mission would be modified—read "simplified." But doesn't this smack of institutionalizing a weak point in the capital's air defenses?

And how does the directorate of the Moscow air defense district's anti-aircraft missile force view the situation? Officer V. Dudchenko, a group chief, agrees that the interests of combat readiness require that the subunit be relocated. But there is no money to do so.

Nevertheless, if a state approach were taken to the problem, the money could be found. For example, from the sale of obsolete equipment to the civilian economy, equipment that, in a number of cases, is simply rusting away. Or from the rational use of funds at the regiment or formation level. After all, some of these funds have gone unspent for years, since industry no longer produces the objects and goods that, according to the old manuals, was permitted to buy. There is another source as well. Consider the cost to the state of the months it takes to process an officer's discharge. Now multiply that sum by the number of officers being discharged in the district and in the Armed Forces by the number of months of red tape—I'm sure it will be a considerable sum.

It would also be logical to think about the following. If, as specialists assure us, the unit (formation) is capable of accomplishing its mission without the participation of

the aforementioned division, maybe it would be better to eliminate the subunit altogether?

Meanwhile, the missile crews are going on combat duty with the same old set of problems and unhappy thoughts: Should anything happen, they will be held fully accountable for it. For they can be held criminally liable for failing to accomplish their combat mission. Then figure out to what extent the position was to blame and to what extent the missile crewmen were at fault. Isn't it a paradox? In carrying out their constitutional duty to protect the motherland's airspace, the soldiers could find themselves defendants, and by no means through their own fault. Those serving in the division cannot but understand this. It's no accident that the communists recently discussed the possibility of sending a letter to the CPSU Central Committee. Still, this would seem to be an extreme measure. The most important thing right now is prudence and good sense in accomplishing tasks of both local and statewide scope.

Record Climb Rate for Tu-142

90UM0639A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent A. Fedorov, Zhukovskiy, Moscow Oblast: "Heavenly Speedster"]

[Text] Three world records set by one-of-a-kind Tu-142 LL aircraft

The takeoff was swift. Hardly had the wheels of the heavy missile-carrying aircraft lifted off the concrete runway when a fifth, additional engine deployed downward out of the aircraft's belly. The massive, heavy craft, which is usually slow and sedate, shot skyward almost like a fighter, climbing dozens of meters within seconds, its engines roaring.

Four minutes and 23 seconds after liftoff, pilot in command Valeriy Vanshin radioed to the ground: "Altitude 6,000 meters, engines running smoothly." Slightly more than one minute later the Tu-142 reached an altitude of 9,000 meters. Impartial instruments recorded

two world records in rate of climb. But the aircraft continued climbing, and a new record for maximum altitude in level flight was set for aircraft in the 100-150 ton takeoff weight category—12,500 meters. It was an unprecedented feat in the history of aviation....

The heavy aircraft stood poised on the airfield at the Zhukovskiy Flight Test Facility imeni Tupolev. The standard Tu-142 long-range bomber [Bear-F+] had taken on an unusual configuration: it now looked like an enormous bird grasping a heavy load in its talons.

By mounting under the aircraft's wings a fifth, additional engine from the supersonic Tu-160 [Blackjack] strategic bomber, the designers at the Special Design Bureau imeni A. Tupolev have created an aircraft which is unique in all the world.

"The idea was simple," related senior test engineers S. Mokrousov and A. Bondarenko. "It is best to test new engines, just as aircraft, in the air. This required a thoroughly-tested, reliable regular-production aircraft. We decided on the Tu-142. Specialist personnel cut open the aircraft's belly, removed all armament, beefed up the fuselage with additional frames, and mounted a powerful jet engine on a special suspension mounting. In order to determine how the engine behaves in flight, Flight Research Institute engineers set up an entire system of monitoring and recording devices, which records more than 400 different parameters: pressure, temperature, speed. The aircraft has been turned into a flying laboratory."

Eleven persons were aboard the Tu-142 LL [designation letters stand for Flying Laboratory] during that record flight: pilot V. Vanshin and copilot A. Artyukhin, navigator V. Sedov and radio operator Yu. Ponomarev, flight engineer V. Merkulov and crew chief A. Kovalenko, engineers and experiment operators A. Bondarenko, S. Mokrousov, D. Bogdanov, and S. Solovyuk.

Particulars on the flight and documentary corroboration by aeronautical record officials have been submitted to the FAI [International Aeronautical Federation]. But this is not the end of it. In the near future they are planning to attempt new records—this time for altitude.

Complaint, Response on Extensive Delays in Warship Overhaul*90UM0364A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 First Edition p 2*

[Letter of complaint and response in the column: "A Letter and a Response": "Ships Languishing in Yards"]

[Text] In the middle of October of 1986 our ship was turned over to a repair yard so that medium repairs could be accomplished. After a list of jobs was compiled and agreed upon, a date of 30 November 1989 was set as the completion date. In the course of taking down the equipment and removing paint and insulation, it was discovered that the hull required additional work to counteract substantial corrosion wear, a development that necessitated composing a new estimate. When time started to run short, the yard management proceeded to adjust the repair schedule, rather than directing its efforts to discharging the obligations it had assumed. In February of 1989, the management came out with the proposal of moving the completion date to 30 September 1990. The commander of the Pacific Fleet approved the new completion date.

The repair yard management has since developed a new work schedule in which the completion date is carried over into the fourth quarter of 1991. There is no doubt that the naval authorities will acquiesce once more. We however believe that it is possible to complete the repairs within a shorter time period. All the necessary materials for our ship are ready and waiting at the dock. Nevertheless, the yard sees fit to use our materials in another ship requiring less work, so that it can claim restoration of a combat craft to sea duty. This provides the basis for "earned" monetary premiums both for the builders and the yard management.

This is the fourth year that the ship is in repair status. We did not study in higher Naval schools to wait around in repair yards for many years. Is there no need for qualified military cadres with experience gained in combat and on long cruises to perform sea duty? It is a fact that experience and practical skills are not something you can put on hold; they must be constantly improved. However, favorable conditions are not provided for this. Even elementary training tours of duty for officers and warrant officers aboard combat craft are not available, to say nothing of simulators and classroom sessions, which are not offered at all.

In addition, under what kind of conditions do we live? Some of the families have remained at the ship's permanent base, while others have gone to other cities to live with relatives. If you want to live with your family, you must look for housing, which is expensive. We all must rack our brains over how to obtain residency registration, employment for the wife, and nurseries and kindergartens for the children.

It is not surprising that of nine young officers that reported for duty aboard the ship in 1988-1989, six do

not wish to continue serving aboard the docked ship, and others intend to leave the Armed Forces. Warrant officers are quitting the ship.

We believe that the situation is no better in the case of crews of other ships undergoing repairs. This leads to the conclusion that a fundamental change in the attitude toward ship repair must come about.

A. Kostin, P. Kalatusha, I. Akhmerov,
and nine other signatures.

(Below is a response to the letter written by the patrol ship's crew. It was written by Captain 1st Rank B. Korennoy, chief engineer and deputy chief of the Technical Directorate, Navy.)

The setting of priorities for repairs comes under the purview of Naval command authorities. The respective Naval services should monitor the progress of the operations and demand that the yard complete the work on time. The letter from the patrol ship's crew addresses shortcomings on the part of the Naval Technical Directorate. That is only one aspect of the matter.

Setting back completion dates in a number of SRZ's [ship repair yards] of the USSR Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] has unfortunately become the norm. Long-term anchorage of ships at ship repair docks is due primarily to limited production allocations to the Navy. Why not assign fewer ships to repair yards and allocate the necessary funds to effect rapid progress of technical readiness? That is what a person may ask if he views the situation from below. Viewing the situation from a higher level, however, it is seen that an enterprise must take on a larger number of ships than that covered by the allocations received by the Navy so that all shops are engaged equally. With a constant number of ships for which repair arrangements are not drawn up, the Navy in turn must place the ships into this "backwater." This kind of situation can hardly be considered normal. The result is that ship repair plans are often not carried out; ships languish in yards; new work on ships develops; repair costs rise; crews are denied active combat training for long periods of time; and crew members' social interests suffer.

It could be assumed that both sides—the Navy and Minsudprom repair yard—suffer in such a case. That is not the case at all. Since most surface craft and diesel-powered submarines are not included in a state order, a yard can select the most favorable orders with which it can earn the most profit at least expense. With Navy orders, which require greater input of labor, expensive armament and military equipment, the SRZ sees greater advantage in taking on repair orders submitted by civilian departments (especially the Minrybkhkh [Ministry of the Fish Industry]). They have virtually no materials requirement. In addition, ships' crews are made available to yards as temporary labor, which tends to be of great assistance to yards in times of labor shortage. Repair plans for civilian ships are regularly overfulfilled. The enterprise's plan is fulfilled in general,

while combat ships wait years for return to service. It also happens that Naval logistical support organs discover additional work needed while repairs are in progress. This has an adverse effect on both regularity of yard operations and repair schedules.

Looking at one's problems without tying them into the general picture is fruitless and not quite fair, of course. To be more specific, one cannot be remiss in appreciating the general reduction in materials discipline for armaments and military equipment in the country, including ship repair yards; the severe shortage of certain kinds of specialists, especially electricians; the insufficient assistance the USSR Minsudprom renders yards relative to repair of modern ships, particularly aircraft-carrying craft. The positional flowline method of warship repair has long won a place in the developed sea powers. Our Minsudprom yards are still in no position to switch to general repair on the basis of a single order, for simultaneous work in all command departments. Estimation of work to be done, assignment of labor, and determination of prices are still not structured to achieve the end result: completion of repair work on time.

The Navy has on several occasions reported to the government the unsatisfactory state of warship repair. The existing situation has been studied by the USSR Committee of People's Control, which has arrived at findings that are not encouraging. It must be stated emphatically that this approach to the restoration of technical readiness of Naval ships is shortsighted. Yes, the international situation does tend to diminish tensions. Nevertheless, the logic of words must be differentiated from the logic of deeds: Our political opponents are adamant in their refusal to include in the armaments reduction dialogue the possibility of effecting reductions in naval forces.

It must be stated that NATO's naval forces are experiencing their "golden age" in their reliance on a powerful ship construction and repair base. If we proceed to make decisions without taking this factor into account, this would be tantamount to our accepting a great responsibility for our Navy and the defensive capability of the country.

Crews Permitted to Phone Relatives During Extended Voyages

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 90
First Edition p 4*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3rd Rank P. Ischenko: "A Call for You from Sea: Navy Institutes Ship-to-Shore Personal Radiotelephone Service"]

[Text] Galina Matveyevna Voronina was busy doing household chores when she was suddenly called to the phone. She was puzzled as she picked up the instrument. The telephone operator verified her name and said to her, "A Call for You from Sea." She soon heard the voice

of her husband—Captain 3rd Rank Sergey Yuryevich Voronin. Had she not known that he was aboard a ship on sea duty a thousand miles from the Arctic base, she certainly would have thought this to be a game. However, what was happening was a reality. This became possible due to the institution of personal radiotelephone service for crews of ships on extended tours of sea duty, so that they can call their immediate families at home or their relatives.

"We had the technical facilities for instituting this kind of communication as long as 20 years ago," said Captain 1st Rank S. Trufanov. "However, security considerations, now thought to be exaggerated, prohibited this practice. It is good that common sense has come into play."

Indeed, navymen have until recently been at a disadvantage compared to their civilian colleagues, who for some time have enjoyed the privilege of frequent radiotelephone contact with the shore. It is true that several years ago officers and warrant officers were granted permission to send ashore a short telegram once every two weeks from a ship that was at sea longer than 15 days. This practice was not widespread, however. Then the Navy decided to set up regular personal radiotelephone service, starting on 1 February of this year.

"We were able to initiate the service as early as 22 January, before the appointed time, by doing the necessary setup work," remarked Captain 2nd Rank N. Kozorez, chief of the Naval Communications Control Center.

At first no limits were set on calls, with the result that the naval telecommunications centers through which radio communication lines to apartment telephones are switched were literally overloaded to the point of breakdown, due to the excessive load imposed by seamen anxious to talk. The nuclear-powered missile cruiser "Kirov" alone put through in four days 115 calls from her crew to their families. That was when it became necessary to devise some kind of schedule. In accordance with the latter, each Navy ship on extended cruise is authorized to put through six calls a day, while the total amount of time allotted to effect this mode of communication is several hours per day for all ships. Each call is limited to 10 minutes. However, there is an aspect here that calls attention to itself. Six calls a day is the limit for any ship, regardless of her officer and warrant officer strength. What about the case of the cruisers "Kirov" and "Baku" on the one hand, and minesweepers and small subchasers on the other? Aboard the former, an officer or warrant officer can call home once every six to eight weeks, while aboard the latter, every seven to 10 days. This amounts to some kind of social unfairness. There apparently is a basis for removing this inequity, by tying the number of radiotelephone calls to the number of persons enjoying this privilege aboard a particular vessel.

What about submariners? They also must spend long periods of time at sea and have just as much need as

surface seamen for brief news from home. The reason given for the unresolved status of this problem is the need for submarine secrecy. However, American and English submarines are concerned over this as much as we, but they are still able to receive from home telegrams consisting of several dozen words. Our boats also carry out radiotelephone communications with the shore. Then why not transmit personal type messages by rendering transmissions of political information shorter but still meaningful?

Something else, also. There is more that can be done relative to providing crews with communications service. For example, in the middle of March the Navy is to conduct an experiment whereby crew members will be able to send and receive telegrams of 20 words once every two weeks, being that not all homes are equipped with a telephone. The problem here is providing this service while maintaining confidentiality of personal conversations. Let us hope that a solution satisfactory to all will be found.

Tajik Civil Defense Official Responds to Questions on Role

90US0785A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 2

[Article written in response to readers' letters by the Chief of Staff of Tajik Civil Defense, Maj Gen F.R. Niyazov: "The Civil Defense Forces Must Operate in an Extreme Situation"]

[Text] [Readers' Letters] "The Civil Defense aides say a great deal about the procedure for preparing and employing its forces to eliminate the consequences of an enemy attack, emergencies, catastrophies and natural disasters. But all of this is on paper. And life often throws us 'practical tasks' such as Armenia, Tajikistan, Arzamas and Bashkiria.... And we do not know how they were actually carried out. Were the nonmilitarized formations employed and to what degree?"

"I would like to obtain reliable information on the actions of the troop units and the various CD [Civil Defense] subunits in the course of eliminating the consequences of the earthquakes in Tajikistan."

"It has been very difficult to watch the broadcasts and reports on the use of working dogs from foreign countries to locate victims. Where are our four-footed rescuers? What conclusions and lessons, even preliminary ones, have been made and drawn by the CD bodies?" [End of Reader Letters]

Readers have turned frequently to the editors with these and similar questions. We have asked that the Chief of Staff of the Tajik Civil Defense, Maj Gen F.R. Niyazov, reply to the readers.

[Niyazov comments] Tajikistan is an area of high mountains and deep gorges. Here there are frequent earthquakes, avalanches, rockfalls, the strong movement of glaciers, mudflows which wipe from the face of the earth entire villages and fertile fields. This is why in our republic the constant readiness of the nonmilitarized CD formations plays a crucial role.

The Dzhirgatal earthquake is fresh in our memory and here on 27 October 1985, late at night the people felt a strong underground jolt. It was precisely calmness and organization which contributed to the fact that the harm caused by it was not so great. On the eve of the 7-point underground conflagration in Dzhirgatal'skiy Rayon a planned integrated exercise had been conducted. Extraordinary commissions, staffs at the national economic installations, the administrative bodies and the CD forces had worked through the questions of eliminating the consequences of nature's arbitrariness. This is why the CD forces of the rayon and the sovkhoses acted precisely and courageously. The work was carried out according to the designated plan which at one time had been worked out for the eventuality of natural disasters, emergencies and catastrophies.

The earthquake in Kayrakkum...the rescue teams, the medical teams, the representatives of the CD technical service demonstrated true examples of valor, heroism and self-sacrifice in rescuing persons from under the ruins of the first stage of the carpet combine.

Also proving themselves positively were the nonmilitarized CD formations in Dangarinskiy Rayon in eliminating the natural disaster in Sargazon.

The CD forces were effectively deployed within a few minutes after receiving the alert on the earthquake in Gissar and obtaining precise data on its epicenter last year. The republic CD Staff grouped them in the crucial sectors. They cleared rubble, removed victims from destroyed houses, provided medical aid, evacuated the population, pushed roads through the collapsed earth, rebuilt power transmission and communications lines and set up temporary housing. The CD soldiers in a short period of time set up tent schools, bathhouses, stores and public dining enterprises for the inhabitants of the villages of Sharora, Okulibolo and Okulipoyen.

Literally within 2 hours after the disaster, the medical service formations from the republic CD arrived at the site of the tragedy. All the ambulances from nearby rayons and the city of Dushanbe were mobilized in a few minutes. Some 36 specialized ambulance medical brigades were dispatched immediately to the site of the disaster. Night and day the medics fought for the life of each man removed from under the rubble or carried out from a destroyed house at the site of the tragedy. The most severely wounded were taken to medical facilities in Gissarskiy and Leninskiy Rayons and to the capital clinics.

The warm gratitude of the residents was won by soldiers and officers from the CD units who from the very first day of the earthquake worked in the most difficult areas. They removed 77 persons who had perished from under the rubble. Pvts V. Dedushkin and V. Kayumov in disassembling a destroyed home saved a 6-year-old boy who miraculously remained alive. Pvts Nikolay Marshalko, Aleksey Gerasimovich and Yuriy Dudko found 50,000 rubles and returned them to the victims. The CD formations together with the military eliminated the danger of a breakthrough of water at a place where an irrigation canal had been blocked by mudflows, and where a lake had formed threatening one of the nearby settlements.

In line with this it must be pointed out that the systematic natural disasters which have occurred annually in the republic and particularly the Gissar earthquake have taught us instructive lessons. The most important of these is that CD should be ready for skillful, effective actions in any suddenly occurring extreme conditions. The consequences of a disaster can be significantly reduced, and in a number of instances even prevented, if the necessary preventive and emergency warning measures are carried out ahead of time.

In being developed upon the initiative and under the leadership of the CPSU, perestroika in all spheres of our society's life has become a reality. Being organically linked with the life of the people and serving their interests, USSR Civil Defense takes an active part in this process and is carrying out measures to radically restructure its activities.

The shortcomings of the period of stagnation did not bypass CD. To them were added our own oversights both on the strategic questions of construction as well as on the questions of the tactics of carrying out its tasks and measures.

We must not go to extremes and deny everything achieved in the previous years. However, a more constructive approach is a sober assessment and even a reassessment of everything done previously, proceeding from the demands of the times and the new conditions of life in the nation and society.

The accelerated pace and expanded scale of scientific-technical and production activity under present-day conditions are inseparably linked with the ever-growing use of complicated technical systems, increased risk in their operation and, consequently, a real threat to the health and life of people, to the environment and the normal functioning of production.

Let us recall what enormous amounts of money and effort were required to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. For long months, the customary pace was disrupted in the economic activities

of large regions of our country and many elements of state administration. A large number of leaders, scientists, construction workers, medical personnel and other specialists had to be diverted from their customary jobs and unplanned materials, equipment and transport had to be used.

These circumstances also necessitate new approaches to the questions of Civil Defense and to carrying out the tasks of ensuring a reliable defense of the population and the clear functioning of the administrative systems under any extraordinary circumstances.

The new tasks of protecting the populus against the destructive action of emergencies, catastrophies and natural disasters, the carrying out of rescue and other immediate work in the course of eliminating their consequences have increased the demands placed upon the readiness of the CD body and forces and increased the responsibility of the leaders for the correctness and promptness of the decisions taken and should be considered among the most important social measures to ensure the life and activities of the citizens. All of this at present is being put down in legislative, directive and normative documents. These should more concretely reflect the duties, rights and responsibility of the officials and all citizens for carrying out defense measures.

It is our duty to overcome the forces of inertia in solving the urgent problems. This will be a concrete contribution to the restructuring of Civil Defense and to increasing the readiness of its forces for action in any situation.

Planning Mechanism Blamed for Conversion Problems

90UM0331A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 24 Feb 90, 2d Edition, p 1

[Article by Yu. Sharipov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and general director of the Ufa Scientific-Production Association imeni Kirov: "Swords Into Washtubs?"]

[Text] At the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, we, the Soviet parliamentarians, were visited, as it were, by just one of our compatriots, the Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze. The main subject of our discussions with the leaders of the North Atlantic Assembly was conversion. And now, comparing our own and foreign experience, we can better see the current problems of the defense complex and which are constantly debated in our deputy Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security.

The numerical parameters of conversion in the USSR are known, and let me recall just two of them. In five years the defense enterprises plan to produce over 4,000 types of new equipment and consumer goods and the proportional amount of civilian products in the defense sectors will reach 60 percent. And there are no grounds for the alarmist question encountered in the letters from numerous voters: "Are we not disarming ourselves to such a degree that only DOSAAF will remain for the defense of the state?" The limits of a reasonable defense sufficiency have been calculated and no one will go beyond them. This is not the danger.

In the materials of the International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Assembly, among the resources which are now being reoriented to peaceful requirements there are mention of the "human resources" in the form of scientists, engineers, and technical specialists. And if we recall that for our nation conversion is virtually the last reserve of the economy, then we can grasp how carefully we must deal with these. But what happens in fact?

In Brussels we learned that the well-known West German firm Krauss-Maffei which until recently had produced the Leopard heavy tanks has now converted to the production of airfield tractors for passenger aircraft. Less expensive aviation fuel is consumed but it is also important that the firm has gone through conversion with minimum losses be these material, technological or organizational. It is a typical example for careful managers. In truth, with the decentralization of enterprises operating previously for defense requirements there are problems of personnel losses. But in our nation, there is no reason to conceal it, these processes are even more painful.

The large plants designed to produce complex military equipment are frequently forced to convert their conveyors to turning out washtubs, teapots or rakes.... It is no surprise that unique manufacturing facilities are lost and skilled specialists depart. At sessions of our deputy

committee we have repeatedly analyzed why such a thing happens. The problem, of course, is not in the idea of conversion. It lies elsewhere, in the planning system or more precisely in its stereotypes.

A simple example. Seemingly, the Ministry of Aviation Industry and Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, in bearing in mind the shortage of modern types of passenger aircraft and ships in the national economy, could within the context of conversion set out more actively to produce precisely such products. But these products are outside the embrace of conversion for a paradoxical reason that "they do not relate to consumer goods." For the leaders of the sectors and the plant directors, this formula, the absurdity of which, in my mind, is obvious, becomes a stumbling block on the path to a rational restructuring of the enterprises, shops and scientific research institutes and design bureaus. In my own work, I have encountered something similar to this: the telephone produced by our association, it turns out, is considered to be a consumer good, but the small telephone exchange with 60 numbers which, incidentally, has enormous demand with the kolkhozes, supposedly has no bearing on conversion. So seemingly there is no incentive to increase the output of such exchanges.

I feel the solution to this is to broaden the limits of conversion by including products involved with services. Then much would fall into place as the scarcity of transport and communications services, as is known, is just as great as the scarcity of pots and to produce pots or a washtub at aviation plants, in my view, is not a permissible luxury.

At present, the enterprises of the defense complex have been given a plan for the production of consumer goods and this plan has been increased by almost 30 percent. And things will be no easier for us in the future as the new laws which are currently being discussed in the Supreme Soviet virtually do not touch upon these enterprises due to the specific features of the sector where the state order prevails. Incidentally, precisely in the defense complex the decrepitness of the current approaches to planning can be seen particularly starkly.

In our association we had begun to produce school computers and electronic telephones and quickly came to realize that the suppliers were going to provide us with components for this equipment, at best, last. The inertia of considering consumer goods as something secondary is exceptionally vital. Moreover, I had encountered ultimatum from suppliers from the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry or the Ministry of Electronics Industry stating that if you want to receive components you must dispatch us cars and lumber.... Generally, in knowing about all of this, a director has to give some thought and then may decide to take on a 30-percent "build-up" which is easier than washtubs or rakes.

The situation is largely caused by the fact that we are converting to direct ties and in essence there is no wholesale trade. And from this comes the "industrial

rocket" or the ultimatums from suppliers who extort material incentive funds from the defense plants. Under present-day conditions, it makes no sense for a supplier to increase the volume of his own production more than 3 percent as the "4-percent letter" which the deputies mentioned with indignation at our first congress has dealt a strong blow against the interests of the production collectives to quickly build up product output including products related to conversion.

As we learned in Brussels, in the West the market helps conversion. But we have different conditions. And hence we can scarcely hope that this will quickly manifest itself by an abundance on the store shelves. We need time. But, on the other hand, in virtually standing idle, the defense plants and design bureaus, as has already been said, are wasting potential which is the property of all the people.

Where is the way out? I see this in a law on conversion the necessity for which, in my mind, has become vital. This could regulate planning for the output of the corresponding goods and the relationships between the production and scientific-research collectives and systematize supply. It is a mistaken notion that conversion should involve only the defense sectors. The entire system of our national economy needs a definite "tuning" and significantly more profound efforts are required than may seem. Before the war, at a price of the greatest effort, it was possible to convert all industry to defense requirements in a single year. In my view, there is no reason to hope that the reverse process would be any easier.

We still have not received from the government the conversion programs for the 13th Five-Year Plan although this document should have been submitted to our deputy committee in December. As for the 1990 plan, we have examined it in the committee. The conclusion is that there are good intentions but it will scarcely be possible to carry them out for the reasons which I have set out above.

Let us speak directly: for now conversion has not given us anything except the 6.4 billion rubles saved in the military budget and the 500,000 former servicemen who are now being shifted to work in the national economy. At the same time, its opportunities are incomparably greater. However, without having any state enforceable enactment and a mechanism for managing conversion, we, I am afraid, risk ending up back where we started.

Maj Gen Benov: Slow Conversion, Increase Funds for Transport Aviation

90UM0391D Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 8, 19-25 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with Maj Gen G.M. Benov, chief of the Soviet Air Force Political Directorate and candidate for People's Deputy, by L. Baynazarova: "Unity—the Guarantee of Renewal"]

[Text]

Short Biography.

G.M. Benov was born in 1941 to the large family of a miner in the city of Kemerovo. His father died at the front and his mother died when he was 16 years old. In 1964, Benov graduated with distinction from Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Flight School. He served as a pilot and as a senior pilot in the Southern Group of Forces. He has been involved in party political work since 1968. He graduated from the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin through correspondence in 1975. He was awarded the title of "Military Pilot-Expert Marksman" in 1980. He was decorated with the Order For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, third degree. He has headed the Air Force Political Directorate since 1989. He is married and has three sons.

Three candidates are competing for one Russian Federation People's Deputy mandate in the Tikhoretskiy National Territorial Electoral District 18 (Krasnodar Kray). Three personalities, three bold, new thinking, aggressive participants in perestroika. One of them is Major General of Aviation Gennadiy Matveyevich Benov, member of the Military Council and head of the Air Force Political Directorate. Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Flight School collective nominated him.

[Baynazarova] Gennadiy Matveyevich, previously during the so-called era of stagnation, your position in and of itself gave you the indisputable right to a People's Deputy mandate. Now you have to defend this right in a difficult campaign. What is your attitude toward this?

[Benov] Very positive. Only then will we be able to achieve the reorganization of our State's political system when power in its entirety will be in the hands of the Councils. And to do this the organs of people's power must consist not of deputies approved by the upper levels but from those whom the people themselves nominate and trust to defend their interests. And the fact that now no position provides the privilege of a deputy's mandate is an important victory for perestroika.

Finally, there is an end to the unsound practice when people formally voted for "their own" representative whom they had never seen. Yes and the candidate himself did not seek the voters. Why? That is how they vote! But now a campaign occurs for votes under elections on an alternative basis. And the candidate attempts to reach everyone. Conversations with the voters help you to understand them and to feel their faith in you with your heart. Can you really deceive the hopes of the people afterward?

[Baynazarova] Gennadiy Matveyevich, you are a general. And the majority of the residents in the electoral district where you vote are civilians. Did you not have any doubts that you could thoroughly comprehend their

concerns and aspirations? And what do you think, why did one of Krasnodar Kray's collectives nominate precisely you?

[Benov] I did not have any doubts: I know this Kray. It would be more appropriate to pose the second question to those who nominated me. And generally a very important period of my life has been associated with Krasnodar Kray, with this beautiful Kray and it has determined my career and the path of my entire life. I obtained the profession of pilot on Kuban soil, inside the walls of Yeysk VVAUL [Higher Military Aviation Flight School] whose collective also nominated me. I was molded as a military man and as a citizen here. I also became a communist here. As you can see, this land is very dear to me.

I think I am not mistaken if I say that the pilots understand and are certainly close to my views, aspirations, and positions as a man, an officer, and a communist and that is why they supported my candidacy. I have never attempted to seize authority from the "ruling chair." Only through work and through my attitude toward the assigned mission. I always support industrious enterprising people. I respect principles, honesty, erudition, competence, and of course, boldness in opinions in a man and the ability to defend his point of view. This is very important right now. I myself aspire to these character traits.

[Baynazarova] RSFSR People's Deputy. How do you see it?

[Benov] The work of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions made an enormous impression on me. I thought a lot and asked myself, what can and should a deputy do? What should he be? What does the core of his activities include? And I came to the conclusion that some deputies are acting dishonestly when in the complicated situation that has developed in the country they deceive both themselves and the people with empty demagoguery and with enticing promises about a bright tomorrow without thinking about today and about ways out of this crisis state in which the country finds itself.

Those who advance rash appeals and make impetuous decisions without an elementary analysis of the situation and without knowledge also do not conduct themselves seriously. I am convinced: A deputy must stand on a solid socio-political position, not resort to extremes, and have well thought-out views on the processes that are occurring. We, our children, and our grandchildren must live on this earth. And what kind of society we create today depends on all of us and primarily on the people's deputies. This is their task, their responsibility, and their duty. And this is also their primary responsibility.

[Baynazarova] What issue upsets you most of all?

[Benov] The issue about the fate and prospects of our perestroika is undoubtedly the top priority. I see the

primary cause of the worsening crisis of the socio-economic, political, and the ideological situation in the country and of the explosion of inter-ethnic contradictions in society in the slowing down of its pace. There is one way out and in this context I must agree with the fundamental provisions of the CPSU Central Committee Platform on the eve of the 28th Party Congress—to act more decisively and to energetically conduct planned reforms. The paramount task of the moment being lived through today is seen precisely in the acceleration of perestroika.

The growth of inter-ethnic contradictions in our common home causes extreme anxiety. This is one of those "surprises" that perestroika has run into in its own progressive movement. Today the issue is like this: Not only the fate of perestroika but the country's future depends to an enormous degree on how inter-ethnic relations take shape. Uniting is the only guarantee of progress. There can be no perestroika without unity!

The major path for resolution of this extremely complex and subtle problem is seen in the persistent conduct of economic and political reforms and the consistent realization of the Leninist principle of federalism in practice.

Recently, we are increasingly meeting critical statements directed at this principle. Moreover, opposition exists to the very idea of a state federal system. Critics most often cite the experience that allegedly "proves" that this idea is untenable. However, for some reason they lose sight of the fact that our past experience was unsound due to a number of vitally important factors. Therefore, the Stalinist, essentially unitarian state model that conferred the name of federation upon itself is being criticized. We have essentially still not lived in a federative state of the Leninist type. This is what we need to understand.

[Baynazarova] Gennadiy Matveyevich, please tell me about your pre-election platform.

[Benov] **In the political sphere.** Attain total power for the Councils and further democratization of the Republic's governing mechanism.

In the economic sphere. Turn over enterprises and plants to workers collectives and land to those who cultivate it. Seek adoption of laws on land and property, further development of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, equal rights for collective, family, or personal farm leases. Promote introduction of regional cost accounting in the Kray, creation of an All-Russian market, and increase cooperation and production independence of workers collectives.

In the social sphere. Conduct an aggressive social policy. Total accomplishment of the housing program. Fight for a society of social justice and a rule-of-law-state. Restructure higher and middle education and public health. Concern about veterans of war and labor, "Afghan" servicemen, single mothers, and large families.

[Baynazarova] Recently, the issue of the advisability of the existence of political organs in the Armed Forces is frequently being discussed. For example, if the commander of a military unit or subunit has a higher education and is politically grounded, why does he need a deputy commander for political affairs?

[Benov] During my entire service career, I have never heard a single commander say he did not need a deputy commander for political affairs. The deputy commander for political affairs is not a political overseer as some are attempting to represent him. His functions include many duties that are not duplicated by the commander or the other deputy commanders. The work of political organs is special. It is directed toward concern for people, their moral health, their intellectual potential, and therefore it requires special knowledge, attention, and tact. Political organs are like the cement that holds the entire Armed Forces building together.

It is also impossible to replace political organs with partkoms [party committees]. The activities of political organs are much broader and voluminous. Partkoms include only communists but political organs provide a political, moral, and ideological influence on all personnel.

Incidentally, we are not the only ones who recognize the need for the existence of political organs. There are special socio-political institutes in practically all of the Armies in the world. Thus, in my opinion, those who are setting forth the initiative to eliminate political organs have a very vague idea about the functions and missions that they accomplish. Some of us still have a strong urge to destroy everything to the foundation. It is only that construction of something new does not quite ensure results afterward.

[Baynazarova] Gennadiy Matveyevich, has conversion affected the Air Force? What problems have arisen in connection with it?

[Benov] Conversion has not only affected the Air Force but it has also become a part of its daily existence. The reduction of appropriations for development and purchase of aircraft is resulting in the release of a portion of our defense complex capacity. As a result, issues of the search for ways to convert the aircraft industry and optimum utilization of its scientific and production potential have painfully made themselves known.

Forcing the rate of conversion is unacceptable in the aircraft industry. Otherwise, the loss of highly skilled personnel, high production costs of civilian output, and price increases for military output due to inclusion of conversion costs in them are inevitable. We already have individual symptoms of this.

Furthermore, I think that some aviation components should not be reduced and, on the contrary, should receive accelerated development. I have in mind military transport aviation that carries out not only military but also national economic tasks, is the government reserve

for emergency transportation of people and cargo in the event of natural disasters, and is also a potential source to obtain hard currency while performing international transport flights. Furthermore, we have proposed that the released capacity associated with aircraft production be reoriented to the production of similar civilian output while bearing in mind its broader sale abroad.

We also know that the Air Force is subject to a reduction of 820 aircraft in accordance with a decision that has been made. At the present time, this task has been accomplished to a considerable degree.

[Baynazarova] And just where will the flying personnel from the reduced aircraft end up? Professional retraining of first class specialists. Will this not cost the State too much money?

[Benov] Training a first class pilot is very expensive—more than 400,000 rubles.

The Air Force Military Council has assigned the task to retain the flying personnel of subunits that are subject to reduction or withdrawal from the territories of the Groups of Forces. Pilots will be sent to new duty locations where they will work in the same type of aircraft. Thus, there has not yet been a problem of massive professional reorientation.

[Baynazarova] As a general, what is your point of view on cooperation between DOSAAF and the Air Force?

[Benov] The Air Force and DOSAAF in many ways accomplish a complicated mission: Strengthening the country's defense capability and training people to defend the Homeland.

The Air Force, like other branches of the Armed Forces, is conducting a search for ways to improve training of flying personnel. Right now we have begun implementing the idea of four stage military pilot training: DOSAAF flying club—flight school—pilot training subunit—combat unit. As you can see, the DOSAAF flying club is allotted an important initial link of the common chain.

The fact that eight special aviation initial flying training schools are being established in the country right now imparts a special significance to that link. They will be located in the cities of Barnaul, Yeysk, Kirovograd, Krasnoyarsk, Mogilev, Sverdlovsk, Bryansk, and Gorkiy. It is true that only two or three special schools will be opened this year. And construction of special schools is being drawn out in the remaining cities primarily due to the indifferent attitude of local authorities. These issues need to be resolved as soon as possible.

[Baynazarova] Gennadiy Matveyevich, Congratulations to you and all Air Force servicemen on Soviet Army and Navy Day! We wish you victory in the election!

Missile Designer Nepobedimyy on Conversion

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[Interview with Prof Sergey Pavlovich Nepobedimyy by S. Ptichkin: "I Know What 'Russian Work' Is"]

[Text] The time of glasnost has shed light not only on the dark spots of the past but has also provided an opportunity to tell about persons whom the nation and above all Russia have every right to be proud of.

The person we spoke with is the Deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Hero of Socialist Labor, Winner of the Lenin and State Prizes of the USSR, the Prize of the USSR Council of Ministers, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Prof Sergey Pavlovich Nepobedimyy, and whose name over the almost 45 years of activity has been cloaked in strict secrecy.

We Got Our Money's Worth

[Ptichkin] Sergey Pavlovich, until recently it seemed an inconceivable thing to meet and speak openly to a representative of the press for one of the leading developers of military missile equipment. How do you who spent virtually your entire life as an "invisible man" consider the opening up of previously prohibited questions?

[Nepobedimyy] In principle, positively. The experience of the defense sectors of industry is very interesting and important precisely now, when we are seeking out the ways to renew all our economy.

In truth, there is a paradox here. We now are simply reveling in the freedom of speech and self-expression, disclosing and bringing out everything possible, while in the United States there is the reverse process. The military-industrial complex is making a maximum effort to close off access to modern technological developments, secrecy at the defense enterprises is being strengthened, particularly where exploratory work is being conducted on modern weapons.

For this reason, I feel that the term "glasnost" can be applied to our defense sectors with the addition of the words: within the limits of reasonable sufficiency.

[Ptichkin] In our country there have been many bold judgments about the past and about the policy of today. Basically these judgments are full of pain for the difficult situation in the nation and a desire to help find an answer to the crucial questions but one also comes across "sensational revelations" and mixed in with a desire to dumbfound the reader with the next "hot" fact. One of these "revelations" is that the arms race was not forced upon us but rather the Soviet Union, beginning with the time of Stalin, constantly built up our military might and provoked the United States and the NATO countries into retaliatory actions. You have worked in the defense industry since 1945. What can you say about this "revelation"?

[Nepobedimyy] I began my defense career when the ruins of Hiroshima were still smoking. Did we drop the atomic bomb on Japan, did we begin the nuclear blackmail? Were we the first to build strategic bombers and nuclear submarines? Even in conventional weapons we have almost always been catching up. Let me give just two specific examples.

The first antitank guided missile systems (PTURS) were designed in Germany in the years of World War II. German specialists were given shelter in France and there developed the Franco-German ATGM SS-10. Our Shmel was developed after this and was actually a complete copy of it. Naturally, we did not stop with what we had achieved, but only in 1963 were we able to develop the world's best and completely original ATGM the Malyutka, and up to the present no one has been able to surpass the Soviet antitank systems which are purely defensive weapons.

The domestic air defense systems are oriented primarily at repelling strategic air raids, and for this reason the antiaircraft missile complexes are designed for high-altitude targets and for great kill ranges. In the mid-1960s, the U.S. aggression in Vietnam began, and in 1967, Israel defeated Egypt and Syria. Ho Chi Minh and Nasser urgently requested aid from the Soviet government in the form of weapons capable of hitting aircraft flying at maximum-low altitudes.

And it was only after this that a major program was adopted to develop easily transportable and even portable air defense complexes. In 1969, we developed the Strela system which was to become simply legendary and this employed a heat-seeking homing head which had first been employed by the Americans during the war in Korea. Again, we were catching up.

Incidentally, both the Shmel, the Malyutka and the Strela were willingly purchased by our foreign partners, they brought very tangible foreign exchange earnings to our nation and so all expenditures on their development and production were repaid a hundred-fold and for this reason one should not believe the superficial arguments about the superexpensiveness of "defense" as we got our money's worth.

[Ptichkin] However, we would all very much like to enter the next millennium not burdened with the arms race. We want to believe in the actually new political thinking, in a world without wars. From your viewpoint is universal and complete disarmament realistic?

[Nepobedimyy] I would also very much like to believe in a world without wars, but, alas, we often merely accept what we desire as reality. On matters of defense it is essential to be a realist and sweet dreams may end up suicidal.

Whatever appeals to reason might be made, it is very difficult to change an awareness worked out over the millennia of the need for the armed defense of one's life.

And events of recent months do not dispose one to complacency but rather quite the contrary.

I feel that the Americans in fact are inclined to accept a decisive cutback in the nuclear arsenals and possibly even the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But this in no way means that the United States has abandoned all military programs. The Americans, and I will use our term, are merely restructuring their financial policy in the military area and, in contrast to us, are doing this very efficiently and intelligently.

One of the areas where the United States is working actively is the development of so-called high-precision weapons which are completely capable of replacing nuclear weapons. The essence of the high-precision systems is the following: each round is a hit, each round brings death. The development of such systems is a very difficult task but it is still cheaper than developing, producing and storing weapons of mass destruction and which consume a larger portion of the military budget both in the United States and in our country. So with an apparent reduction in defense expenditures, the United States not only is maintaining its battleworthiness but in the near future will significantly strengthen this.

Why Does a Tank Plant Need to Produce Dishes?

[Ptichkin] Nevertheless, the word "conversion" has been firmly incorporated in the Soviet defense industry, although both the public judgments and the articles in the press are the most contradictory on this matter. How do you personally consider conversion?

[Nepobedimyy] It seems to me that from the very outset the approach to conversion has not been sufficiently thought out. We have reassessed the practical effect from this simple restructuring of the defense sectors and have not correctly determined the priorities in conversion. Here we must balance everything with extreme care.

Certainly many enterprises in the defense sectors are oriented at producing very specific articles and with every desire in the world they cannot be converted to peacetime output. Again, is the defense industry really to blame for the fact that the store shelves are empty? Why should a tank plant turn out enameled dishes? Why should our defense industry be held responsible and pay for the fact that we do not have any irons, refrigerators, washing machines and sewing machines for sale?

There are entire sectors oriented solely at the output of these commodities. It is here that we must turn! However, it seems that it is harder to find the persons to blame for the fact that there is no soap for sale than it is by directive to have some "missile" plant organize the production of washing powder.

[Ptichkin] Are you not overestimating the possibilities of the Soviet engineers and domestic industry in solving the strategic tasks of acceleration? Certainly, the public opinion has formed that the Russians do not know how to work well. At the First Session of USSR People's

Deputies, Yu.D. Chernichenko said bluntly: "The Estonians have the words 'Russian work'...and this 'Russian work' is bad work. There was also the statement by L.I. Abalkin who ascribed the troubles of perestroika to Russian laziness.... Logically, the conclusion follows that foreign aid is indispensable for us.

[Nepobedimyy] Yes, as Ostap Bender said: "Overseas will help us...." And not to end up later just in the same position as the "great schemer" who suffered a complete defeat. The question you have raised is very vast and fundamental. It would be difficult to answer it briefly.

I will not speak about the capabilities of all Soviet engineers, I will speak about Russian engineers. Unfortunately, I am not familiar with "Estonian work" and I do not know for what it is so renowned, but I have encountered Russian work and I can answer for it. The fact that up to now the standard of living of the RSFSR is one of the lowest in the Union merely shows the flagrant injustice and not our laziness. In contrast to the obtrusively popular political scientists who reside more overseas than in the USSR, I have worked all my life in Russia and I know about "Russian work" not by heresy and I feel that our people merit much more than is allocated to them from the centralized allocations also formed from the same Russia. In truth, these funds have now dried up and it is essential to feed the regions which are bemired in interethnic conflicts.

It has developed historically that a larger portion of the nation's defense enterprises is located on the territory of the Russian Federation and they basically employ RSFSR citizens the basic mass of whom is made up of Russians and Slavs. And this was not the consequence of any policy of chauvinism but merely that during the war the evacuation was to the East beyond the Volga, the Urals, into Siberia....

So the "Russian work" was primarily what comprised the basis of our parity, the defense might of the state.

Recently, the last batches of medium- and shorter-range missiles were destroyed. I can say that the world's finest models of military equipment were destroyed and not what should have long been sent to scrap. For example, the SS-20 surpasses the American analogue, the Pershing-2 missile, for all parameters and, what was quite important, was cheaper in cost and in operation. The purely defensive missile SS-23 generally speaking had no analogues in the world. Certainly the U.S. military-industrial complex employs no dilettantes, but nevertheless they have been unable to resolve those design and technological tasks which the Russian engineers and workers successfully carried out.

Let it not be thought that I am brandishing weapons. The defense industry had its own specific tasks and it carried them out on a world level of quality drawing on its own forces, without joint entrepreneurship. What has prevented the other sectors and particularly the enterprises of light industry from doing the same?

Yes, a larger portion of the industrial goods produced in the nation, even in Estonia, would not find any demand on the world market. At the same time, in addition to the consumer goods market, there is the multibillion weapons market. This is a completely objective reality of today and there is no need for us to shamefully divert our eyes from this, anymore than there is something for us to be ashamed of as here the "Russian work" in this market has an unchanged demand, in competing successfully with American and Western European work. One of our articles may cost us just several hundred rubles but on the world market they willingly pay thousands of dollars for it. If the defense industry were specially oriented at producing "export armament," then there would be no need to sell lumber, petroleum, gas or gold for foreign exchange earnings.... Of course, weapons trade is a very serious and responsible matter. It should be carried out only by the state and not on cooperative bases.

Each Nation Has Its Own Interesting Traditions

[Ptichkin] All the same, it will be difficult for us to dispense with studying world experience. At the end of last year in Moscow a conference was held for the leading economists of the nation who examine different programs for the recovery of the USSR national economy. Many said precisely that we do not use this experience with sufficient boldness.

[Nepobedimyy] Of course, we must adopt advanced foreign experience but even skillful copying provides only a tactical gain without ensuring a strategic advantage.

As for the "leading economists," I fail to understand the very term. There is no leading economy but there are plenty of leading economists. Actually, the "leading economists" are very concerned for rapidly introducing overseas innovations in our economy but the result will be like in Gogol's "Dead Souls," when a landowner felt that you merely had to dress up the peasants in the German style and all the problems would immediately disappear.

When will our "leading economists" and "politicians" turn their indifferent heads to Russia and cease seeing only the dirt there?

I would like to stray a bit into military history. One of the most vivid military leaders of the 20th Century was Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov. He was not a refined intellectual with delicate manners, rather he was a Russian soldier with marshal shoulderboards but surpassed all the German aristocratic field marshals with their rich noble genealogy and crushed their Teutonic armada. When they were trying to seek out certain shortcomings in G.K. Zhukov and endeavored to play down his greatness, I immediately recalled an apt expression: Let his rivals try to be victorious under the command of Dzhugashvili! And how ultimately could they have done without the people's hero?...

I have recalled Mar Zhukov for the following reason. People who achieve outstanding results under the conditions of the greatest adversity are undoubtedly more talented than those who work in hothouse conditions without needing anything. An ordinary Russian engineer who has managed to complete a technological development even analogous to the one carried out at the plants, let us assume, of the Lockheed firm is a head taller than any leading specialist at that American firm.

The experiencing of the restructuring of all industry during the war years clearly demonstrated what our workers are capable of. We were all fed up with the complete destruction of the fatherland! We would all pull the nation out of the swamp of stagnation, but...instead of a concerned discussion of the ways out of the stalemate, we, in the best traditions of administrative rule, in truth, accompanied by the slogans of perestroika, were given laws on the state enterprise and cooperation. In an instant everything was turned upside down.

The few leaders of industry who could have maintained the scientific and technical priorities, production efficiency and personnel of the highest professionals, those enterprises which actually could have headed the acceleration and perestroika of all industry were put under the most disadvantageous, simply humiliating conditions, while the most favored conditions were given to private entrepreneurship.

Of course, it would be more pleasant to purchase an entire plant in Italy or France and then travel there on constant official trips and probably it would be more pleasant to establish joint enterprises, in carrying out all the demands of foreign partners and being content with bits of foreign exchange that might fall off the other's table...it would probably be more pleasant to feel oneself a citizen of the world but, as was said in the well-known film, it is an insult for the state....

Always a seeming "iron-clad" argument is given, namely that economic laws are the same for the United States and the USSR. If they live well there, then, having copied their economic model, and also possibly the political system, we will live as well!

To this one might argue as follows: there is solid-state physics and plasma physics. There is one science but the laws are different.... The "leading economists" stubbornly refuse to consider the national aspect of their science. The historical path of the United States and the traditional relationships in industry and in finance are totally different from what we have had and do have.

It is said that in Russia before the revolution there was a very original school of economics. Possibly the fact that in recent years this has been forgotten and up to the present has not been restored may explain all the economic failures. I feel that a return to the Russian economic model will not contradict perestroika.

Each nation has its own procedures in work. It is difficult to confuse a Japanese motor vehicle with a German one.

We also have our technical traditions, our own engineer school. And where we have followed our own path, we have achieved not merely success but also world recognition. But where we began the hurried, thoughtless imitation, where we compared our every step by looking to the West, we ultimately suffered defeats and at best remained where we were.

For this reason, I merely find humorous the people who lose their head at the very appearance of an overseas supermarket, who are ready to disavow their entire past, to cut themselves off from it, even without wondering why things turned out as they did.... In truth, there is an explanation: the apparatus is to blame! One would merely want to see the state without the state apparatus. It is not the presence of the apparatus but rather the level of its work which determines the efficiency of state administration. An imbalanced, degraded and discredited state apparatus inevitably leads to the collapse of all state power in the nation. So at present we must not inveigh against the apparatus but rather help it escape from the crisis.

[Ptichkin] Since our conversation has moved to the "state level," please tell about your work in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

[Nepobedimyy] For myself, I consider the most significant result of the work in the Supreme Soviet to be that I took an active part in working out the basic provisions for establishing a Russian Academy of Sciences. And I did not approach this matter formally as I never considered the question of establishing a Russian Academy to be a formal matter or some bureaucratic games.

Russia, unfortunately, has not had and does not have its own think tank which could in a responsible manner and in full accord with the vital interests of the republic, assess the various "projects of the age" and which are being constantly dumped on its exhausted land; a think tank which could forecast the development of its industry, agriculture, demographic problems and ecology.... As the base institutes I propose, in particular, using the sectorial scientific research institutes working in defense. I even worked out a plan for so-called scientific conversion. If we will resolve certain formalities, and this is completely within our power, then we will obtain a very powerful Russian scientific base with good experience in applied work. I have proposed making active use of the so-called doctoral corps which is one of the most capable forces in science but which in the USSR Academy of Sciences is in too unequal a situation with those who have been given academy titles. This would not be leveling in rights as I am generally against leveling and "getting rid of the kulaks" on all levels. Merely the doctors of sciences will gain greater opportunities for active involvement in the practical affairs of the Russian Academy.

[Ptichkin] What would you wish for those who in the near future will take over the leading bodies of the

Russian Federation? What would you like for all RSFSR citizens before the forthcoming elections to the soviets?

[Nepobedimyy] First of all, responsibility! In the 20th Century, too many hardships have befallen Russia. Its land has been depleted and ruined by bad management. A decline in morality and general culture can be observed everywhere and borders on complete savagery. We are living through a difficult and troubled time. And it is criminal to try to satisfy one's own vain political ambitions at the expense of the motherland in such a critical period of its history.

Both the strength and weakness of the Russian man are to be found in his trusting responsiveness. It is easy to lead him by a catchy slogan and a quick phrase. This has been shamelessly used by the "radical elements" with pogrom attitudes. They seek to destroy and not to build.... I merely would caution my compatriots against excessive trust in the "unselfish" fighters against the privileges of others. As a rule, these fighters, having gained power, very quickly take on privileges which their predecessors did not even dream of and they are just as indifferent to the interests of the working people.

Unfortunately, Russia does not have its own mass information organs and it is very difficult to get the word of truth to the RSFSR citizens. We can only hope on the conscience and possibly the subconscious of the Russian person and hope that he even at the last minute will distinguish truth from lies and will not confuse real concern for the fate of Russia with empty chatter.

Russia is a multinational state and the nationality aspect in the forthcoming elections will undoubtedly be found. As a Russian man, I would like to remind the readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA of the words by the writer Valentin Ivanov from his book "Rus iznachalnaya" [Russia Primordial]. "The Russian always wanted the impossible. Eternally hungry, he lived in anticipation. There has never been a happy Russian for in his own mind he always remained below his dream. And for this reason he achieved a great deal...."

We must regain our interrupted awareness that behind us stand centuries, millennia of very rich and glorious history. Will we really permit the destruction of what was created by the hardest labor of our ancestors? Having recovered our national dignity and a feeling of being the true master in our own house, we humiliate no one, we insult no one.

Quite on the contrary! Only with a purified moral and physical rebirth of Russia will it be possible to have the complete rebirth of all the peoples inhabiting our enormous land.

The struggle for this rebirth began with the elections to the soviets of Russia and its outcome will depend upon each of us....

Conversion of Military Helicopters to Civilian Use
90UM0391C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by S. Mikheyev, general designer of the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni Kamov and RSFSR People's Deputy: "Conversion can Provide Billions of Dollars to Society If We Select the True Path"]

[Text] As a worker of the so-called "military industrial complex," I can say that defense industry workers themselves count on conversion more than anyone else and this is easy to prove based on the example of our OKB [Experimental Design Bureau]. For decades we have meticulously delivered outstanding military helicopters to the Armed Forces in the hope that someone somewhere would produce no less outstanding consumer goods for us. Alas, our "self-consuming" and militarized economy has turned out to be incapable of doing this. The reduction of military confrontation has provided the hope that we will now be able to work not at the expense of the State budget but while producing products for the market and while receiving standard weight rubles or hard currency in return.

What has conversion turned out to be for us? A reduction of orders. I am not talking about military helicopters, I am talking about civilian helicopters! At the same time that the Ministry of the Aviation Industry assigned our OKB the task to reconfigure military helicopters into civilian helicopters, MGA [Ministry of Civil Aviation] announced a reduction of orders for helicopters.

I am certain that the aviators are committing a strategic error. First of all, Aeroflot's helicopter fleet is obsolete. The aircraft that are currently being operated were designed 20 or more years ago. They lag behind in [fuel] efficiency that our consumers are already beginning to understand. Second, if in our country a helicopter is a way to gain access to an inaccessible area, in the West the helicopter has long since become a normal means of transportation—like a car, a telephone, or a pneumatic tube...

It is true that they are different helicopters: As a rule, small, 2-4 tons, quite cheap and very economical. They are aircraft for saving time that, as we all know, costs money. We have practically none of this type in our country, our helicopters are "more expensive than time" because we never previously accounted for money, even less for State money.

But let the aviator-operators delude themselves. Another thing is also possible: The country is currently not so rich that it can spend money on future helicopter design—there are more urgent needs. And we—the designers and manufacturers? We are obliged to look ahead. If only because five to seven years pass during the development of each aircraft, from the initiation of design to the beginning of series production. We are obliged to be simultaneously concerned with the future and with the present.

How? By increasing production output, by increasing its competitiveness, and by selling them to consumers. And if there is not a sufficient amount of rubles inside the country to purchase our aircraft, we need to go out and penetrate the foreign market.

Instead of this, conversion presents surprise after surprise. This year, our OKB (not the series production plant, but the OKB!) must produce 30 cabbage seedling planter combines—the Moscow Party Obkom has assigned us this task. We have also received a government task (thanks to the agropromers [agroindustrialists]) to design equipment to package dried fruit.

Of course, we can also understand conversion this way. We can manufacture a thousand "consumer" step-ladders from the metal that goes into the construction of one helicopter—but they will not be enough even for suburban Moscow's Lyubertsy. Constructed of the same metal, a helicopter which incorporates our ideas, technical knowledge and modern technology costs 3-4 million dollars on Western markets and we can buy step-ladders for the entire country with this money if you really want to.

And there is a market for our product. According to my calculations, until the year 2000, the demand for just two-ton helicopters is not less than 2,000 and that is three billion dollars. And our OKB is innovatively and technically ready to fight for this market with the French who are currently providing 89 percent of this class of aircraft. We have appropriate and very promising designs and the firm's reputation is quite well known abroad.

But we, I am talking about many of the country's State organizations, do not know how to think strategically. We need initial hard currency capital for assured access to the foreign market. We can get hard currency by selling the KA-32 helicopters we are already producing but, according to existing regulations, almost all hard currency profits go into the State Budget. We are looking for a sponsor to agree to participate in our projects. Banks normally play this role in the West but our Bneshekonombank [Foreign Economic Bank] demands unbelievable interest for credits. And such matters requires not a moneylender or a usurer, but a comrade in arms.

In principle, we can also find a business partner abroad but will it not be wasteful to give someone a solid share of the profits in the future?

Besides capital, the OKB needs a series production plant as a partner to produce export goods. But the "division of labor" in our defense complex is such that a designer does not have the capability to manufacture his own aircraft and production does not have the right to independently make a decision about producing some model or other. Everything is [done] through the ministry that also has both the designers and the producers at its disposal. It is possible that this management scheme was justified earlier during the output of exclusively

defense goods. Now something else is required—we need an association of firms with a complete cycle as it is understood in “their country” and proven through practice.

We have no other way out other than to fight for survival under conditions of fierce international competition and we can be late everywhere. This is why a fight for civilian markets will be the result of disarmament. We can lose the high technical and technological potential we have already achieved through the time [spent] on cabbage combines and similar consumer equipment. Someone can show this as a manifestation of “group interests” at the same time that we need to worry about universal interests. But what if a high technology enterprise wants to provide the country not with cheap consumer goods but with hard currency with which we can purchase ten times as many of these same consumer goods? Does this desire really contradict the interests of the people?

Cooperatives Used for Military Building Maintenance, Repair

90UM0391A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Reserve Colonel F. Semyanovskiy, Moscow Military District: “Unearned Money”]

[Text] Repairs to building and structures is a serious problem for any military unit. There are not enough materials, skilled workers, or required scaffolding. But now an opportunity has presented itself to resort to cooperatives for assistance. For the sake of justice I must say that, as a rule, highly skilled specialists who are well versed in the economics of the construction business work at them.

The USSR Council of Ministers and USSR State Committee on Prices Resolution clearly defines that construction and construction-repair cooperatives are provided with primary construction materials and parts in accordance with cost sheets that are in effect for state construction enterprises and organizations with payment of work accomplished by these cooperatives also according to state prices and tariffs. And in reality?

Effekt Construction Cooperative was called in to carry out repairs of buildings and structures at one Moscow garrison unit. Appropriate contract documents were completed and the cost of all of the work was determined by the cooperators. However, it was discovered that the cost of repairs was increased by 60 percent.

And here is another example. One construction cooperative demanded 35,600 rubles to repair the Moscow Oblast Military Commissariat Building. But an appraisal revealed that the real cost of the work had been more than doubled. This was clearly done based on the customer's lack of information.

But perhaps Monolitchik Construction Cooperative displayed the most ingenuity when it was hired to perform

major repairs on Moscow Oblast's Balashikhinskiy Joint Voenkomat Building. The cooperative attempted to illegally pass off as its own more than a third of the 105,000 rubles in estimated expenditures.

Unfortunately, the attempts of cooperatives to profit at the expense of their military customers are by no means limited to these examples. Obviously the opinion exists among them that the military has so much money that no matter what price you set the military will pay it.

I have one other motive to these cases. There are quite a few conversations among the people about those high salaries that cooperatives pay their workers. As we see, these salaries are not always the result of honest, conscientious labor.

Electronics Vans, Equipment Sold to Computer Game Cooperative

90UM0391B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Ladin: “Non-Computer Games”]

[Text] A military train consisting of 27 flat cars that had 48 ZIL-131 vehicles with radio equipment vans on them recently arrived in Moscow. But the receiver of the military equipment turned out not to be a military unit but a Moscow cooperative with the innocent-sounding name of “Computer Games.” Only, as we became convinced, its games were not innocent at all. By the way, everything is in order....

At the end of December 1989, a Turkestan Military District directorates sold Zemlya i kosmos [Earth and Space] Scientific Research Institute 16 R-404 transceivers, each of which is accommodated in three vans loaded with equipment, electrical power generating units, antenna arrays, and so forth.

It is true that after a certain period of time the “sellers” in Tashkent and Alma-Ata learned that it was not the institute at all that planned to purchase the transceivers but a certain cooperative that was simply using the name of the scientific institution as a cover. But this did not trouble many people: The main thing was that some sold and others bought.

Furthermore, the military had to expect trouble already because their people had direct contact with the cooperative. The fact is that one of the military district directorates actually had grounds to sell transceivers of the brand named. There is a corresponding document in this regard. But it also defines the method of sale of surplus or unused assets in the USSR Ministry of Defense. And in this case they had to operate through the territorial organ of the USSR Gosnab system or the sales organ of the ministry, state committee, or department to which sale of the corresponding assets is assigned. And military

units have the right to sell the assets independently only in the event of their refusal or if an answer is not received from them within a month.

In this case, the military district communications troop commander tasked Officers A. Tolstopyatov and A. Yakovlev with management responsibility for all surplus sales operations. They verbally "sent" the order down to a subordinate headquarters and Lieutenant Colonel B. Sandler was directly engaged in signing accounts and other required documents.

And so the Gossnab territorial organ should have been notified about what the communicators wanted to sell. This was also done on September 27 through appropriately completed inventory. It is true that Boris Yakovlevich Sandler for some unknown reason included in this document far from all of the equipment that would be sold.

Furthermore, Kazakh SSR Republic Commercial Information Center (RKITs) accepted that incomplete inventory and approved the sale. Equipment sales began in October and November. Accounts were signed at Nth unit. The signatures of Lieutenant Colonels D. Shleydovets and B. Sandler are on them. That is, they knew that Gossnab RKITs did not refuse to be an intermediary for them. And that means the unit did not have the right to independently make deals.

In Lt Col B. Sandler's words, everything began when he met Colonel V. Repnyy, former deputy commander for weapons of Nth Unit (he is currently in the reserve). He also allegedly suggested that he knew some cooperators in Moscow who have ties to Zemlya i kosmos Scientific Research Institute. This institute has an urgent need for R-404 transceivers, why not sell them to scientists while bypassing Gossnab, and he will allegedly pay a commission for acting as an intermediary.

"And what has this to do with a cooperative?" Boris Yakovlevich had become interested then.

"Because," explained Repnyy, "the institute needs 16 transceivers but it does not have any cash. That is why it is using the cooperative and the cooperative is offering its own money. Later, they will settle accounts.

This is the story Lt Col Sandler told me. He cannot provide anything else to confirm the truth of the intentions of Computer Games Cooperative. To this day, he has not received any documents either from the cooperative or from the institute.

Nevertheless, Boris Yakovlevich begins to carry out V. Repnyy's suggestion out of the goodness of his heart to help people. On November 12 1989, accounts were signed for numbers 45 and 46 that tasked two remote garrisons to ship 16 transceivers to the cooperative.

According to the cooperative's records and in accordance with the items' surplus wholesale price listed in the documents, I emphasize, wholesale, more than 160,000 rubles is being transferred into the account of one of the military district's directorates. That is quite a bit except for the "game" that the equipment costs quite a bit more. First of all, according to documents, the cooperative should have received equipment manufactured in 1972 with a depreciation ratio of 80 percent that in fact did not correspond to reality. Second, the equipment loaded on the flat cars was far from what was indicated on the bill of lading. For example, the documents listed R-404 transceivers. And in actuality, they were R-404m. The letter "m" seems like a minor detail but the price of this equipment is also three times more. Did you grasp that? According to preliminary calculations, the small letter "m" that was "unnoticed" by many salespeople among the communicators allowed the cooperators to "save" 201,400 rubles. And having already sold the military equipment in Moscow, they would make many thousands of rubles in profits.

And one more detail. Anyone who has had experience in organizing movement by rail at any time knows what efforts it takes to push out even one loaded flat car. And here the entire operation is set up one week. It remains to be hoped that competent organs will look into these not nearly innocent non-computer games.

Latvian Draft Law on Alternative Service

90UM0345A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 90 pp 3-4

[Draft Law of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic on Alternative (Labor) Service]

[Text] The law defines the basic economic, social and legal provisions for alternative (labor) service in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The law is aimed at ensuring the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Latvian Constitution, in linking this with a person's duties in relation to society and the equality of all citizens before the law.

This Law is one of the measures to actually implement the Declaration of the Latvian Supreme Soviet on Latvian State Sovereignty.

Alternative (labor) service is based upon the principles of civil rights and is not related to the USSR Armed Forces or other paramilitary organizations.

Section I: General Provisions

Article 1. According to the Latvian Constitution, Latvian citizens who out of pacifistic or religious convictions cannot serve in the troops are obliged to undergo alternative (labor) service. Pacifism is a system of humane principles which includes a categorical protest against war and any violence, depriving them of any form of support.

Religious convictions are based upon the love of man and the belief that war and violence are an absolute evil, repudiating the use of weapons in any forms.

Article 2. The aim of alternative (labor) service is to ensure the freedom of conscience of the individual and service to society for carrying out essential tasks with the observance of the rights of the citizens.

Article 3. Alternative (labor) service is available to persons indicated in Article 1 of the current Law, if there are no circumstances indicated in Article 4 of the current Law.

Article 4. Not to be sent to alternate (labor) service are the following:

- 1) Citizens who because of state of health are unfit for active military service;
- 2) Citizens for whom a deferment for active military service has been granted;
- 3) Students of full-time institutions of learning;
- 4) Students of seminaries;
- 5) Ordained priests.

Article 5. The Law on Alternative (Labor) Service applies to persons who have reached the age of 18.

Article 6. Upon reaching the age of 27, a citizen cannot be called up for alternative (labor) service.

This provision does not extend to persons for whom the period of alternative (labor) service ends after the reaching of the age of 27 as well as persons for whom the period of alternative (labor) service has been extended on the basis of a decision of the rayon (city) executive committee for failure to report to work without valid reasons or persons for whom the undergoing of alternative (labor) service has been deferred.

A person, after reaching the age of 50, is to be removed from the rolls of alternative (labor) service.

Article 7. The period of alternative (labor) service is 36 months and for persons who have completed institutions of higher learning, 18 months.

Article 8. Alternative (labor) service is performed in the form of lowly-skilled (auxiliary) jobs in the sphere of the municipal economy, public health or social welfare at the citizen's place of permanent residence.

In instances when there is no opportunity to provide a job in the designated sectors, the Latvian Council of Ministers determines a different sphere of employment.

Article 9. By a decision of the Latvian Council of Ministers, persons who are undergoing alternative (labor) service can be sent to eliminate the consequences of accidents and natural disasters.

Persons who have undergone alternative (labor) service, by a decision of the Latvian Council of Ministers, can be recalled for alternative (labor) service for a period of up to 6 months for eliminating the consequences of accidents or natural disasters.

Section II: Procedure for Settling the Question of Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 10. A citizen whose pacifist or religious convictions do not allow him to serve in the troops is to submit a valid statement on this to the induction commission of a rayon (city).

Article 11. The statement for alternative (labor) service should be submitted no later than the day when notification of call-up for active military service is presented.

In submitting a request for alternative (labor) service to the induction commission, the citizen simultaneously refuses to receive notification for induction for active military service.

Article 12. The induction commission of the rayon (city), having received the citizen's request for alternative (labor) service and a refusal to receive notification of induction immediately forwards the corresponding materials to the Latvian Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service or to the commission on alternative

(labor) service of the same rayon (city), if such a commission has been formed in the rayon (city) in accord with Article 26 of the current Law.

Article 13. The request of a citizen for alternative (labor) service halts his call-up for active military service until an official review of the submitted request.

Article 14. In the event of the rejection of the request (including the appeal process), a repeat acceptance of such a request and a review for the same grounds is not permitted within a period of 2 years.

Section III: Commissions Settling the Question of Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 15. A citizen's request for alternative (labor) service is reviewed by the Latvian Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service.

Article 16. The Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service is established by the Latvian Supreme Soviet which also sets the size and specific members.

Article 17. The membership of the Latvian Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service includes deputies, representatives of the community, public organizations, participants in the Defense of Peace Movement as well as representatives of religious sects.

Article 18. Requests for alternative (labor) service should be reviewed within 20 days from the date of their receipt by the Latvian Commissions for Alternative (Labor) Service.

In the event of necessity this period can be extended by a separate decision of the Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service.

Article 19. The Latvian Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service for resolving a question has the right to invite any citizen to its session or demand the necessary materials.

Article 20. The review of requests at the Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service is carried out openly.

Article 21. The requester is informed by the Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service of the time and place of reviewing the request.

The requester or his representative has the right to participate in the Commission's session.

The failure of the requester to report at the session of the Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service is not an obstacle for examining the merits of the question.

Article 22. In reviewing a request for alternative (labor) service, the Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service keeps minutes and takes its decision with reasons stated.

Article 23. The Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service takes its decision by a simple majority of the votes of the commission members.

Article 24. The Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service is empowered to take a decision with $\frac{2}{3}$ of the commission members present.

Article 25. A copy of the decision on the question of undergoing alternative (labor) service (regardless of whether the request was granted or rejected) within a period of 3 days is issued to the citizen under signature and is forwarded to the rayon (city) executive committee and the military commissariat.

Article 26. Upon the proposal of the Latvian Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service, in the event of necessity, a rayon (city) soviet may form a commission on alternative (labor) service of the rayon (city).

The provisions of the current Law apply to the procedure for forming as well as the functioning of a rayon (city) commission for alternative (labor) service.

Section IV: Procedure for Resolving Disputes

Article 27. A decision of the Latvian Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service on refusing to grant the request for alternative (labor) service can be appealed by the requester (or his representative) to the rayon (city) people's court within a period of 10 days from receiving a copy of the decision.

Article 28. The procurator has the right within the designated period to submit a request on the ruling of the Latvian Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service to the rayon (city) people's court at the place of residence of the requester.

Article 29. The question of reopening the time for submitting a protest in the event of an appeal on the decision of the Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service is decided by the rayon (city) people's court.

Article 30. The decision of the rayon (city) people's court can be appealed or protested to the Latvian Supreme Court and the ruling of the latter is final.

Article 31. If the question of alternative (labor) service is initially settled by a rayon (city) commission on alternative (labor) service and which has been set up in accord with Article 26 of the current Law, an appeal of the decision of the given commission can be submitted to the Latvian Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service.

The appealing of the decision of a rayon (city) commission on alternative (labor) service is carried out within the procedures and times stipulated in Articles 29-30 of the current Law.

Article 32. The decision of a rayon (city) commission on alternative (labor) service cannot be directly appealed to the rayon (city) people's court.

Section V: Undergoing Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 33. The decision of the commission on alternative (labor) service or a court ruling is the basis for being sent to alternative (labor) service.

Article 34. The rayon (city) executive committee issues notification for undergoing alternative (labor) service to the citizen who is being called up for service over his signature.

Article 35. The citizen is obliged to report to the designated organization, enterprise or institution at the time stipulated in the notification.

Article 36. The administration of the organization, institution or enterprise where the citizen has been sent for undergoing alternative (labor) service is obliged to hire the citizen for the job designated in the notification in accord with the labor legislation.

In the given instance, a refusal to hire is not permitted.

Article 37. The administration is obliged within a period of 3 days to notify the rayon (city) executive committee in writing of the hiring of the citizen for the job as well as failure to report to work without valid causes.

Article 38. Dismissal of citizens who are performing alternative (labor) service from their job is possible only with the approval of the rayon (city) executive committee.

Article 39. In undergoing alternative (labor) service the citizens have all the rights and obligations stipulated by the labor legislation, with the exception that:

- 1) They cannot be dismissed from the job at their own request;
- 2) Training leaves are not to be paid for them;
- 3) The failures to report for work without valid reasons is not to be included in the period of alternative (labor) service;
- 4) They are not granted regular vacations.

Article 40. The period of alternative (labor) service begins as of the day the citizen is hired.

Article 41. During the period of undergoing alternative (labor) service, the citizen cannot hold a leading position.

Article 42. During alternative (labor) service, the citizen has the right to submit in writing a request to undergo obligatory military service.

The review of such a request is carried out by the rayon (city) executive committee the ruling of which is final.

Article 43. Supervision of alternative (labor) service is exercised by the rayon (city) executive committee.

Section VI: The Procedure for Terminating Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 44. Alternative (labor) service is terminated at the designated date, not including the time for which alternative (labor) service was deferred or any periods of absences on the job without valid reasons for administrative arrests.

Article 45. The rayon (city) executive committee no later than 10 days prior to the end of the period of alternative (labor) service informs the administration of the organization, institution or enterprise on the terminating of alternative (labor) service for a specific citizen, with the indicating of the date.

Article 46. Notification by the rayon (city) executive committee of the administration of the organization, institution or enterprise is compulsory.

At the time designated in the notification, the administration halts labor relations with the citizen in line with the terminating of the period of alternative (labor) service.

Article 47. Should the citizen voice a request to continue working, a labor contract can be concluded on the general grounds in accord with the labor legislation.

Article 48. The administration of the organization, institution or enterprise is obliged no later than the next day to inform the rayon (city) executive committee of the release of the citizen from alternative (labor) service.

Article 49. The rayon (city) executive committee takes a decision to release the citizen from alternative (labor) service.

Article 50. A citizen may be released ahead of time from alternative (labor) service in the event that he:

- 1) Has been condemned to incarceration for more than 3 years;
- 2) Has become the sole provider in a family;
- 3) Has become disabled in Group I or II;
- 4) On the basis of his request has been called up for active military service.

Article 51. Deferment from alternative (labor) service is granted if the citizen:

- 1) Has been condemned to incarceration for a period of not more than 3 years;
- 2) Has been condemned to corrective labor.

Article 52. In the cases stipulated in Articles 48-51 of the current Law, the rayon (city) executive committee adopts a corresponding decision which is obligatory for the administration of the organization, institution or enterprise.

Section VII: Concluding Provisions

Article 53. The procedure for undergoing alternative (labor) service is defined by the Regulation Governing Alternative (Labor) Service approved by the Latvian Council of Ministers.

Article 54. A corresponding note is entered in the passports of citizens who are to undergo alternative (labor) service.

The accounting documents of those citizens who are to undergo alternative (labor) service are kept at the rayon (city) executive committee.

Article 55. Citizens who have undergone alternative (labor) service are not to be called up for military assemblies and exercises.

The designated positions also apply to persons indicated in Article 1 of the current Law who previously had undergone compulsory military service.

Article 56. Responsibility for violating the current Law Governing Alternative (Labor) Service is applied in accord with the current legislation.

Article 57. In the event of martial law or military operations, the current Law is to remain in force, if a different legislative enactment has not been approved.

Reform of Local Military Commissariats

90UM0354A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Col V. Nosov, Arkhangelsk Oblast military commissar, by Capt 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, under the rubric "Military Reform: Problems, Suggestions": "Why is the Military Commissariat Cautious?"]

[Text] Matters having to do with the restructuring of local military management agencies will unquestionably occupy an important place among the tasks facing us during the military reform. Col V. Nosov, Arkhangelsk Oblast military commissar, talks with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent about certain aspects of the reform which need to be considered at the state level.

[Correspondent] Vasiliy Ivanovich, how do you define the military commissariat's place in view of what is frankly its difficult "geographic" situation at the juncture between the Armed Forces and the larger society in the current situation?

[Nosov] Officers with the military commissariats say that they are between a rock and a hard place. This is a colorful exaggeration, one might say, but there is some truth to the sad statement. If only because, as some people feel, it is the interests of strengthening the national defense capability and not the departmental interests of the Ministry of Defense which do not always fit painlessly into this or that specific situation of the national economy.

It is not always possible to meet the requests of enterprise and organization managers with respect to calling up draftees for assemblies—for exempting workers they need from attending the assemblies, let us say. At the same time, of course, the military commissariats are to a certain degree dependent upon local authorities. Our oblast military commissariat is provided with weapons, technical military equipment, transport and other kinds of supplies by the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, for example. We are provided with service buildings, facilities for induction centers, medical and technical personnel for conducting the registration and induction of the youth for active military duty and a great deal more by the ispolkoms of the local soviets.

[Correspondent] Which means that you essentially have a dual dependency....

[Nosov] Judge for yourself. How are workers with the military commissariats provided with housing, for example? While in Arkhangelsk and certain other large cities in the oblast our officers and warrant officers receive housing from the garrisons, it is provided by the ispolkoms in other cities and rayon centers. The situation is the same with respect to accommodating us at kindergartens and nurseries.... In other words, we are frequently forced to go with hat in hand, so to speak, to local authorities. Where is the independence of the military commissariats in this situation? Although I know of no cases in which our workers have given in to any unjustified requests or pressure from the management of oblast cities and rayons; under the existing procedure dictation by local authorities is certainly not ruled out.

In addition, that provision of the guiding documents in accordance with which the military commissariat functions with the authority of an ispolkom section are sometimes interpreted too literally at the local level. The plan for the procurement of [livestock] feed for rayon and city military commissariats, for example, is set at the same volumes as for other enterprises and organizations. Even at the most inaccessible and remote sites. If this job—an important one for the oblast, I understand—cannot be accomplished without the military commissariat, then why not at least take into account the specific nature of its work and the fact that combat readiness should not suffer under any circumstances? Last year we succeeded with great difficulty in persuading local authorities of the need to arrange things so that a worker from the military commissariat did not have to travel more than 40 minutes between the feed procurement area and his job. And we are not talking about some sort of caprice. This is a matter of state interests, which should guide both the military commissar and the ispolkom chairman.

And what about preparation of the youth for the military service and the military-patriotic indoctrination? For some reason the military commissariats have been charged with practically all of this work. But it is primarily the local soviet organs which are supposed to

handle it, a fact established in the pertinent documents. We are prepared to carry our share of the load, of course, but the whole thing should not be dumped onto the workers in the military commissariats. I repeat, this is our common state job. Is the work performed to improve the health of the youth, both physical and moral, needed only by the Ministry of Defense? Do our young men not return stronger in every respect to the labor collectives after 2 or 3 years in the service?

Today we talk a lot about the need to concentrate our efforts on the main thing, on that which furthers the restructuring and serves the interests of strengthening the state. Just what interest could be greater for the Soviet individual than that of protecting the homeland? And is it not one of the main tasks of the military reform to put everything in our state to work on this?

No, when deciding the matter of holding military assemblies—when to hold them and how many reservists are to participate—I am not against coordinating this with local authorities. There is no doubt that this sort of interaction is proper, and we ordinarily arrive at a decision acceptable “to both parties.”

But let us figure out what this “coordination” involves. I go to the chairman of the oblast ispolkom to coordinate some matter. I am pro, he is con. So there is no coordination of the matter. I will be held accountable for it, however. Consequently, I must seek a compromise at the risk of becoming even more dependent upon the local authorities.

[Correspondent] Now, if you do not object, let us move on to another dependency of the military commissariats, their dependency upon the Ministry of Defense. It is the main and determining factor in your functioning, since the military commissariats actually exist only because the Armed Forces exist....

[Nosov] Recently one has the sense that the district command element is giving increased attention to our affairs and needs. This is manifested in, among other things, the staffing of the military commissariats with experienced and worthy officers, something not always done in the past.

At the same time, there are situations in which the total dependency of the military commissariat upon the military command element does not quite parallel, to put it mildly, common sense or the needs and capabilities of our region.

We train many motor vehicle drivers based on special orders, for example. But the driver is still a driver when he returns from the army. And then what are we to do when we prepare the reserve? The correct thing would be to retrain drivers, of which we have an excess, for other military specialties in which we have a shortage. In addition to everything else, however, the cost is considerable.

If we considered actual needs, we would reduce the order for the training of drivers by approximately one half in our oblast. This, however, would require altering the nation's entire system of training specialists for the army, a problem which involves not just us. For now, we do what is demanded of us even though we can see how it could be done better. In all fairness, it should be stated that some things are already being done in this area. Last year our oblast's order for the “delivery” of specialists for the army and navy was adjusted and brought into closer conformity with the realities. The overall problem was not eliminated, however.

[Correspondent] Permit me, Vasiliy Ivanovich, to add some of my own thoughts to what you have said. Perhaps it would be more practical to turn the military commissariats into a separate state service? Vested with enough authority adequately to accomplish the missions performed by military commissariats, of course. In my opinion, such a reorganization would make it possible to remove the influence of subjective factors upon the functioning of the military commissariats and to take into maximum account in their work both the needs of the Armed Forces and the capabilities of the national economy.

[Nosov] That sounds fairly attractive on the surface. Naturally, it would be more convenient for the military commissariats to have a single leadership made up of professionals. Where is the guarantee, however, that there will not be more minuses than pluses?

[Correspondent] I agree that this needs to be thought about and calculated. I discussed it with Col D. Yegorov, your colleague and Murmansk Oblast military commissar, and he is convinced that converting the military commissariats into a separate state service would be a step in the right direction. He gives the following reason, among others. The headquarters of the Leningrad Military District issues to the Murmansk Oblast Ispolkom, as it does to yours, an order for providing draftees not just for units of the Ground Forces, but also for ships of the Navy and formations of the Air Defense and Strategic Missile troops. And I believe that Dmitriy Ivanovich asks a perfectly logical question: Just why is the “go-ahead” for the manning of other branches of the Armed Forces issued by the headquarters of the military district, which is a large territorial, combined-arms formation?

[Nosov] There are indeed grounds for questioning this. Today, while subordinate to the district headquarters, we man units and formations not just of the Armed Forces but also of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the border and railway troops and civil defense regiments. If alternative service is instituted, there will be no one but the military commissariats to handle it as well.... But we have been and remain under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. And I tell you frankly that I do not know how the legal status of the military commissariats should be changed in connection with making them a sort of personnel section also for many other departments.

We are going to have to resolve this matter, however. Many *Krasnaya Zvezda* readers, including workers in the military commissariats, are obviously correct when they say that the induction for the military service and discharge into the reserve should be effected at the level of decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Could the President of the USSR perhaps make the decision in the future? But let us imagine that we have been turned into a separate entity. To whom would we be subordinate? Perhaps the military commissariats could be placed under the Committee for Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet? This would be an improvement also because it would relieve the Ministry of Defense of yet another function not directly related to its assigned missions.

But where will the personnel for this service come from? While the district command element presently accommodates us and sends competent and conscientious officers to the military commissariats, it would hardly have any incentive to do this in the situation you describe, if only because it need good officers itself.

There is also a question about whether Moscow could precisely specify and plan the number of draftees for each oblast and where to send the draftees, since this job is presently performed in numerous military districts. Just imagine the enormous scale of things if everything were combined into one. The staffs at the center would inevitably have to be enlarged, not to speak of the fact that the basic data would have to be constantly updated. Just in our oblast 33% of the reservists move each year. And every month we adjust the information and promptly report it to the district. Just who would do this in the situation you describe?

[Correspondent] Why you would still do it.

[Nosov] Yes, but where would it be the easiest to process—at district headquarters, for one group of oblasts, or in Moscow, for the entire nation?

[Correspondent] I believe that the problem could be solved by making extensive use of the electronic computer. It would calculate how many draftees and reservists are needed in what oblast, in what specialties and for what purposes. One thing for sure, the computer would not suggest sending cadets from naval infantry schools into the Ground Forces, as is sometimes done today.

[Nosov] Well, when the military commissariats receive electronic computers, then perhaps such a reorganization will make sense....

This was the last statement made by Col Nosov on the cassette in my dictaphone. One can see that he demonstrated a certain restraint and caution in it and throughout the interview. And that is understandable. It is easy to break things up right now, but what will we replace them with? Nonetheless, the Arkhangelsk Oblast military commissar believes that sooner or later the status of the military commissariat will require updating and more thorough consideration of the rapidly changing situation

in the nation. But do we need to wait for this until the military commissariats receive electronic computers?

Concentration of Draftees in Home Republic—Cause of Incident

90UM0354B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
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[Article by Capt 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Sprouts in the Field of Discord"]

[Text] During the night of 21 November 1989 23 military construction workers went AWOL from their unit in the city of Kutaisi and decided to make their way secretly to Moscow to see the USSR minister of defense. The reason, they indicated in a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, was ethnic hostility on the part of their Georgian co-workers. The immediate cause had occurred two days previously, when some young Georgian military construction workers newly arrived in the unit entered the sleeping quarters of the 4th company led by Jr Sgt V. Aspanidze around 03:00, roused the personnel and abused their co-workers physically and verbally.

It seems that we have reached the danger point. The virus of inter-ethnic discord has penetrated the high walls of the military units and is beginning its destructive work. This is borne out by the editors' mail, which increasingly contains letters telling about ethnic conflicts between servicemen. The Political Directorate of the Transcaucasus Military District draws the same conclusion.

"Far from everything reported to the editors by the runaways was confirmed in the investigation," Col A. Gorgan, chief of the District Political Directorate's Department for Party Organizational Work, said. "Representatives of the garrison Judge Advocate's Office, state security agencies and commissions from the district political directorate were at work in the unit. You can read all of the information on the matter. There are extremely serious grounds for alarm, however. Inter-ethnic relations have been significantly exacerbated recently in this and a number of other units in the district. There are many causes, but I believe that it is directly linked also to the adoption not long ago of the decision to permit up to 25% of the draftees from certain republics to remain and serve within those republics...."

It is not difficult to see that there is such a linkage. Unfortunately, the increase in the number of servicemen born in the republic in which the units are located is today frequently resulting in outbreaks of ethnic conflict and in the establishment of a climate of ethnic tensions in the units. In one case 16 soldiers went AWOL from a unit stationed in the Azerbaijan SSR. They explained that they could not take the pressure from servicemen of the native ethnic group, who make up one of the largest and most closely knit ethnic groups in the unit as a result of the fall induction. An ethnic conflict occurred in a unit located not far from Tbilisi, in the fall replenishments for

which Georgian fightingmen accounted for around 70%. And only the rational position taken by Georgian servicemen of previous inductions and the prompt reaction of the command element, which appealed for help from workers in the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee, war and labor veterans in the republic and the parents of the young fightingmen, made it possible to defuse the developing confrontation.

I could extend the list of cases like this. I am afraid, however, that this would evoke the totally incorrect reaction that the 25% quota is to blame for it all.

It is not a matter of the quota alone, however. Who makes up the 25% we mentioned? Young men from large, disadvantaged families, children of elderly parents, married men and those for whom doctors do not recommend a change in climate for reasons of health.... The selective nature of the decision is obvious. For now it has only affected people in the Baltic area and the Transcaucasus. And, incidentally, this was one of the factors causing the 23 military construction workers to run away to Moscow. They were moved, it was explained, by anger: Why are the Georgians permitted to serve in their own republic, while we (Russians, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kirghiz) are not?

There are other problems. Why was the new demographic situation, let us call it, in the units located within the district a surprise to many commanders and political workers? Why were the possible consequences of a significant increase in the proportion of indigenous servicemen in the units not taken into account? Why are local party and soviet organs not relied upon in the indoctrinational work performed with fightingmen in the forces?

And I feel that the final factor should be discussed separately. According to Col V. Deynekin, chief of the Inter-Ethnic Relations Group of the Center for the Study of Social and Psychological Problems under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, only 15-17% of the officers easily establish mutual understanding with Georgian servicemen; 2-5% with Azerbaijanis, and 8-14% with Armenians. A total of 23% percent of those surveyed believe that it is impossible to take into account the ethnic-psychological features of subordinates for organizing the service, that one cannot in fact accommodate everyone....

The statistics thus indicate that the officer cadres are not yet very well prepared to resolve these conflicts. In this situation it seems essential to enlist local party and soviet workers, who have a far better knowledge of the ethnic character, the mentality and the soul of their fellow countrymen than the commanders and political workers, to perform practical indoctrinational work and not just make a show of it.

This is especially so since experience has demonstrated its good effect upon the minds and hearts of the youth during the induction campaign.

"There were few problems during the induction in Gurdzhaani, where David Yefremovich Saarishvili is secretary of the rayon party committee. The party workers and people's deputies in the local soviets performed extremely well," said Lt Gen L. Sharashenidze, military commissar of the Georgian SSR. "In general, however, I have to say that the fall induction in the republic was not an easy one. There were young people who absolutely refused to serve in the 'occupation army.' There were also many who were prepared to serve, but only inside their own republic. In my opinion, this is all a result of the situation which has developed in the Transcaucasus, sometimes also of political speculation on the part of certain groups."

The republic military commissar cited this example. Almost twice as many Georgian servicemen died in the Armed Forces in 1989 as in the previous year. Some people in the Georgian People's Front and other unofficial associations interpreted this fact in an extremely peculiar way. The increase in the number of deaths, they said, was a result of dislike for Georgians on the part of other ethnic groups, who do not hesitate even to take physical reprisal.

This account was thoroughly checked out. A special commission was set up in the GSSR Supreme Soviet to study the service situation of servicemen drafted from the republic. Delegations visited all of the districts and familiarized themselves with the service and the life of their fellow countrymen, with the moral climate in the units and with the development of relations between fightingmen of different ethnic origins in the military collectives. The delegations included members of the Georgian Communist Party CC, rayon and city party committees, local soviet organs, the Komsomol, the Georgian People's Front, various unofficial associations and the parents of servicemen.

"The delegations discovered no cases of any kind of discrimination by Georgian soldiers on ethnic grounds," Col V. Sulaberidze, chief of the political section of the republic military commissariat, said. "There were numerous shortcomings in the forces, of course, and discipline is not always at a high level, but no sort of selective treatment of Georgians was discovered anywhere."

It is no secret that the field of inter-ethnic discord is being cultivated extremely vigorously and skillfully today not just in Georgia but also in other republics. There are forces with an interest in this. The destructive work plants ideas of national exclusivity, distrust for and dislike of members of other nations and ethnic groups in the minds of the youth.

In the unit from which the 23 military construction workers went AWOL it is acknowledged that the people had begun dealing with one another guardedly, that there emerged a breakdown into "ours" and "theirs" and that there was a perceptible readiness immediately to enter into a confrontation with "theirs" at the first excuse. Lt

Col N. Nesmeyanov, unit commander, Capt N. Zakharov, his deputy for political affairs, and Sr Lt K. Amiragov, propagandist, spoke of this. It was also confirmed by certain military construction workers.

"I try to associate only with my fellow countrymen," recently drafted David Dadiani admitted. "We are young men, hot-headed. And if I, God forbid, should offend a member of another ethnic group, they would say I did it because I am a Georgian, a nationalist...."

Russians, Kazakhs, Armenians, Moldavians and members of other ethnic groups also frequently draw together within a little world of microgroups of "fellow countrymen" and attempt to gain confidence and protection precisely from this kind of union. The gap between such groups gradually grows and intensifies. And this is not just in the military construction units but sometimes in the combat units as well. Not long ago, for example, eight soldiers went AWOL from an artillery unit. The reason was the same: ethnic conflicts....

The situation of ethnic confrontation is being made worse also by the extremism of a certain segment of the civilian population. Lt Col N. Nesmenyanov's subordinates, who work at a brick plant, state that they have heard the following from civilian workers at the enterprise more than once: "You should all get home while the getting is good? Try to get them to let you serve in your own republic too...." This is instead of gratitude for the assistance to the republic. The detachment personnel are erecting housing in one of the settlements, a youth dormitory and an Olympic sports facility in Bakuriani and are reinforcing sections of roads where there is a danger of wash-outs in Adzhariya.

The following incident is actually criminal.

On 29 November 1989 Z. Gugulashvili, a guard at a neighboring fruit and vegetable sovkhos, fired upon the barracks of one subunit with a hunting rifle. The people were exposed to danger. And all because Gugulashvili greatly "disliked" the presence of individuals of Ossetian and Azerbaijani origin in the subunit....

The incident created a tense situation among the personnel and, naturally, contributed greatly to the intensification and exacerbation of inter-ethnic problems existing in the subunit itself.

Most of these negative incidents are well known to military leaders of all ranks, law-enforcement agencies and local party and soviet workers. It seems to me, however, that no one has come up with a way to solve the problem.

Could Georgia's party and soviet workers have foreseen the changes which would occur in the situation in the units as a result of the increase in the number of indigenous servicemen in them? I believe they could have. After all, these are people in whose work political analysis has a special place. Were they obligated to do so? This question too I would answer in the affirmative.

They have an interest, after all, in the level of combat readiness and military discipline in the units and in the purity of the moral climate in the military collectives.

We must still speak with greater concern about the inadmissible passivity of a number of commanders and political workers, however. After all, they are the ones who bear personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the units and subunits entrusted to them.

Many activities are conducted toward the international indoctrination of the soldiers and sergeants and the strengthening of friendship and comradeship in the unit commanded by Lt Col N. Nesmeyanov. When one looks at the work performed by the group for inter-ethnic relations—I spoke with Capt N. Zakharov and Sr Lt K. Amiragov—however, one concludes that these activities retain much from the old approaches, whereby people simply proclaim from a rostrum the theory of almost an inborn sense of internationalism in the Soviet fightingmen and maintain that the number of ethnic groups whose members serve in the unit further confirms the fact that "the army is one inviolable family."

We are only now beginning to understand that internationalism is certainly not an inborn quality. It needs to be developed, strengthened, fostered.

"We do indeed frequently choose the trodden path," Nikolay Nikolayevich Nesmeyanov admits. "Take me, for example. I establish contact with all of the military leaders at the garrison, but I did not get around to visiting the party gorkom, raykom or gorispolkom and sharing my problems with them. And today it is only possible to achieve success when you work in close contact with the local authorities...."

Has the insight not come too late? I think not. Meetings with Demur Pavlovich Chikhladze, secretary of the Kutaisi party gorkom, Lamara Ippolitovna Shamugiya, secretary of the Avtozavodskiy Rayon party committee, and Demur Davidovich Donadze, head of the ideological section of that raykom, in which the chairman of the military construction detachment took part, convinced me that an exchange of information on negative developments in the units makes it possible jointly to find both a political and an organizational solution.

One of the participants in the talks proposed the following, for example:

"I believe that in this situation it would be expedient to hold a number of informal meetings between the fightingmen and the city community. The latter could tell about the history of Kutaisi, about its architecture.... Our subordinates now know almost nothing about these things. And the study of the area where one serves is a mandatory point in the plans for the party political work. Is it there simply so that a check mark can be made?"

"We are prepared also to help set up a group for the study of the Georgian language," Lamara Ippolitovna Shamugiya added. "Our raykom recently helped set up

such a group in the military workshops, assigned linguists and provided the necessary literature. The officers and warrant officers are grateful. It is now easier for them to work with the soldiers and easier to achieve mutual understanding with the local population.

The assistance of party and soviet workers no doubt does have a role. The military command element is still going to have to do most of the work, however: prevent the spontaneous conversion of district units into national formations, for example, prepare commanders and political workers at the basic levels for effectively influencing the ethnic personnel.

Since problems like the ones described occur also in other districts, their solution depends in great part upon the center, upon the administrations of the General Staff and the Main Political Directorate. Among other things, we need to take a closer look at the functioning of the military-technical commissions of the districts, which distribute the replenishments among the formations and units. The replenishments arriving in the units must reflect more closely the structure of the troops in the district.

A great deal is expected in the forces from the Center for the Study of Social and Psychological Problems under the Main Political Directorate. Who, if not it, should seriously study the possible consequences of establishing those quotas for republics and work out scientifically based recommendations for commanders and political workers at the company and battalion levels.

These recommendations are needed also by members of the commissions and groups for inter-ethnic relations. The time has obviously arrived also for an extensive exchange of opinions and experience among the members of these groups and commissions. It could take place within the framework of the district conferences on these problems, with the opinions of the participants subsequently published in district newspapers.

Inter-ethnic relations in the military formation have still not developed—and obviously will not develop—into those acute forms which we encountered in a number of the nation's regions. Any crack in them should evoke new concern, however, and not just on the part of commanders and political workers but in the entire people. It must be detected promptly and eliminated skillfully and resolutely.
vice During Transition Period

Law on Service During Transition

90UM0568A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Law of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic on Service of Residents of the Estonian SSR in the USSR Armed Forces in the Transitional Period]

[Text] Service of residents of the Estonian SSR in the USSR Armed Forces is illegal according to the 30 March

1990 decree of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet "On the State Status of the Estonian SSR."

Recognizing that the USSR Law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service" and military registration and conscription of residents of the Estonian SSR for active service in the USSR Armed Forces on the basis of the 28 March 1968 USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 195-75 "On Approval of the Statute on Local Organs of Military Control" and the 29 March 1990 USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 305, Clause 2 are contrary to the legal status of the territory of the Estonian SSR, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet

resolves:

1. To repeal articles 2, 78, 79 and 189¹ of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code.
2. To rehabilitate those residents of the Estonian SSR who were convicted on the basis of articles 78 and 189¹ of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code for refusing or evading service in the USSR Armed Forces, and for evading training or control sessions or violating the rules of military registration.
3. To recognize participation of institutions, enterprises and organizations of the Estonian SSR in compulsory application of the USSR Law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service" in relation to residents of the Estonian SSR as not corresponding to the state status of the Estonian SSR, and to cease this activity.
4. To establish that departments, institutions, enterprises and organizations of the Estonian SSR are not permitted to require residents to present military registration documents when they register for housing space, when they are discharged from housing space and when they exercise other civilian rights.
5. To establish that the procedure of service of residents of the Estonian SSR on active duty in the USSR Armed Forces and the conditions of their release from it are established by the Government of the Estonian SSR on coordination with the USSR Council of Ministers.
6. To suspend—for the year 1990—Part 3, Article 5 of the Estonian SSR Law "On Labor Service in the Estonian SSR" and to extend until 15 May (inclusively) the deadline for submitting declarations of assumption of labor service in 1990.
7. The law becomes effective from the moment of its adoption.

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Ruutel
Tallinn, 11 April 1990

Deputy Military Commissars Interviewed

90UM0568B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with ESSR Deputy Military Commissars, Colonels Nikolay Yakovlevich Redko and Vladimir Ivanovich Fedyrka by I. Ristmyagi: "Why, Oh Why Are You Doing This..."]

[Text] How can we possibly not recall Demyan Bednyy's textbook verses! A mother bids farewell to a rustic youngster leaving to join the army. He is surrounded by a crush of relatives: Why, oh why are you doing this, it would be better if you didn't join the army. "The Red Army will find its bayonets, and the Bolsheviks will do just fine without you," is what the poem goes on to say. It would be interesting to trace the literary destiny of such a young soldier, to see his traits in the reliable Chonkin, in the happy wit Terkin. But no, not right now. The topic of today's discussion is something totally different. Although it will also concern itself with soldiers, with yesterday's soldiers, with the peers of Demyan's hero of long ago, for whom it is now time to serve, but....

Estonian SSR deputy military commissars, colonels Nikolay Yakovlevich Redko and Vladimir Ivanovich Fedyrka are the participants of our discussion.

[Ristmyagi] On 29 March the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the Decree on the Regular Call-Up of Citizens to Active Military Service in April-June 1990. Who and what organs are implementing this decree?

[Fedyrka] The first thing I would like to turn attention to is the corresponding subdivisions of the Law on Universal Compulsory Military Service, which answer your question categorically. Conscription is the responsibility of organs of the Soviet government. Draft commissions staffed by civilian officials are set up under the executive committees. The only officer is the chairman—the military commissar of the given rayon or city. And there are no representatives of the armed forces in the medical commission that certifies the conscripts either.

[Ristmyagi] The civilian authorities and civilian doctors are the first to "sift out" the conscripts, but physically weak youngsters and chronically sick people still wind up in the army. What do you have, planning indicators that compel you to accept just about everyone, with rare exception?

[Fedyrka] That's what everybody's asking. Of course we don't have a plan. The procedure is like this: A few months before the call-up we submit information to the headquarters of the military district—the Baltic district in our case—on young men of the corresponding age; we indicate how many youngsters are graduating, how many will be going to tekhnikums for pre-diploma practical work, how many are married, how many are taking care of elderly or sick parents, and so forth. All of this is indicated. I know from my own work experience, which is rather sizable, that not less than 30 percent of the conscripts receive deferments for one reason or another.

The doctors also decide for themselves whether a young man is suited for service or not. Though of course the limits of deviations from the norm permitting call-up have been too lenient. But there is nothing here that workers of the military commissariat can change. On the other hand legislators are fully capable of discussing this matter, and obligating the corresponding departments to change the instructions. I would like to note in passing that unfortunately, there are increasingly more sick youngsters, and I mean sick, and not just physically underdeveloped, young men who can't even do a couple of chin-ups. This year 678 persons will not be drafted for medical reasons, while last year there were half less. This, the health of the youngsters, is something else that the society should concern itself with. But for the moment it is more concerned with saddling boys with the burden of a criminally punishable act.

[Ristmyagi] Are you referring to the latest law of the republic's new Supreme Soviet, "On Service of Residents of the Estonian SSR in the USSR Armed Forces in the Transitional Period"?

[Fedyrka] Yes, of course. These laurels should be shared, by the way, by legislators and public figures such as Yuri Liym, the leader of "Geneva-49." I'm not about to go into the legal details of whether the principles of that Geneva Convention are applicable to the status of Estonia. Something else is important in our discussion today: Fifty-year-old Liym is urging 18-year-old boys to turn in their draft cards and to refuse army service, which as we know is criminally punishable. Let me cite Article 78 of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code: "Evasion of a regular call-up for active military service is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 1 to 3 years."

"Geneva-49" is sending letters to currently serving Estonian youngsters, appealing to them to desert and to return home immediately. Some follow this inciteful advice right away, while others give it some thought. I have here a letter from a soldier serving in an airborne regiment, forwarded to us from the republic's Supreme Soviet. The youngster would like a clarification: When he flees his unit, should he take his weapon along? You can imagine what might await him, were he to heed Mr. Liym's advice.

[Ristmyagi] Are you saying that there are some who have already heeded it?

[Fedyrka] Alas, there are. Eighty-four youngsters who had been called up from Estonia have violated their oath. Seven have already returned, of course—some voluntarily, while others were found by procuracy organs.

[Ristmyagi] What awaits them? The courts, a colony?

[Fedyrka] Not at all; they go on serving. The people in the military procuracy, after all, do understand that the boy has simply been led astray. And if the parents yield to such appeals, what can we say about the youngsters? When they begin to see the error of their ways, and come

to the military commissariat, we, knowing the political tension that exists here, contact their military unit and explain the situation. In a word, we find understanding. But when it comes to those who hide in the woods and in cellars, they will obviously have to suffer the consequences of the law.

[Ristmyagi] And how do you feel about alternative labor service?

[Redko] Positive in regard to the idea itself. I am even certain that it is something that is necessary. There are, after all, youngsters who have been brought up in religious sects possessing creeds prohibiting the bearing of arms.

Let me go a little further. Our military construction troops are formed, mildly speaking, out of a contingent ill-suited for service. I don't need to explain that any further, do I? These units and this cheap manpower are used by a minimum of 20 union ministries (the Ministry of Defense is not included among them). Without a doubt, alternative service could only be beneficial to such youngsters, even in construction organizations. And it would be beneficial to the effort as well—I am referring to the quality of construction.

The Law on Alternative Service recently adopted by the ESSR Supreme Soviet suffers from many omissions in my opinion. The main one is this: There are no criteria for rejection from active military service, and certain articles of the law may be interpreted in different ways, which is impermissible. But in any case my thoughts are purely theoretical in nature. The country's laws, which we are obligated to use as guidelines in our practical activities, do not as yet foresee alternative service. Let me add that our union legislators, who are unable to keep up with life's realities in their legislative efforts, are also inciting constitutional conflicts in certain regions of the country.

[Ristmyagi] In such a case there is a question I can't keep myself from asking, Nikolay Yakovlevich. Could it be that the time has come to discuss in the USSR Supreme Soviet the possibility of forming a professional army?

[Redko] It would be better if I allowed you and your readers to answer this question yourselves; as for my part, I'll simply give you some of the raw data. First of all, the youngsters that are now entering the army are for the most part psychologically and physically unprepared for service—something that the parents themselves never tire of repeating. Second, officers spend a great deal of time on what we might call re-education and remedial education, at the same time that in a professional army they would be spending their work time as it should be spent—on professional training of the personnel. The work week of a Soviet officer is approximately 80 hours long, while that of a Soviet worker is 41 hours long. A military pilot who has graduated from a higher military school receives pay totaling up to 350 rubles per month (basic pay and grade pay). A trolley bus driver receives 400-500 rubles. And the comparison can

go on—availability of housing, of children's day care centers, of jobs for wives. You answer the question—do you think our officers would like to serve in a professional army?

In the USA's professional army, soldiers receive \$630 monthly pay in their very first month of service. Plus \$250 for medical support. Would our soldiers like to serve in a professional army?

Could we, who possess an army of the same strength, allow ourselves the same thing today? There are 3.2 million persons in the U.S. Armed forces, while in ours there are 702,000 more; we would also need to subtract those subject to reduction in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet decision. The numbers of people are the same, but what about finances? Am I telling you anything new about America? No, all of these data have been published. So what is there to talk about?

[Ristmyagi] The topic of discussion is in fact something else. Let's return to the Law on Service of Residents of Estonia in the USSR Armed Forces adopted on 11 April by the republic's Supreme Soviet.

[Redko] There is obviously a legal conflict today between the laws of the Soviet Union and those of the republic. Deputies of the ESSR Supreme Soviet continue to assert that we are living under conditions of an occupation and that this is an occupation army; this doesn't correspond not only to the legal norms but also to common sense. At least because an occupation would not permit free parliamentary elections. All right, that's enough of that, let's return to legislation. It was originally asserted in our republic that the problems of international life and defense remain within the jurisdiction of the center, and that the rest is the responsibility of the republic. Then a law on military service was adopted—on 6 December of last year—stating that young men must perform their military duty on the territory of the Baltic Military District or in a neighboring district, in similar climatic conditions. As a point of information, after last fall's call-up, 70 percent of the youngsters were assigned to military units in the European part of the country. However, a different law is then adopted on 15 March, foreseeing alternative labor service. But this law remained on the books for less than a month. The most recent law—the one which was passed the day before yesterday—completely ignores the USSR Council of Ministers decree on the regular call-up. I wonder, not as a deputy military commissar but simply as a person, whether deputies who voted for this law have draft-age sons? Are political appeals and slogans really more important than the destinies of young men? They will be judged, after all—that's absolutely certain. It's no wonder that many parents coming to us for an explanation feel so greatly confused.

Well, what are we going to do about the spring call-up? We will conduct it in accordance with the decree of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

If local government authorities responsible for the call-up refuse to conduct it, this work will be done by the military commissariats of the cities and rayons. In a word, we will act within the framework of the USSR Law on Universal Compulsory Military Service.

Local Draft Evasion

90UM0568C Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 17,
Apr 90 p 15

[Article by correspondent Leonid Levitskiy: "Estonia: Conscripts Not in Formation"]

[Text] "...The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To repeal articles 1, 78, 79 and 189¹ of the ESSR Criminal Code.
2. To rehabilitate those residents of the Estonian SSR who were convicted...for refusing or evading service in the USSR Armed Forces.... To enact the Estonian SSR Law "On Service of Residents of the Estonian SSR in the USSR Armed Forces in the Transitional Period." 11 April 1990....

Valga is a small town. A legendary T-34 stands frozen on a concrete foundation at its entrance. We were brought to it by an associate of the military commissariat. The fresh, emerald-green grass pushing its way up toward the sun, toward the warmth, was a complement to the dark-green tank. But the fragments of concrete were totally out of place. I picked up a twisted chunk of metal—a shell fragment perhaps, or perhaps a tank track fragment. Someone placed a bomb beneath the vehicle's undercarriage. An explosion of enormous power resounded after midnight.

An officer told the story: "We managed to renovate the foundation and bring in a new T-34 within a day. The monument was restored, though I'm not certain how long it will stand."

Who was bothered by the tank on the foundation? Who dislikes the memory of those who perished on this soil?

In September 1944 around 10,000 soldiers and commanders lay down their lives in liberating this Estonian city with its 20,000 population.

"Stinging words are often heard today: 'And who asked you to liberate us?' For 3 years now it has been asserted that Estonia is occupied territory. That the Soviet Army is an invading army. That same T-34 has been violated before—it has been smeared with paint and fuel oil," Lieutenant Colonel A. Veselov, Valga's military commissar, openly admitted. "Conscripts are openly being encouraged to refuse army service in the rayon. And not only by activists of the 'Geneva-49' committee. Even rayon party committee first secretary M. Kolosova promised to 'defend' youngsters from army service as a way to pick up votes. She won her seat. But what was the price which misled recruits had to pay for her 'victory'?

They are rejecting receipt of draft notices and refusing to go to the induction centers."

The goal of my trip to Valga was to acquaint myself with how things were going with the beginning of the spring call-up into the army. The military commissar gave it to me straight—the call-up had practically failed. The district council refused to conduct it. The city newspaper is conducting its own "local" war against the armed forces. The press has imposed a taboo upon responses prepared by associates of the military commissariat. Nor was the USSR Council of Ministers decree on the beginning of the call-up published.

A little background: The USSR Law on Universal Compulsory Military Service was adopted in 1967. According to it, local soviet organs are responsible for the draft. They organize draft commissions out of civilian officials. Only the commission chairman is an officer—the military commissar. And even military commissariats are financed by soviet budgets.

Refusal of the uyezd soviet and volost soviets to have anything to do with the draft paralyzed it for practical purposes. Several dozen youngsters from Valga were to join the army. Twenty-two have agreed thus far, with only two of them being Estonians.

Geneva-49 committees have begun an "antidraft" campaign. They are acting energetically, capitalizing on the population's ignorance of the laws.

The Geneva Convention "On Protection of the Civilian Population During Times of War" was adopted in 1949. One of its articles prohibits an occupying state from taking the population of captured territory into its own army during times of war and military conflicts.

Estonia entered the USSR 9 years prior to the Geneva Convention's adoption. And as we know, the law is not retroactive. Meaning that there is no legal basis for the activities of Geneva-49. All appeals not to join the army, and to desert from it, are unlawful. The papers which these committees issue to young men are false certificates. Many who believed in these papers have come to harm.

Ninety-four youngsters called up from Estonia voluntarily deserted their units. Seventy-two of them are still in hiding, not cognizant of the unpunished political intrigues of Geneva-49.

The situation is growing more complex with every day. Hundreds of youngsters hiding from the courts may now be in the woods where bunkers stood not long ago.

The republic's Supreme Soviet tried to defuse the situation. On agreement with the Ministry of Defense, almost 70 percent of Estonians now serve exclusively in the country's European part. But the military leadership's concession has not altered the situation as a whole. Moreover the republic's Supreme Soviet adopted the law "On Labor Service" right before the spring call-up.

Young men are released from army service in many countries of the world for substantial religious or political reasons. The extent to which such reasons are justified is verified by special commissions. Few probably remember that both Russian and the first Soviet regulations foresaw such an alternative. It was officially noted in the 1939 USSR law on universal compulsory military service. Of course, people, the society and the country have changed significantly since then. And the initiative of Estonian legislators is fully justified. Sooner or later it will be embodied in an all-union legal document.

But we cannot discount the fact that the law was adopted in Estonia in haste, at the eve of the elections to the new parliament. It was more a political than a legal act. The criteria and reasons allowing for alternative service are not specified by it. For the commissions on labor service (they have been established under city and uyezd soviets), statements of the young men themselves are sufficient, with no input from draft commissions required, to substitute labor service for military service.

Just the commission of the Tallinn City Soviet has already received around a thousand such declarations. It also possesses a sizable number of requests for "recruits" from enterprises and organizations. The militia, fire-fighting services, hospitals and municipal administrations. The time of alternative service is half a year longer than military service. However the youngster gets to live at home, he receives 125 rubles per month—such is the official subsistence minimum in Estonia, and he is responsible only to the work schedule. No one is writing the final version of the labor service "regulations" yet. But in any case, they will not eliminate fundamental contradictions.

The Law on Labor Service is incompatible with the legal system of the country, or of the republic as well. It contradicts both constitutions. Youngsters who are sent to work by the soviets become transgressors of the law through the fault of those that send them. What are the conscripts to do? Which regulations are they to follow?

The supreme soviet of the new convocation aggravated the conflict.

The law "On Service of Residents of the Estonian SSR in the USSR Armed Forces in the Transitional Period" was adopted on 11 April. The essence of the law is this: Service in the Soviet Army is recognized to be legally wrong. All state documents regulating universal compulsory military service contradict the status of Estonia. Refusal to serve is no longer considered a violation of the law. Institutions and organizations must cease all activities associated with compulsory military service. Military documents will no longer be required for housing registration, for employment and for study.

"The mark of left-wing populist radicalism is very strong in this document, virtually as if it was drawn up not in the supreme organ of power but in the offices of Estonia's party of national independence, in Geneva-49

committees and in similar organizations," noted the newspaper MOLODEZH ESTONII.

What happens next? A session of the Kohtla-Jarve City Soviet refused to carry out the new law. It is said that the opinion of the deputies is also shared by their associates in Narva. But in all other cities the situation is like it is in Valga. Out of almost 3,000 conscripts in Estonia, half are seeking alternative service.

Maj Gen Zaychenkov on Legal Issues

90UM0568D Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with Maj Gen Ye. V. Zaychenkov by correspondent A. Idla: "Our Ship Is Listing..."]

[Text] A message from the Tallinn City Soviet:

"Young men qualified by age for conscription into the USSR Armed Forces in 1990 who are unable to serve in the army due to serious extenuating circumstances must submit documented evidence to the employment commission of the Tallinn City Soviet not later than 16 April 1990.

"Labor service releases the individual from the obligation to serve in the USSR Armed Forces."

From a decision of a session of the Kohtla-Jarve City Soviet of People's Deputies:

"...The Estonian SSR law on labor service in the Estonian SSR is to be deemed null and void, and not to be enforced on the administrative territory of the city soviet, as being contrary to a number of articles of the USSR Constitution and the Estonian SSR Constitution, as well as the USSR Law on Universal Compulsory Military Service...."

These were the reactions in Estonia to the USSR Council of Ministers decree on the regular call-up of civilians for active military service. Representatives of a USSR Ministry of Defense commission that included Major General Ye. V. Zaychenkov encountered these contradictions as well. Our correspondent met with Yevgeniy Vasilyevich and asked him a number of questions.

[Idla] Did the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense send the commission only to Estonia?

[Zaychenkov] You probably are aware of the fact that the call-up for military service was announced for the first time in a decree of the country's government, and not in an order from the defense minister. In order to learn how it was being fulfilled locally, the USSR Ministry of Defense established several groups, one of which came to Estonia.

We met with workers of the military commissariats, with representatives of local government organs and with private citizens.

[Idla] And what impressions were you left with?

[Zaychenkov] We were taken aback by certain positions. For example the USSR Council of Ministers decree on the spring call-up in Estonia was published in only two Russian-language newspapers. I did not see anything about it in Estonian. This elicits difficulties in the aspect of informing the public and explaining the essence of the new approaches to this issue. On the other hand this has elicited false rumors. Our commission associates this fact with the documents adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet, and particularly with the law on labor service in the ESSR.

And now local authorities of a number of rayons are deciding to cancel financial support to military commissariats. Everything is being done to keep conscripts from becoming informed. Appeals to local authorities by military commissars are met with a lack of understanding. And now some draft-age youngsters who have shown due cause are already preparing to go into alternate service.

The Geneva-49 movement did not play the last role in this matter either.

[Idla] How do you assess the activities of its leaders?

[Zaychenkov] They are using a well known tactic, citing some document, but remaining silent about its essence.

The Geneva conventions on protection of the victims of war was adopted in 1949. One of them, the convention "On Protection of the Civilian Population in Times of War"—contains Article 51, which prohibits an occupying power from conscripting the population of occupied territory to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces, while Article 2 specifies that the convention "will be applied in the event of declaration of war or of any other armed conflict."

Somehow we haven't noticed that the Estonian SSR is in a state of war with the Soviet Union, or that armed conflicts are occurring here. Obviously this interpretation of the issue is very much to the liking of someone, and it is being utilized competently.

Meaning that these conventions have no relationship to legal regulation of conscription of USSR citizens for service in the USSR Armed Forces. References to them are nothing more than speculation upon the people's ignorance. It is speculation that is all the more dangerous because it can mislead a person in such a way that he might violate the law, while the instigator would bear no responsibility.

[Idla] And why is this being done?

[Zaychenkov] The answer is simple. The spring call-up in the republic has to be foiled. This is the ultimate end of everything, beginning with the refusal to create draft commissions.

At the same time we acquainted ourselves with a number of documents, including with the decision of the session

of the Kohtla-Jarve City Soviet. These documents suggest that there are right-thinking forces in the republic.

It must be recognized that the law on labor service in the USSR has no legal basis. We must follow the USSR Constitution, which defines all of these positions, to the letter. I would like to believe that common sense will triumph, and youngsters will go to serve.

To me, a person who has served over 30 years, the propaganda being waged against the USSR Armed Forces in the republic's mass media is also unpleasantly startling. I am hearing and reading about an "army of occupation," about "invaders." During the Great Patriotic War almost 50,000 Soviet Army soldiers and commanders of different nationalities died during Estonia's liberation from German fascism. The war didn't spare anyone, after all. But now we're the invaders. I'm certain that this belief is held not by all Soviet people but by those who find such an idea useful.

[Idla] Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, do you have any hope that our ship, which frankly speaking is listing dangerously, will right itself?

[Zaychenkov] I think that the Supreme Soviet and the republic's government will ultimately make the right decisions, and that the laws which have been adopted will be repealed. There is no other solution. Everything must be brought into correspondence with the Constitution of the USSR, and of the ESSR as well. My hope is that such a decision will be made!

Estonian Law on Military Service During Transitional Period

*90UM0549A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 1*

[Article by A. Ruutel, Chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet: "Estonian SSR Law on Estonian SSR Residents' Service in the USSR Armed Forces During the Transitional Period"]

[Text] Based upon the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution, "On the Official Status of the Estonian SSR, dated 30 March 1990, the service of Estonian SSR residents in the USSR Armed Forces is juridically illegal.

Recognizing that the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service", as well as those implemented on the basis of the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 195-75, "On Confirming the Status of the Local Military Administrative Bodies", dated 28 March 1968, and the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 305, paragraph 2, the military registration and call-up of Estonian SSR residents to active duty in the USSR Armed Forces, dated 29 March 1990, contradicts the legal status of the territory of the Estonian SSR, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To repeal articles 2, 78, 79, and 1891 of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code.

2. To rehabilitate those residents of the Estonian SSR who were convicted under articles 78 and 1891 for refusing or evading service in the USSR Armed Forces and also for evading reservist active duty training or periodical training or for violating military registration rules.

3. To recognize that participation by Estonian SSR institutions, enterprises, and organizations in the compulsory application of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service" with respect to Estonian SSR residents is not in keeping with the Estonian SSR's status as a state and to put an end to this practice.

4. To establish that Estonian SSR departments, institutions, enterprises, and organizations are not authorized to require the presentation of military registration documents from Estonian SSR residents when they register

for an apartment, when they sign out of an apartment, and when they are exercising other civil rights.

5. To establish that the terms of service by Estonian SSR residents who are on active duty in the USSR Armed Forces and the conditions of their release from active duty will be determined by the Estonian SSR government in concordance with the USSR Council of Ministers.

6. To rescind part 3, article 5 of the Estonian SSR Law "On Labor Service in the Estonian SSR" and to extend the period for submitting applications to join the labor service in 1990 to 15 May (inclusive).

7. The law takes effect at the moment of its passage.

Tallinn, 11 April 1990.

1975 Mutiny Aboard Large ASW Ship 'Storozhevoy' Reexamined

90UM0348A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Mar 90 p 4

[Excerpt of larger work by Nikolay Cherkashin: "The Last Parade"]

[Text] On 27 February, IZVESTIYA began a discussion of dramatic events which played themselves out in the Riga roadsteads in November 1975. Both KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the author of the published essay agree with Maj Gen Just A. Boriskin that "both then and now the violating of the military oath, the unauthorized seizure of power on a naval vessel, the removal of it from under subordination to the Navy Command and the refusal to carry out orders have been and remain the severest military crime."

At the same time, there is the unresolved question directed at all who in one way or another were involved in that difficult story: "How did he (the deputy commander for political affairs of the large ASW ship, Capt 3d Rank Valeriy Sablin) decide upon such an extreme step, what was he thinking and what was he professing?"

Of course, it would be a sad affair if the answer to this question would be sought out by foreign authors, and if their dissertations would be defended on events occurring in our nation but with which our reader was not familiar.

For several years, the writer Nikolay Cherkashin has been preparing this essay in meeting with the relatives of Valeriy Sablin, with the participants in these events, as well as workers from the military procuracy and the USSR KGB.... Various documents, letters, photographs, we are hopeful, will help answer these difficult questions which we previously did not even imagine.

The essay is being published fully in the second issue of the journal RODINA. We are publishing only a fragment of it.

In that year, they were presented with these stars almost simultaneously: not even 5 minutes apart to Mar Brezhnev and Capt 3d Rank Sablin. To the former went the "Marshal's Star" shining in diamonds. To the latter the pinchbeck officer star For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3d Degree. Sablin was serving the motherland on the large ASW ship "Storozhevoy."

The judgments for these two stars were similar: for the diamond one it was inglorious decline and for the other, the copper-zinc, long oblivion....

Brezhnev was being politely applauded. In the noise of the well-organized ovation the angry clank of iron was drowned out. Knocking with their crutches on the radiators were the legless frontline veterans in the war veteran hospital which was on Preobrazhenskiy Gate. Initially, one ward began to knock, then it was joined by

another and yet another until all the floors were flooded with noise. Out of insult and indignation, the resonant metal was being beaten by those whose combat decorations included the color of the blood of their holders.... The drumming of this protest did not reach the ears of the four-time star-winner but, on the other hand, it was heard in competent levels. The hospital in Preobrazhenka was broken up in a few days....

No, in those voiceless years not everyone kept quiet. And Valeriy Sablin would clearly have been of that breed of angry veterans and it was lucky that in 1941 he was only 3 years old....

In 1975, he was serving in the Baltic and I was in the North. We were colleagues as we were both ship deputy commanders for political affairs. We never met at sea nor on shore. I heard his name late in the autumn. My commander whispered the improbable news to me.

...On the second day of the November holidays, the large ASW ship "Storozhevoy" without authorization left the parade formation of military ships in Riga and headed out to sea. The deputy commander for political affairs [zampolit] arrested the commander, took his place on the bridge and headed the ship into neutral waters. There he radioed a revolutionary challenge to the nation's leaders. Scrambled aircraft halted the "Storozhevoy" by warning shots. And when the commander was able to free himself, he, going up to the bridge, severely wounded his zampolit, Sablin, with a pistol and turned the ship.

It would be hard to believe that this story played itself out in our times, in our fleet.

Later there were various interpretations. Supposedly, this was committed by a mentally ill person who was not promptly diagnosed. "There is no way about it," asserted others, "Sablin is the grandson of that very White Guard admiral who in 1918 refused to carry out Lenin's order to sink the Black Sea Fleet at Novorossiysk, he had been recruited by Swedish intelligence and then he tried to take the ship to Stockholm." Still others asserted that he had done this to spite the command, as his service was not going well, he had not been promoted and not given an apartment....

Incidentally, at that time we found a rather convenient explanation for ourselves ascribing it to "adventure." There was no time to worry ourselves about what had happened as we were planning for combat service—at sea, far away for a long time.

But still the notch in my memory remained, Sablin. Nor was this name forgotten in the fleet. From time to time, it surfaced in idle conversations in a trusted group, it became overgrown with probable and improbable details and each time was mentioned in very sympathetic tones. Here everyone knew that the crew had been broken up, the ship had been sent to seas far distant from the Baltic and it was highly recommended that this question not be mentioned.

Now, this can be spoken of at full voice. But how strange and painful a right is; the words which we now read on the deformation of socialism, on the need to return to Leninist principles and true democracy would have cost Sablin his life had he addressed them to Brezhnev.

Would he have rushed? Would he really have waited until April 85?

There was no White admiral in the family of Valeriy Sablin. His great grandfather on his mother's side was a Baltic guard, Fedor Vasilyevich Tyukin, who perished in October 1914 along with the entire crew of the cruiser "Pallada." His grandfather, Vasily Petrovich Buchnev, was also a sailor on the Baltic working as a mate at Kronshtadt. His grandfather on his father's side, Petr Ivanovich Sablin, went through World War I and then the Civil War, winning the Red Banner three times.

In the family of his son, Capt 1st Rank Mikhail Petrovich Sablin, there were three boys: the elder Boris, the middle Valeriy and the younger Nikolay. The brothers were proud of their father and they knew his combat decorations by heart: the Order of the Red Banner, two Red Stars and both degrees of the Patriotic War.... The elder Sablin began the war and ended it in the Northern Fleet. He was then highly praised and respected by the then fleet commander, Adm Arseniy Golovko.

In retiring, Mikhail Petrovich moved to Gorkiy where for long years he taught military affairs to the officer candidates of a river school.

The brothers certainly prepared to become sailors. But the health of one was bad, and the second when a young man chose the profession of military engineer. So only Valeriy realized his father's dream. In 1956, he was admitted to the Higher Naval School imeni M.V. Frunze.

A letter survives from Sablin as a second-year office candidate who had returned from a training cruise: "Today we have just reached the pier and we have been a fortnight at sea. I have not been on shore yet. These 15 days flew by in an instant. Everything was confused: where was the night, where was Monday, where was Saturday. The longer I am here (on the new destroyed) the more I am certain that the naval school is right and I have not erred in my choice. Here you feel more strongly that you are on a ship, that you are a combat unit, that the ship commander is a responsible person who in a word causes the ship to dash forward, to blaze with all its guns, who is responsible for the ship, for the men. On the cruiser you did not feel this.... There everything was fine and solid, it was a fortress in the water and even rolled somehow thoughtfully, importantly. But the destroyer skims along like a bird, it bobs like a boat; and if a turn is made, you can feel the waves caressing the side....

"I have already learned three specialties and I can take over for a petty officer. I love to talk with the sailors about their life before the navy, they recall this with satisfaction and the soul of another human opens up before you...25 May 58."

The years passed and the youthful excitement died down but his life always combined a love for the sea and a sincere attention to the sailor, to his personality and soul. Later this would grow into an acute interest in man generally, in the state of affairs in the nation and society.

"Service is going well, I am very accustomed to the ship and the sailors. It is even sad to say farewell. I love to speak with the sailors about their former lives. Yesterday I was sitting with one, Smirnov, talking while we darned a canvas. He was from a village in Kalinin Oblast and was a junior groom. When you listen to him it is as if you are reading a book on peasant life.... How interesting they are, these sailors."

"The talk about Lenin went well. It is a shame to admit that only at the age of 21, it seems, have I really understood the greatness of Lenin. Before this was somehow unconscious and superficial...."

Valeriy's childhood was spent in four cities with masculine and courageous names: Arkhangelsk, Polyarnyy, Severomorsk and Gorkiy. Whatever a city it was an educating grandfather in a sailor's suit, in a worker shirt; each left its imprint on the boy's soul. And probably most of all it was Polyarnyy. It was here that he learned what war was.

"Mom gave us all the bread and in order to stifle her hunger she began to smoke," recalled the elder of the Sablin brothers, Boris. "Once I found a lot of butts in Valerka's pockets. I wanted to grab him by the neck and I think I even began to do so. But he said to me: 'I shake the tobacco from them into a tube and give it to mother. It will be a present for her.' Although I was older, such a thing had never come into my mind. He loved both his father and his mother very much.... He was also able to keep his word. One time, we were waiting for him to come back from school but he never showed up. We became worried as he was a first grader and it was a polar night.... My father and I went out to find him. And he was standing behind the school. 'What are you doing here?' 'I had an argument with some other boys. They said they would come after their lessons. But they have not come.' 'Well, let's go home. You have won. They were cowards.' That was the character he had."

He learned to read and write early. At the age of 6, he liked to take a large sheet of paper, he folded it in half and drew the masthead of the newspaper PRAVDA and wrote in block letters "Proletarians of All Nations, Unite!" and then made comments on household and courtyard matters. "Vodka is a fibber," for example.... His mother kept this newspaper for a long time....

He worshipped his father. But he quarreled mercilessly. It would happen that we would assemble at the table: father and his brother and Valeriy and myself. We were all military, officers. But they were persons of their own times and we were of our own. "It is impossible to live as we are living now." And if I was swept away by emotion, Valeriy argued clearly as to how, what and why.

"In school," recalled the fellow classmate of Sablin's, now a high official in the RSFSR Ministry of Finances, A.I. Lyalin, "Valeriy was called the 'conscience of the course.' But don't think that he was a bore like a confirmed good student. No, he was very happy and at the same time fixed in his principles. He was not evasive.

"The leadership regarded him highly. He quickly became a squad commander and one of the first of our group to join the party, while still in the 4th year. We elected him the secretary of the faculty Komsomol committee...."

...After graduation the new lieutenants presented each other with their cadet photos, inscribing them sincerely:

"Valerka, be as you are and were with us, Yu. Mikhaylov."

"To the most restrained, most principled Valeriy, Kolenov."

"To a fighter for justice, G. Kanevskiy."

One of the wishes, jokingly, was in verse, as follows:

"I want [you] to become a hero of the world so that the lyre sings your praise as the pride of the Russian sailors over future centuries!"

Thus, in December 1960, Lt Sablin began his officer service in Sevastopol, on the destroyer "Ozhestochenyy." On the ship he was in command of an artillery fire control group and later a battalion.... How he commanded can be seen from a letter which the commander of the destroyer sent to his father on 22 January 1965:

"Dear Mikhail Petrovich!

"The command of the ship where your son, Sr Lt Valeriy Mikhaylovich Sablin is serving, thanks you, as a father, for having raised a good son for the motherland, a dedicated communist for the party and an exemplary officer for the fleet.

"Over the period of service on the ship, your son has eight commendations from the ship and fleet command.

"We are proud of Valeriy who sets an example for all the subunit commanders. He devotes much effort and his young ebullient energy to the cause of raising the ship's combat readiness and strengthening military discipline among all the personnel....

"Ship commander, Capt 3d Rank Malakhovskiy."

He also found his friend in life. They met at a school dance. It was like an ordinary novel about a naval cadet and a Leningrad student. But they found one another for all their life. She followed him to the ends of the earth, be it in the Far North or on Mount Elbrus which they climbed together as well as all the Caucasus Passes. And if Valeriy had leave in the summertime, he headed home to the countryside to see his parents where they rented a hut. A week would pass and the father would pick up a shovel in the barn and fastened to it was a piece of paper: "Don't be so busy! Rest more often." His mother would take up a book and there would be a piece of paper with the inscription: "Don't forget to put on your glasses!" And three laughing persons instead of a signature: the son, his bride and the grandchild.

"Of the three of us," recalled Nikolay Mikhaylovich Sablin, the younger brother, "he was the most outward going. He was the soul of any party, he played the guitar and sang, although without much voice but with energy. He was a mountain climber. A skier. A volleyball player. And everything with zeal and boldness. He drew well. As a cadet, he even drew portraits of Marx and Lenin. He was a skilled photographer. Here are a few photos which remain...."

An amateur photo with white spots on the corners. In a tiny Northern Fleet cabin, the entire casual life of a lieutenant: a chair with a jacket thrown on it, an antediluvian radio, Valeriy in an officer's cap with an armful of wood, his wife and child. Three happy persons. A moment of happiness. And not just any but their own....

One other photo. The bridge of the destroyer. Lt Sablin wearing the armband of the watch officer was standing thinking by the grip of the order telegraph. "Stop! Slow astern! Full steam ahead...."

And so they stand at the crossing in front of the road marker: "Go to the right and you lose your horse, go straight ahead and you are lost...."

And he chose straight ahead.

Regardless of brilliant recommendations, Lt Sablin did not become a senior lieutenant very quickly. His rank was held up for almost a year. Why? He wrote a letter to N.S. Khrushchev where he set out his thoughts on the matter of the purity of the party ranks. He wrote as a communist who theoretically had the right to turn to any party level. But in practice, everything ended with a harsh reprimand the sense of which is not difficult to guess.

Seemingly, Sablin understood the lesson and threw himself into ship service. There followed a certificate of honor: "To Sr Lt V. Sablin for successes achieved in carrying out the assignments of the command during the

period of the long move between Severomorsk and Sevastopol. Unit Commander, Rear Adm Belyakov."

When the young officer was transferred to a different ship, in the destroyer's wardroom he was presented with a commendation written out on the paper of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

"Respected Comrade, Sr Lt Valeriy Mikhaylovich Sablin!

"The command of the unit, the officers and the personnel will remember you with profound gratitude as an intelligent and able specialist, a sincere, sensitive and exacting officer-educator who carried out his military and civilian duty in an exemplary manner. Let your courage and the ardor of your heart always warm and inspire others! We express confidence that in leaving the unit, you in the future will serve as an example of honesty and dedication to our great cause....

"Sevastopol, 21 December 1965."

The fleet has always been tight with praise, particularly for young officers.

There was another commendation, another and another....

One could leaf through them and quote them for a long time, but one thing is already clear: the officer was serving not out of fear but out of his conscience.

He was intended to become a ship commander. But he amazed everyone when he requested admission into the Military POLitical Academy imeni Lenin.

...Sablin's outlines of the works of Lenin, Marx and Plekhanov.... How markedly they differed from the ordinary, those copied by wrote from a neighbor with just one aim in mind to take the exams. But from these excerpts one could clearly see how Sablin's thoughts and determination had matured....

From Marx: "A moral state offers it members a state manner of thought, even if these members go into opposition against a state body, against the government...."

From Dzerzhinskiy: "We, the communists, should live in a manner so that the broadest masses of workers see that we are the servants of the people and that we are using the victory of the revolution and power not for ourselves but rather for the good and happiness of the people."

He studied Marxism without a guide. He referred to the classics directly without hired or highly-paid interpreters.

The fleet is delicate and complex matter where one immediately feels any unhealthy social organism, be it bribery, drug addiction or the coercion of paperwork. A

ship is the model of the state in miniature. If the nation develops a fever, the ship shakes. In those unhappily remembered years, the fleet was feverish as never before. It was precisely then that there began the "hazing" and the number of accidents grew. Ships caught on fire, collided and sank. In 1974, the large ASW ship "Otvazhnyy," caught fire, blew up and sank. A year later, flames raged on the enormous helicopter carrier "Moskva" and submarines were lost....

More and more frequently in the angry orders the reason for all the accidents was given as "official negligence." But this "negligence" had long and diverse roots....

Vladimir Vysotskiy, the contemporary of Sablin and his favorite poet, to the twang of the guitar shouted out the bitter words:

And although we were not shot, We lived without daring to raise our eyes. We also were the children of the terrible years of Russia The hard times poured vodka in us....

Capt 3d Rank Sablin dared to raise his head, to lift his glance and voice his protest.... He went up to the ship's bridge, rising to this rostrum, realizing perfectly well that at the same time he was going to the scaffold....

"For a long time, I have been a liberal," wrote Sablin in his farewell letter to his wife, "confident that I must correct something a bit in our society, write one or two revealing articles and dare something.... That was how I felt until approximately 1971. Study in the academy finally persuaded me that the steel-like state-party machine is so steel-like that any blows to the forehead would be turned into empty sounds....

"From 1971, I began dreaming of free propaganda territory on the ship. Unfortunately, the situation developed in such a manner that only in November 1975 did any real opportunity to act arise.... What impelled me to do this? Love for life...and I have in mind not the life of a satiated Philistine, but rather a bright and honest life which causes sincere joy among all honest people. I am convinced that in our people, as was the case 58 years ago, a revolutionary awareness is bursting forth and the people will achieve communist relations in the nation...."

He saw his destiny.... To take the ship to Leningrad and then over the airwaves announce: "To everyone! Everyone! Everyone!!! This is the free ship 'Storozhevoy'...." And then there would come the truth about the situation in the nation. "Citizens, the fatherland is in danger!" It had been undermined by the bureaucracy and demagoguery, the sham and lies.... There should be a return to Leninist principles, to democracy and social justice.... There should be respect for honor, life and dignity of the individual.... Oh, how much there was to be able to say....

His cherished notebook breaks off with the last entry: "And you at times must wait almost half your life for it to come, your moment!"

His moment came on 8 November 1975. On that day the nation was celebrating not only the 58th anniversary of October, but also the 70th anniversary of the first Russian Revolution....

On 7 November 1975, Sablin in his cabin wrote a farewell letter to his parents with the wet Baltic autumn whistling outside.

Not long before this he had congratulated them on the 30th anniversary of the Victory. Now the letter was quite different. Would they understand? Would they forgive him?

The father did not immediately understand why Valeriy decided to put his life on the line. Only later, when at a meeting in Lefortovo Prison and they had a conversation did the retired Capt 1st Rank Sablin seemingly grasp the essence of the thoughts of his middle son. In any event, he would not condemn him no matter how the advisors insisted.

His mother realized one thing: her son was determined on a certain death. And immediately an urgent telegram was sent from Gorkiy to Baltiysk: "We received the letter from Valeriy. We are amazed, indignant, and we beseech you to reflect. Mother. Father."

He did not stop. He had been raised on different principles.

Sablin had rather good relations with the commander and he did not want to subject him to the humiliating but still inevitable procedure of arrest. For this reason, he tried to persuade Vasilyev to spend the holiday on shore. But the commander was unmoved and would not take a step from the ship as on holidays service would be more tightly controlled than in ordinary days.

"At 2000 hours on 8 November 1975," related A.V. Vasilyev, "the zampolit came into my cabin without knocking. He was very agitated and slightly pale.... 'Comrade commander, there has been an accident!' I jumped up: 'What has happened? Where?!' 'Up there, on the bow, in the sonar enclosure....'

"We dashed together along the stairs: hatch after hatch, deck after deck, ever downwards...I had just rushed into the nose compartment when over my head the steel lid banged shut and the catches clicked in place. I did not immediately understand what had happened. I looked around and caught sight of an envelope with the inscription 'To the Commander' and several books from the ship library. The letter in which Sablin explained the reasons for his actions stunned me. I snatched up the telephone but it was dead...."

All the same, this was not the seizure of a ship in the spirit of pirate novels.... Yes, Sablin had tricked Vasilyev into a trap. The zampolit had chosen the least harm

which might be caused to the commander in this situation. The only way he could justify to himself his necessarily dishonest action was by the notion voiced by Chernyshevskiy (it had been copied out in Sablin's outline): "For the sake of achieving his goals, a revolutionary must often put himself in positions which would never be allowed by an honest person pursuing purely personal ends."

Having assembled the officers and warrant officers ["michman"] in the wardroom, Sablin announced his decision to "turn the ship into a center of political activity" and proposed that each man make his choice. The voting was carried out as follows: the zampolit handed out red and green circles to everyone there. The green was "pro" and the red "contra." There were around a dozen greens. The remainder were locked up in the bunk room, although they did not intend to interfere in the course of events. This was done so that later they would not be accused of complicity.

Sablin's plan was bold and at first glance impossible: during the night to move from Riga to Leningrad and go up the Neva. They would anchor there until he was given an opportunity to speak on television.

Sablin's plan could have succeeded completely if it were not for one circumstance. In weighing anchor, a warrant officer jumped overboard and made his way to the submarine standing ahead of the "Storozhevoy" in the parade formation. The submarine commander did not believe the confused story of the warrant officer and still reported to shore and sometime later, while the information was making its way to Moscow, combat aircraft flew out to intercept the "Storozhevoy"....

Somewhere in the Irbensk Strait, the high-speed bombers caught the target and let off a warning volley. A burst from a large-caliber machine gun went through the smokestack. Then a mate released the commander and he, armed with a pistol, rushed to the bridge, where the zampolit stood by the order telegraph....

With the arrival of the ship at base, Sablin was arrested and sent to Moscow.

The investigation of his case was simple. Sablin did not deny anything, he assumed all the blame and as his last words requested that the sailors from the "Storozhevoy" not be brought before the court....

While he was lying in the prison sickbed (a bullet had gone through his leg), he wrote cheerful letters to his parents.

And with all his energy he endeavored to maintain the belief in his elders that they would not take his life.

After several months of ominous silence, there arrived a thin envelope. What fell out of it was as follows:

"Death certificate.

"Citizen V.M. Sablin died on the 3d of August 1976. Cause of death (crossed out). Place of death (crossed out)."

He had been executed....

Mikhail Petrovich Sablin outlived his son by 6 months. He died in January 1977. Being unable to endure the death of her two dearest persons, Anna Vasilyevna Buchnev, the mother of Valeriy Sablin, died a half-year later.

* * *

I know that the story of Sablin will cause various interpretations. There will be those who view Sablin's action as an attempt at a military coup. And what would happen if everyone acted in a similar manner?!

Yes, completely!

In the old Russian Navy, there was the custom that when a crew, in strongly disagreeing with something, would line up and not disperse until the commander arrived and heard its complaints. This was called "stating a complaint." Sablin intended to do something similar to this: to "form up" in the view of the city of Lenin and "state a complaint" of the monstrous mistruth of our life than, of the distorting of Lenin's ideas and the arbitrariness of the Brezhnev elite.

In the last letter to his son, Valeriy Sablin wrote: "My dear son! I am temporarily saying farewell to you in order to carry out my duty to the motherland. Be a good boy and help mother. Protect her and stand up for yourself.

"What is my duty to the motherland?"

"I am afraid that at present you will not understand completely but as you grow up everything will be clear. At present, I advise you to read Gorkiy's story about Danko. Like him, I have decided to 'tear at my breast and reach the heart....'"

Whatever may be said about him, however he is compared, one thing cannot be denied: Sablin is unconditionally a profoundly Russian phenomenon, he comes from the very heart of national character as Dostoyevsky pointedly said:

"...They (Russian boys.—N.C.) do not waste time on figuring things out, rather they act as their conscience commands, often even being certain of the most terrible consequences for themselves...."

The Russian boys are impatient, they want everything all at once, either in a single sweep to rid the entire world of evil and injustice or embrace it and with their lives protect its beauty against the machinations of others. It is all or nothing....

"Well, what did Sablin achieve by his action?" the skeptic may ask.

Yes, externally nothing special happened: a ship left the parade formation in the evening and by morning had recovered its place. None of the people of Riga even noticed this.

Personally, I had to know all the truth about Sablin so that I could live easier. I feel this is true for many, many other people. No matter how bitter or difficult this is, it is all so complex....

The Brezhnev clique preyed on the fear of society of the Stalinist bone-crunching state machine. Sablin endeavored to dispell this murderous fear.

The "Storozhevoy" was not the cruiser "Avrora" nor the battleship "Potemkin." It did not intend to give a signal for armed insurrection and it did not plan to throw officers overboard. It was to be merely the "Storozhevoy" the breacher of the blockade of bureaucratic lies.

I cannot help but ask the question: What would Sablin have done today? And my answer would be: The "Storozhevoy" would scarcely have weighed anchor today, for at present there is no need to break down open doors. Then, in 1975, a breakthrough into glasnost was impossible by a different, nonextremist method. And now, it is sad to think that in such a year—already 1990!—he would have the legal right to speak to millions of television viewers and he would have an opportunity to find a "free territory for propaganda" at any meeting without seizing the ship. So that this, finally, could be possible, Sablin headed the "Storozhevoy" into the open sea in that mute November of 1975.

Legal Aspects of 'Storozhevoy' Mutiny

90UM0351A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by Capt. 1st Rank S. Bystrov: "The Sablin Case"]

[Text] The Legal Aspect of the Story of the Ship Hijacking

Those who served in the mid-seventies in the Baltic Fleet, and indeed not only there, can still remember. On 3 November 1975, the deputy commander for political affairs of the large antisubmarine ship "Storozhevoy", Capt. 3rd Rank V. Sablin, after locking up the ship's commander and a number of officers and warrant officers, temporarily seized control of the "Storozhevoy", which was in the port of Riga, and on 9 November, despite the categorical orders of the higher command, hijacked it to the Baltic Sea beyond the limits of the Soviet state border. Sablin sent a radiogram with his ultimata to the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy for transmission to the central party and Soviet organs. By sentence of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court dated 13 July 1976, Capt. 3rd Rank Sablin, Valeriy Mikhaylovich, on the basis of paragraph

"a", article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, was condemned to death by firing squad. The sentence was not subject to appeal or contest, Sablin's request for clemency was rejected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and on 3 August of that same year, the sentence was carried out.

An article in IZVESTIYA on 27 February of this year (Moscow evening edition) "Was There a Mutiny on a Soviet Destroyer?" refers precisely to this event. Indeed, information about this reached the paper from New York, although it could be obtained here too without trouble. At present two journals are considering publication of a long essay by writer Capt. 1st Rank (Res.) N. Cherkashin about Sablin's action, a condensed version of which was published by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and earlier, by one of the Ural newspapers.

Last year, Vice-Admiral (Res.) P. M. Yarovoy appealed to the Main Military Procuracy in the name of the Council of the All-Union Naval Historical Society.

"The All-Union Naval Historical Society (VOIF), created at a constituent conference in the city of Kalinin on 18-19 February 1989, requests that you shed light on the following fact: in 1975, a combat ship of the Baltic Fleet broke away from its commander's control. We know that the leader of this action, V. Sablin, was shot. We wonder: was this attempted treason against the Motherland, or an expression of protest against the prevailing period of stagnation in our society?

Since the lives of people stand behind these events, we petition you:

1. to submit an official protest if this is not a case of treason against the Motherland;
2. to allow the members of the Soviet of the VOIF to become acquainted with the trial..."

After examination of the matter, a response was made to the petitioners.

But apparently the circle of those interested grows ever larger. And KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked the Main Military Procuracy to provide information from the documents of the inquiry and trial in the Sablin case.

A talk with documents in hand lasted for several hours. Participating in it were Major-General of Justice A. Boriskin, the chief of the Directorate of the Main Military Procuracy for Oversight of Compliance with the Law by the Organs of Preliminary Investigation of the USSR KGB and for Questions of Rehabilitation, Colonel of Justice N. Anisimov, assistant to the Main Military Prosecutor, Major-General of Justice A. Zagvozdin, the deputy chief of the Investigations Department of the KGB, who took part in the investigation of the case of V. Sablin, and Colonel of Justice O. Dobrovolskiy, the chief of the Department of Investigations of the KGB.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Leonidovich, as the assistant to the Main Military Prosecutor, you were assigned the task of studying the criminal case of Sablin and preparing a response to the All-Union Naval Historical Society. In your duties you must become involved in cases of rehabilitation of service members illegally condemned at various times. Is the Sablin case one of these?

[N. Anisimov] I would like to say right away and unequivocally that no grounds for this have been found. Although, judging from the materials taken from him, from the testimony of his accomplice, Seaman A. Shein, and from the testimony of witnesses and Sablin himself, he was guided by political goals, the case was essentially a criminal one. Violation of his military oath, forceable seizure of power on the ship, removal of the ship from the authority of the Navy command, refusal to obey numerous orders... However, you try to paint it or argue, the essence here remains the same—treason to the Motherland by a serviceman. You see, essentially Sablin tried to take a ship from the state.

His ultimatum, radioed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy began with this demand:

"Declare the territory of the ship "Storozhevoy" free and independent of state and party organs for a year."

[Correspondent] But to judge from further points, he intended to use this alienation of a mighty combat unit of the fleet to implement his own political views. The second point of the ultimatum was that one of his like-minded friends receive the opportunity to speak daily over television for half an hour after the VREMYA program.

[Boriskin] The only man admitted to be an accomplice of Sablin was Seaman Shein, who was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Even during the investigation he made the statement: "...With every day I grew increasingly convinced that I had made an irreparable error in supporting Sablin, and I condemn myself for my thoughtlessness and my naivete. Now I must ask myself: what have I done?..."

[Dobrovolskiy] It is hard to predict Sablin's further intentions. Yes, he told the sailors from whom (after locking up the ship commander, and the officers, warrant officers, and seamen who didn't agree with him) he obtained obedience, that the "Storozhevoy" would go to the Kronshtadt roadstead, and then would work at political propaganda. However let us turn to the materials of the bill of indictment.

"At 10 o'clock Sablin received a radiogram from the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy with a final warning... However Sablin did not obey this appeal either, and continued to hold the ship on its former course, and at the same speed, toward Swedish territorial waters..."

At 10:32 on 9 November 1975, the criminal actions of Sablin and his accomplice Shein were stopped by forces

of the USSR Navy and the crew of the "Storozhevoy", and the ship was halted in the Baltic Sea... 21 miles past the limits of the Soviet state border and a distance of 50 miles from the territorial waters of Sweden".

How things would have developed further, where the ship would have gone, what plan Sablin had—all these things could only be presumed. Even to his trusted man Shein he did not divulge his plans until practically the last moment.

[Correspondent] Judging from the materials of the case, this was a conspiracy of one man.

[Anisimov] Precisely. And in his revolutionary aspiration, as Sablin asserted in speeches to the men, he chose Shein as his comrade, a man who had been convicted before his service for theft of state property. And precisely this Shein, to whom Sablin handed over the commander's pistol, played the decisive role in locking up those who didn't agree, in intimidating the rest, and in foiling the first attempt of the sailors to free the ship commander, who had been treacherously locked up in the second radar station.

[Zagvozdin] Sablin also fooled, intimidated, or deceived the sailors. For example, he promised the senior servicemen immediate discharge to the reserve on their arrival in Kronshtadt if they would unquestioningly obey his instructions. And they did so until they realized where it was leading. It soon became clear to them all as service members that Sablin had transgressed to the point where it could not be called anything but a crime. Therefore, the sailors themselves freed the ship's commander. Incidentally, today nothing has changed in the assessment of such military crimes. The articles of the law that he violated exist and are in force because they are necessary.

[Correspondent] Oleg Andreyevich, you were a captain at the time you interrogated Sablin.

[Dobrovolskiy] Yes, I was part of the investigative group, and was involved solely with him.

[Correspondent] What impression did he make on you, and how did the investigation go?

[Dobrovolskiy] He was calm, and did not change his political views. In general, for practical purposes he had worked at political work for just two years after graduating from the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, to which he had come from a line position. By specialty Sablin was an gunnery officer. And he was sorry about what he had done. He had long prepared to realize his plan, since 1973, but apparently he did not evaluate it from the standpoint of the law, but was caught up in his ideas and did not perceive his real responsibility. Here is what he told the sailors: "Don't be frightened of the consequences if we fail. By Soviet law I will receive up to 5 years for disobeying the order of a superior, but you will obey my orders..." That is, he believed practically in the impunity of his actions. Experts confirmed

that he was healthy, but I think he played a role with which he had become obsessed. One day he told me that at one time Lenin had the pseudonym "Sablin". And he saw this as an omen for himself.

[Correspondent] Sablin turned his ideas and his disagreement into a criminal form. This is unacceptable for any man, especially for a service member, let alone an officer.

[Dobrovolskiy] After all, even now some people disagree with some things. Well, if some commander decides to "move" his military unit to implement his political views? This is absurd. And I believe that the Sablin case, since it is arousing the interest of some at present, should serve as a warning: no political motives can be a justification for criminal, socially dangerous deeds.

Shkadov On Public Attitude Toward Military

90UM0576A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 May 90 p 3

[Article by General of the Army I. Shkadov, "We Have Broken the Wings of War"]

[Text] Recently I visited Berlin on business related to writing of the All-Union Memorial Book. I also visited the building of the former engineering school at Karlshorst, where the books were finally closed on the war against fascism. Now there is a museum there dedicated to the Battle for Berlin and the signing of the document of unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany. I also visited the fraternal cemeteries, where rest the remains of Soviet soldiers fallen in battles of the last days of the Great Patriotic War. I remembered many things. Very many...

The Great Patriotic War found me in the post of regimental deputy chief of staff for intelligence in the 108th tank division of the Bryansk front.

I was not aware of the strategic situation at the war fronts, but I did know that in ours, the Bryansk front, the German 2nd Tank Group of General Guderian was racing into a breach formed in the defensive zone of the 13th Army. At that point the commanding general of the front, General A. Yeremenko, committed our tank division to the battle to repel the assault.

An encounter battle ensued in which the division's 250 tanks opposed around 500 enemy tanks. We knew that our T-34s and KVs, which were in the arsenal of the division, were better than the main German T-4s. As a result of well-considered, tactically competent actions by commanders of all levels, the bravery of the tankers, and the good qualities of the equipment, we managed to almost completely destroy the German 17th Tank Division, the first to join battle with us.

I not only saw these fierce battles and participated directly in them, but after the heroic death of the commander, and then the chief of staff, for three days I discharged the duties of regimental commander.

These days you sometimes read certain lively 'historians' and don't understand what war they are writing about. They say that we fought badly, "with numbers rather than with ability," and that men died for nothing.

This is not true. We also fought with ability. I allude to what I saw. In November 1941, in the region of Novomoskovsk, a composite group consisting of 12 KV tanks, 7 light tanks, and an infantry company, which I was ordered to command, repelled the attacks of superior forces for three days, destroying 19 tanks and killing several hundred soldiers and officers.

Two platoon leaders and I were awarded Orders of Lenin, and around 20 comrades received other orders and medals. At that time, in forty-one, such commendations were very rare.

Were there miscalculations on our part? Yes there were. And I saw them both on a tactical and on an operational scale. But in studying the history of wars and military art both before the war and after, I somehow cannot recall wars or battles in which commanders and leaders did not make miscalculations and even significant errors.

Often I have occasion to read that our strategic leadership incorrectly determined the axis of the main assault of the German fascist command. But then, by the laws of logic one must admit that it, this axis, was correctly chosen by the Hitlerite command. However, why was the blitzkrieg broken off, why did the enemy shift to the defense as a result of the Battle of Smolensk, and why was his 2nd Tank Group thrown from the west to the southwest axis? It is closer to the truth to say that there were miscalculations on both sides.

From the pages of many scholarly and near-scholarly works and articles comes no explanation of the reasons why we retreated to Moscow in 1941, and to the Volga in 1942. This was a complex and multi-faceted problem. I dare hope that it will be comprehensively and objectively studied and fully presented in the new 10-volume edition of "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People." However, even though I held modest posts at the start of the war, I saw that we were fighting a well-trained and technically well-equipped army, and that we were significantly inferior to him in tanks, for example. Our main T-26 and VT tanks were weaker than the German T-4s, while there were few of the new T-34s and KVs, considered to be the best in the world. By the start of the war 1,255 T-34s had been produced, and 689 KVs, while the enemy had six thousand tanks, primarily T-4s.

Roughly the same thing occurred with respect to aviation. In the very first days of the war the Germans managed to destroy its main forces in the western fronts, right at the airfields. This explained their superiority in 1941 and the first half of 1942. Sometimes we watched with tears in our eyes as the "Messerschmitts" shot down our ground attack planes, which had flown without the protection of fighters.

I believe that the most difficult problem before the war and in its initial period was the problem of the command personnel, especially combined-arms personnel. For the sake of truth, I would like to tell why this happened. In 1937-1939, the Army shifted from a territorial system to a cadre system. In comparison with 1930 the number of cadre divisions had increased by a factor of ten, while the total numerical strength of the Armed forces grew more than three-fold. Associated with this there was a sharp increase in the need for command, political, and engineer and technical cadres. The unjustified repressions against command personnel, stemming from Stalin's cult of personality, also had a negative effect.

However the measures taken (according to figures from 1 January 1941), had manned the Ground Forces and Air Forces with 86 percent of their command personnel, and 100 hundred percent for the Navy. By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the resources of reserve officers had more than doubled in comparison with 1939, although the level of their military training was low.

From the first days of the war it became extremely clear that there were few well-trained command cadres in the Army with combat experience in leading large formations of forces. The year 1941 was the most difficult and important stage in resolving the problem of providing the Army and Navy with officer cadres. The losses of all categories of officer personnel were also great. Only in 1942 did we manage to fully staff the active Army with command cadres at all levels.

...At the end of 1941 I was appointed commander of a tank battalion and commanded it for a year in battles in the Kaluga region, on the Don, and at Stalingrad. I was wounded, but two months later was back in battle again. In November 1942 I took command of the 52nd Independent Tank Regiment, with which I traveled from Stalingrad to Hungary as part of the Stalingrad, Southern, Southwest, and Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts. In two years of fighting the regiment received the Red Banner and the Order of Suvorov.

In early 1945 I took command of a tank brigade. I had occasion to cooperate with many commanders of rifle and artillery regiments, divisions, and corps. Hence I have grounds for the statement that from the start of 1943 our active Army not only had first-class tanks and other combat equipment, but also a sufficient number of well-trained officer cadres.

Our victory in the Great Patriotic War over an enemy with powerful armed forces and military-economic potential was achieved at great cost—8,668 thousand dead, missing in action, captured and never returned from captivity, and dead from wounds, illness, or accidents. Of them, around a million officers and generals.

Along with the Army and Navy, all of our multinational Soviet people won the victory.

The officer cadres of the Army and Navy were developed in fierce battles with the German fascist hordes. These

including many talented military leaders, such as G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev, K. K. Rokossovskiy, A. M. Vasilevskiy, R. Ya. Malenkovskiy, and others. In most cases our military leaders were professionals in the highest sense of the word. They knew how to correctly and effectively use combat equipment and its power in battle, and flexibly to control their forces, which were equipped with many modern combat and technical assets. Of course they did not become masters all at once. But quickly. They were rushed by time, rushed by history.

In this regard, I must mention the sullyng of our Armed Forces and their glorious past in the press, movies, radio, television, and stage. Here the more vicious the insults, the more popular they are. Recently this defamation has become more subtle. As for instance: overall the Army deserves praise and attention, but the officers, especially the generals...

Today there remain fewer than 200 men in the Armed Forces who were participants in the Great Patriotic War.

And precisely this group of veterans of the Great Patriotic War, in anticipation of the 45th Anniversary of Victory, are most subjected to attacks. From the pages of OGONEK and other publications of that ilk they represent us generals as "mere soldiers," with the implication of "martinets" as well, and preach that we must also be political figures and diplomats. Indeed, can the authors really not know that our generals and officers had

grasped this back in the liberation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and when they took Berlin? Thousands of generals and officers provided international assistance to the armies of a number of states in developing their armed forces. And in most cases they displayed high political and diplomatic qualities, as was noted repeatedly by the leadership of the host countries.

There are constant "revelations" on the pages of OGONEK and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI depicting us as conservatives and Stalinists. Their correspondents roam with cameras through dachas and apartments of generals and marshals, revealing the "secrets" of their benefits and privileges. But not one of them even has even mentioned the fact that they are inhabited by men who spent half their lives in earthworks, trenches, bunkers, and tanks. Was that the "object," chosen when these smart dealers appeared, who receive incomes tens times or more higher than that of the marshals who built the "dacha-palaces?"

It is sad, by no means a cause of celebration, but a fact. We are certain, we hope, that all this is just a phenomenon of the times. But the glory of the Great Victory and our Armed Forces will live on for centuries. You see, we were the ones who defended the honor and independence of the Motherland, brought freedom to the peoples of Europe, and saved human civilization from the brown plague.

Pakistan's Nuclear Program Examined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 90
First Edition p 3

[Article by Col S. Bakov: "Nuclear Ambitions"]

[Text] Recently Pakistan has stepped up its work of creating nuclear weapons, for which the country's leaders are allotting substantial funds, and doing so even to the detriment of other military programs. It should be remembered that Islamabad's program for the development of the so-called "Islamic" atomic bomb was approved already by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Under that government the foundations of the corresponding scientific and technological base were laid. After the military, headed by Gen Zia-ul-Haq, seized power in the country in 1977, implementation of the nuclear military program in Pakistan was stepped up. Efforts in this direction are also continuing under the current government, headed by Benizar Bhutto.

From the beginning of the 1970s a program for developing its own nuclear weapons has been underway in Pakistan, code named Project 706. The Pakistanian nuclear scientist Abdul Kadir Khan is its leader. Within the framework of this program, the technology for obtaining weapons-grade uranium is being developed, and the industrial base for stockpiling it in the required quantities is being created. Undoubtedly, it is in connection with the use of atomic energy primarily for military purposes that the Pakistanis decline to place the majority of their atomic scientific research and industrial base facilities under monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to this day have not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

The nuclear center at Kakhut, 30 km east of Rawal Pindi, is an especially secret and protected facility, which is directly related to Pakistan's military nuclear program. In this center is a factory for the separation of uranium isotopes. The 10,000 gas centrifuges in the center operate around the clock on Islamabad's nuclear military program. According to evaluations by Western specialists, the Pakistanis were already able to assemble several nuclear weapons from the weapons grade uranium developed in Kakhut.

Judging by everything, the Pakistanis are not satisfied with the rate of development of weapons grade uranium, and to "correct" the situation have begun to assemble more productive equipment in Kakhut, as well as the construction of yet another factory for separation of uranium in the Golra area, 10 km west of Islamabad. Plans are to obtain a substantial amount of enriched uranium of high purity in the more modern gas centrifuges of this factory than those in Kakhut, which will make it possible to put the production of nuclear weapons "on stream."

Implementation of the nuclear program is supported by the presence in the country of uranium ore reserves assessed at 20,000 tons. Extraction is going on at uranium mines in the area of Dera-Gazi-Khan. Located here is a uranium enrichment factory created with assistance from

the FRG, with an annual capacity of 200 tons of uranium concentrate. According to calculations, weapons purity uranium for 16-24 nuclear weapons with an average yield of 20 kilotons can be obtained from this quantity of uranium raw materials during its subsequent processing.

It should be emphasized that Pakistan is also conducting an active search for sources for acquiring uranium raw materials abroad. A so-called "Organization For the Production of Special Works" has been created to purchase materials, raw materials and equipment needed by Pakistan's atomic industry.

Thus, over the last several years Pakistan has been able, using its scientific and technical base, to stockpile fissionable substances suitable for use in nuclear warhead devices. Whereas back five to seven years ago such assessments were always made with some qualifications, today this is no longer of any doubt even to the most careful specialists. In the figurative expression S. Solarz, U. S. Congressman, and chairman of the subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Ocean affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the statements by the Pakistani governments that their country is not engaged in the development of an atomic bomb, are "not worth the paper they are written on."

Pakistan's completion of development of its own tactical and operational-tactical missiles, with operating ranges of 80 and 300 km respectively, introduced substantial clarity into the assessment of the state of her nuclear capability. Range tests of these missiles, which were named Khatf-1 and Khatf-2 [phonetic], were conducted in early 1989. It is believed that these missiles can be used as nuclear weapons carriers. Pakistan can also use F-16 fighter-bombers obtained from the U. S. as such carriers. Reports have long been received about the Pakistanis refitting aircraft of this type as carriers of such weapons.

The example of Pakistan shows how dangerous the short-sighted, conniving policy of countries possessing nuclear missile technology, with respect to those states that are trying in any way to obtain nuclear weapons, may be to strategic stability and the cause of peace at the present stage. The lack of principles and thoughtlessness of all the recent American administrations, and those of several of its Western allies, are of the greatest regret in this plane.

It is known that the Symington-Glenn amendment to the law on military assistance to foreign states, approved by the U. S. Congress in 1976, forbids rendering this assistance to countries that are engaged in the development of their own nuclear weapons. Pakistan was on the list of these states. The U. S. CIA presented proof to the American leadership on this score. However, day to day interests of the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations associated with events surrounding Afghanistan, judging by everything, forced them knowingly to close their eyes to obvious instances of Islamabad's defiant non-observance of the conditions that it was to observe in order to obtain the tremendous assistance that the U. S. has been giving it in recent years. The heads of the American administrations,

knowing that the Pakistanis will never grant the United States authority to monitor their nuclear facilities, limited themselves to the "word of honor" of Pakistan's leaders that Islamabad was supposedly not working on its own military nuclear program.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, speaking on 29 March of this year at the annual session of Pakistan's atomic energy council, expressed satisfaction about the course of implementation of the country's nuclear program. Not

long before this, Munir Ahmad Khan, chairman of the government commission on atomic energy, was awarded one of Pakistan's highest orders.

All this indicates that Pakistan's plans in the nuclear field are being successfully implemented. What these plans are, to this day still remain largely a guess, but there can be no doubt that Pakistan's military nuclear program, with all of the ensuing dangerous consequences, is being successfully implemented.

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